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INTRODUCTION 
On I- February 1994 the Polish Europe Agreement, an association agreement 
concluded between- the EU and Poland, entered into force. ' Thi Is thesis provides 
an analysis of the implementation of that Agreement. It also evaluates Sabatier 
and Mazinanian's implementation framework and its relevance to EU external 
relations agreements! 
The Importance of -Implementation Theory 
It is vital that commentators consider notjust what the law claims or purports to 
do but also whether the law achieves its objectives, is the legislation effective ? 
It is clear that no universally accepted definition of effectiveness exists, either in 
general terms or with respect to EC law. Moreover, little empirical research- 
. rqlating to EC law exists. ' 
The debate on effectiveness has tended to concentrate on the importance of 
implementation as a means of securing effectiveness. One of the most influential 
studies in the area of implementation theory of EC law was that- undertaken at the 
European University Institute and published in 1988. ' This study took as its 
In this thesis the following terminology is used: 
Chapter one deals with the period between the 1950s and the 1980s. In this chapter 
reference is made to the European Economic Community (EEC). Thereafter, for 
convenience, all references are to the European Union (EU). Where reference is made to 
the "EU side" this relates to the EU and its Member States. Finally, reference is made 
throughout to European Community (EC) law as the EU does not, as yetý have legal 
personality. 
2 Daniel Mazinanian and Paul Sabatier, Effective Policy Implementation, (Lexington, 
1983). 
Francis Snyder, "The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, 
Tools and Techniques" 49 at p58 in T. Daintith (editor), Implementing EC Law in the. 
United Kingdom: Structuresfor Indirect Rule (J. Wiley, 1996). 
Sidentopf and Ziller (eds), Making guropean Policies Work., the Implementation of 
Community Legislation in the Member States, 2 Volumes (1988). 
1 
starting point a definition'of the political process as "a process of problem 
solving by the politico-administrative system". ' Throughout the study, the 
emphasis is therefore on implementation as being an integral part of the process 
of theýpolicy cycle. In this way a fi-amework for studying the implementation of 
EC law was' devised. It classified four phases: adoption, 4implementation, 
application and enforcement. Snyder has identified a number of problems with 
this study. ' First, it focused upon a top-down approach, emphasising the role of 
the policy-maker at the expense of other levels of government with decision- 
making power. Secondly, there may be many different levels of implementation 
and the theory did not always take account of these. Thirdly, implementation may 
rely on social as well as purely administrative or legal factors and this had been 
largely ignored. Snyder concluded by calling for a" different approach... in order 
to eventually elaborate a theoretical conception of Community law". He considers 
there to be three aspects to effectiveness: implementation, enforcement and 
compliance. This thesis focuses upon the first aspect of Snyder's effectiveness 
trinity: implementation. 
Implementation studies are central to our understanding of the law. This is no less 
valid for EC law than any. other type of legislation. - In general terms, the: 
implementation of EC law must begin with an examination-of the primary 
legislative provisions. Article 5 EC requires Member States to "take all 
appropriate measures whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the 
obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the 
institutions of the Community". As a consequence, Member States are under a 
duty to ensure that they have correctly implemented EC law. This would begin 
with an examination of whether the existing domestic legislation meets the EC 
5 Sidentopf and Ziller (eds), fn 4 above at p3. 
Seefn 3 above at p60. 
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standards. If not, new legislation may be required, existing legislation may require 
modification, secondary legislation may be necessary or perhaps achange in 
government agency practice is required! 
The field of European competition law provides a good lexample of the 
importance of implementation stu4y to EC law, both for the policy maker and for 
those to whom the policy is targeted. For example, the European Commission 
cannot be confident of developing effective competition policy unless it monitors 
the implementation of the legislative and non-legislative measures designed to 
secure the achievement of competition objectives. Businesses must know what 
the impact of the competition policy is in order successfully to compete in the 
market place. To this end, it is not sufficient merely to understand the legislative 
provisions but it is necessary to have a good working knowledge of how the 
Commission applies and interprets these rules on a day-to-day basis. In this way, 
the businesses may assess both the relative merits of complying with the 
competition rules and the possible costs of failing to comply with the competition 
regime. ' In this area of law it is not merely the legally binding provisions, the 
treaty articles, regulations, directives and decisions which are important. 
Commission practice (such as the issuing of comfort letters) or the issuing of 
notices are equally important to an understanding of how the competition policy 
is implemented. 
In the context of European external relations the issue of implementation is 
equally relevant. European external relations have evolved slowly since the 
For an analysis of the implementation of EC law in the UK see, Lynn E Ramsey, "The 
Copy Out Technique: More of a 'Cop Out' than a Solution T' (1996) 17. Statute Law 
Review 218. 
See for example, A. Brown, "Notification: Whether to Submit to the Flawed System" 
(1992) 17 ELR 323. 
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inception of the treaties. ' Legal analysis has largely focused upon the issue of 
competence in external affairs and the related issue of power-sharing between the 
institutions. In addition, many commentators have considered the scope and 
nature of external relations agreements. In general there has been little work 
carried out which considers the effectivenbss of external relatlions agreements. 
Some commentators have attempted to analyse the impact of agreements on trade 
and development. " 
Others have attempted to predict the impact of agreements upon associated 
states. " Such academic works are invaluable in the development of a critical 
understanding of European external relations. 
This thesis aims to provide an additional dimension to legal studies in the field 
of external relations. It is difficult to analyse the effectiveness of European 
external relations policy without first understanding in what ways and to what 
extent existing agreements have been implemented. Similarly, the continued and 
developed use of the association agreement as a foreign policy tool cannot be 
properly evaluated without implementation studies first having been carried out. 
Within the context of relations with the Central and Eastern European . States 
(CEES) this is particularly important since the association agreement concluded 
with the Visegrad states, (Poland, Hungary and the former Czechoslovakia) the 
Europe Agreement has been adopted as a model in agreements with other- CEES. 
Any analysis of the effectiveness of the EU response to the CEES must be based 
upon analysis of the implementation of these agreements. Moreover, accession 
9 See A. G. Toth, Oxford Encyclopaedia of European Community Law (OUP, 1990), 
pp256-271. See generally, I Macleod, I. D. Hendry and Stephen Hyettý The External 
Relations ofthe European Communities (Clarendon Press, 1996); Dominic Mc Goldrick, 
International Relations ofthe European Union (Longman, 1997). 
to See for example, Addo "A Critical Analysis of the Perennial International Economic LaNv 
Problems of EEC-ACP Relationship" (1990) GerYIL 33. 
See for example, Elizabieta Katvecka-: Wyrzykowska "Po! and's Trade Relations with the 
European Community" (1993) 2 Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 21. 
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to the EU is in part dependent upon progress towards successful implementation 
of the Europe Agreement. A subsidiary, but none the less important, justification 
for the need for imP*Iýmentation studies in the field of external relations is 
accountability. The objectives of many association agreements are often 
supported by EU funding. The correct implementation of these agreements is part 
of the effective deployment of EU financial resources. 
Theoretical Framework 
This thesis argues that a tripartite framework based upon a modified Sabatier and 
Mazmanian framework, power imbalance and institutional considerations may 
be employed in order to analyse the implementation of the Polish Europe 
Agreement: The framework which is developed identifies a number of variables 
which may have a direct impact upon the implementation of the Polish Europe 
Agreement. This framework is applied in order to assess the progress made in 
implementation to date. It is used to explain why implementation disputes have 
arisen and why the parties to the Agreement adopted certain negotiating- positions 
during the implementation disputes. The thesis argues that the implementation 
framework which has been developed- assists our understanding.. of the 
implementation of the Polish-Europe Agreement. In addition it argues that this 
implementation framework provides a useful basis for future analysis of 
European external relations agreements, particularly mixed agreements. 
Sabalier and Mazinanian 
- This thesis adopts Sabatier and Mazmanian's classic work on the implementation 
of public policy as the basis for its theoretical framework. Sabatier and 
Mazinanian divide their analysis of implementation into three broad categories: 
1. The tractabi4problems; 
2. The ability of the statute to structure implementation; and 
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3. Non-statutory variables. 
Within these three býolad categories Sabatier and Mazmanian have identified a 
number of varýables which, they believe, impact upon implementation. 
This. 1hesis analyses the Sabatier and Mazinanian framework in order to test the 
relevance of its application to the Polish Europe Agreement. The conclusions 
reached result in modifications to Sabatier and Mazmanian's fi-amework. It is this 
modified fi-amework which is then tested against the progress and experience of 
implementing the Polish Europe Agreement. In this way it is possible to develop 
a theoretical framework which may be employed to analyse the Polish Europe 
Agreement and other external relations agreements. 
Power Imbalance 
This thesis argues that the asymmetry of power between the parties to the Europe 
Agreement has direct and important consequences for the implementation of the 
Polish Europe Agreement. Chapter two analyses the relative power of Poland and 
the EU-side vis-a-vis the. Europe Agreement. The analysis is based upon a 
rational actor thesis which assumes that all states aim to act in a way which 
maximises their positiohs. This thesis argues that the outcomes of the process of 
negotiating the Polish Europe Agreement reflects the power. imbalance of the 
parties to the Agreement. This is consistent with writers such as Moravcsik. " 
Moravcsik argues that "interstate bargaining outcomes are decisively shaped by 
the relative power of nation-states. "13 Asymmetry of power is assessed using the 
Nash bargaining theory which asserts that where power imbalance between states 
exists then ft state which benefits most from an agreement, relative to their best 
unilateral and coalitional. alternatives to the agreement, tends to offer the greater 
12 Andrew Moravcsik, the Choicefor Europe, (UCL, 1999). 
13 Andrew Moravcsik, fn 12 above at p7. 
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compromises in order to achieve it. "' This thesis tests the concept of power 
imbalance within the Polish Europe Agreement using Galanter's work on the 
impact of the 'structure- of the legal system upon the ability of the law to attain 
redistributive change. 
This, thesis demonstrates that power imbalance directly determines the nature, 
scope and content of the Polish Europe Agreement. It also analyses how the 
effects of power imbalance at the negotiating stage continue to impact upon the 
Agreement at the implementation stage. 
Institutional Considerations 
It may have been tempting to have approached analysis of the Europe Agreement 
from an institutionalist perspective or, alternatively, to have assessed the 
Agreement in terms of integration theory. Neither approach would have proved 
a truly rounded picture of the complexities of the process of integration. This 
thesis accepts the premise that "institutions matter" and demonstrates how the 
non-unitary nature of the EU directly impacts upon the implementation process. " 
Chapter seven describes in detail the implementation disputes which have taken 
place, some of which have arisen due to the*division of competences. between the 
EU and its member states and the difficulties which result when the-objectives of 
these two parties conflict. This thesis also demonstrates the complexity of both 
the EU and Polish organisations in chapter six. The complexity of the EU 
institutional structures undermines the ability of the Polish side to negotiate 
effectively at both the drafting and implementation stage. 
14 Nash J, "The Bargaining Probl 1950) Econometrica 155; Nash J, "Non-cooperative 
Games" (1951) Annuals of Mat e atics 286; Nash J, "Two-person Cooperative agmes" 
(1953) Econometrica 128. For recent analysis of Nash see generally John F Nash Jr, 
Essays in Game Theory (Edward Elgar, 1996); Osborne M. and A. Rubenstein, 
Bargaining and Markets (San'Diego Academic Press, 1990); and. Osborne M and A. 
Rubenstein, A Course in Game Theory (MIT Press, 1994). 
Laura Cram, Policy-making in the EU Conceptual Lenses and the Integration Process 
(Routledge, 1997) at p27. 
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Writing on the new institutionalism has been concerned not with implementation 
but with policy formblation. It is acce ted that the process of implementing the ,P 
Europe Agre&ment is partly concerned with policy formulation because in certain 
areas *the text of the Agreement establishes only a framework for cooperation 
which requires the detail of that cooperation to be agreed later. I4owever, focusing 
solely upon this aspect using an institutionalist Perspective may reduce the 
importance given to other factors which impact upon the process of 
implementation such as the importance of the text to the Europe Agreement. The 
work of Sabatier and Mazmanian demonstrates the dangers of an analysis which 
does not give due importance to the role of the text in the implementation 
process. Chapters seven and eight demonstrate the importance of non-institutional 
and non-policy issues to the process of implementation. 
Similarly, an analysis developed solely on the grounds of integration theory 
ignores broader variables, such as the power imbalance between the parties. This 
thesis analyses the power imbalance between Poland and the EU side in the 
process of negotiation and implementation. Chapter two discusses the factors 
which both contribute to and reinforce this imbalance. First, Poland is 
economically weaker than the EU and. from, the 1980s has sought and received 
financial assistance from the EU. This is discussed in chapters one and two. 
Secondly, Poland's desire to join the EU was made explicit at the very outset of 
the negotiations. The EU side have been able to conduct negotiations knowing 
that the prize of EU membership is Poland's ultimate goal. 
Chapters two and seven demonstrates how the EU side exploited Poland's desire 
for membership to give them a bargaining advantage in both the negotiation and 
implementation process. Thirdly, the EU side are very experienced in negotiating 
association agreements. This advantage is reinforced by the EU side's ability to 
conduct negotiations in English using a draft agreement prepared by the 
Commission These factors both create and reinforce the power imbalance 
between the parties. 
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This thesis therefore is concerned with the broader issue of implementation rather 
than concentrating piirely upon institutionalism or integration theory. 
Thesis Structure 
This thesis begins by explaining ýhe significant legal and political developments 
in relations between Poland and the EU from the cold war period until the 
concluýion of the negotiations for the Europe Agreement. Chapter two uses 
Galanter's work in order to highlight the power imbalance between the parties to 
the Europe Agreement. Chapter three then provides a detailed evaluation of 
Sabatier and Mazmahian's framework and proposes a modified implementation 
in the light of this evaluation. Together chapters two and three provide the 
theoretical fi-amework used to analyse the implementation process in this thesis. 
Chapters four and seven evaluate the overall progress made in the implementation 
of the Europe Agreement. These chapters examine: the adoption of legally 
binding and autonomous legal measures; the significance of the Europe 
Agreement text for the implementation process; the structures which exist to 
implement the Europe Agreement; and implementation disputes. Sabatier and 
Mazmanian's fi-amework is then analysed in relation to the analysis and evidence 
gathered in this thesis. Galanter's work is used to understand the impact of the 
power imbalance between the parties on the implementation process. The thesis 
concludes by highlighting the issues which have played a crucial role in shaping 
the implementation of the Polish Europe Agreement. It proposes an 
implementation fi-amework which may be used in future studies on the 
. implementation of EU external relations agreements. 
Chapter Outlines 
Chapter one examines the developments in legal and political relations between 
the then EEC and Poland from the post war period until the period preceding the 
negotiations for the Polish Europe Agreement. It highlights the progress made in 
these relations. It begins by analysing the cold war period when there was non- 
recognition of the EEC by the USSR and, therefore, by Poland. It examines the 
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small-scale sectoral agreements concluded in the 1960s and the adoption of the 
so-called "autonomoiis trade policy" by the EEC. It explains the importance of 
the joint declaration on mutual recognition to the development of legal and 
political relations between the EEC and Poland. The chapter also considers the 
importance of internal political Oevelopments within Poland. It concludes by 
examining the first generation agreements and three autonomous developments: 
PHARE, the EBRD and Tempus. 
/-negotiations 
for the Polish Europe Agreement. This Chapter two examines the 
provides an importani basis for this thesis for three reasons. First, it analyses the 
negotiating process highlighting a number of conflicts and explaining how they 
were resolved. These patterns and strategies are later reflected in the 
implementation disputes discussed in chapter seven. Secondly, it uses Galanter's 
framework-to understand the power imbalance between the parties and how this 
shaped the negotiations process. Finally, it examines how the final text agreed 
between the parties reflects the conflicts which took place during the negotiation 
process. The analysis of the power imbalance between the parties is central to a 
full understanding of the implementation process and is further analysed in 
chapter eight. 
Chapter three examines the implementation framework used in this thesis. It 
begins with an examination of why Sabatier and Mazmanian's framework is - 
relevant to this thesis. It analyses'their framework-, applying it to the Polish 
Europe Agreement. It concludes by describing a modified version of the Sabatier 
and Mazmanian's framework which may be used to analyse the Polish Europe 
Agreement. 
Chapter four examines the developments in Polish-EU relations from the 
adoption of the interim agreement on I March 1992 to the start of official pre- 
accession negotiations on 30 March 1998. It discusses the complexity of 
measures which now regulate Polish-EU relations. In particular, it highlights the 
10 
distinqtion between the adoption of binding legal measures, such as the interim 
agreement and the Europe Agr eement, and autonomous legal measures such as 
the structured relationship, the Commission's White Paper on the Single Market 
and Agenda 2000. It concludes that the complex structure of measures which has 
evolved has direct implications for the implementation of the Europe Agreement. 
Chapter five analyses the text of the Polish Europe Agreement. It examines each 
aspect in turn: legal basis and form; political dialogue and institutions of 
association; free movement of trade; movement of workers; right of 
establishment; provision of services; financial cooperation; competition 
provisions and state aids; the approximation of legislation; economic cooperation; 
cultural cooperation; and financial cooperation. It highlights four ways in which 
the text of the Europe Agreement may create difficulties for implementation: 
1. The Agreement. articles vary considerably in level of detail and a number 
of provisions are ambiguous or lacking in precision; 
2. The Agreement contains a number of provisions which permit the parties 
to derogate from their obligations; 
3. The Agreement contains a number of provisions. which permit 
consultation to take place on issueg beyond the scope of the text; and 
4. The Agreement contains a number of provisions which are based upon 
EC law standards. 
Chapter six examines the structures which have evolved to implement the Polish 
.- 
Europe Agreement. It examines four categories of implementation structure: 
Polish; Joint Polish/EU; EU; and Member State. It concludes by stressing that the 
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complex range of implementation structures and implementation processes is 
constantly evolving. This creates two problems: the need for coordination within 
structures and the need for coordination between structures. 
Chapter seven examines implementation disputes which have tVýCen place in five 
sectors: tanneries; oil; steel; cars and citrus fruit. It identifies root causes of 
disputes and the triggers which propel a minor dispute into a major trade dispute 
which are common to all five disputes. It examines the impact of these common 
roots and triggers upon the implementation process. 
Chapter eight provides the conclusion to this thesis. It begins with an overall 
evaluation of progress in implementing the Europe Agreement to date. It then 
applies the modified Sabatier and Mazinanian framework, developed in chapter 
three, to the analysis of the Europe Agreement provided in this thesis. It suggests 
a number of additions -which should be made to the modified framework. In 
particular, it stresses the need to develop an understanding of the impact of any 
power imbalance between the parties upon the implementation process and uses 
Galanter's framework to assess relative power. The chapter proposes a number 
of solutions to some of the. implementation difficulties which have arisen. -It also - 
uses the implementation fi-amework to explain why implementation disputes have 
taken place and why they have evolved in particular directions. 
Some Comments on Methodology 
The Polish Europe Agreement is a mixed agreement which seeks to establish, 
inter alia, a free trade area between the parties. For this reason, the 
implementation process deals with issues which are highly sensitive both 
economically and politically. There is very little official information relating to 
the implementation disputes publicly available. This thesis, therefore draws 
heavily upon information obtained in interviews conducted with implementing 
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officials and experts. These interviews were unstructured- and each lasted 
between 30 to 60 minutes. They were followed up by letters, faxes and telephone 
calls. A list of the interviews is provided in tables one and two below. 
NWIst access to printed material may have been very restricted' many officials, 
particularly Polish officials, felt able to talk frankly about the implementation 
process.. The information obtained from these interviews was used to build up a 
detailed picture of- 
1. The implementation structures and processes which have evolved; 
2. The evolution of implementation disputes; and 
3. The dispute resolution strategies anclýpositions adopted by the parties. 
A second area of research difficulty arose in relation to Polish public law. To date 
there are no texts available in English which'deal in any depth with Polish 
constitutional and'administrative law. In addition, there is no official English 
translation of the new Polish constitution. The analysis in this thesis, particularly 
in chapter six, is largely based on an unofficial translation of the Polish 
constitution by Albert Pol and Andrew Caldwell which is unpublished. 
The importance of this attempt to, use primary resources, wherever possible, 
should be stressed. Researchers examining European integration have become 
increasingly criticised for their failure to rely on primary sources. Too often 
writers pursue a postfacto analysis where the rationale for state behaviour is 
inferred rather than attempting to discover from the actors themselves what really 
happened. This thesis focuses upon the importance of the text of the Europe 
Agreement and attempts wherever possible to interview the actors involved in the 
13 
implementation process. 16 
This thesis represents the law as at 31 March 1998. 
TabIe One: Interview details (Brussels) 
23 September 1996 Geoffrey Harris, Secretary to the EU-Poland Joint 
Parliamentary Committee. 
24 September 1996 Krzysztof Treczynski, Counsellor, Polish Mission to the EU. 
24 September 1996 -John Bell, Counsellor, DG IA. 
25 September 1996 Jorgen Mordenstein, Centre for European Policy Studies. 
27 September 1996 Etienne Claeyer, Director, PHARE for Poland. 
27 September 1996 Richard Jones, UK Permanent Representation to the ý. U. 
__j 
16 See for example Andrew Moravcsik, fn 12 at ppl. 2-13; Peter Ludlow, "Recasting the 
European Political System, 1950-1996, " CEPSRevieiv I (Summer 1996) 25-33; Alan S. 
Milward, "Conclusion: The Value of History" in Milward et al. The Frontier ofArational 
Sovereignty: History and Theory 1945-1992 (London, 1993), 197-198. 
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Table Two: Interview details (Poland) 
ý3 October 1996 Michel Pireti, PHARE, EU Delegation to Poland. 
23 October 1996 Leszek Kieniewicz, Secretary to the Polish Delegation to the 
EU-Poland Joint Parliamentary Committee. j 
23 October 1996 Anna Grupinska, Secretary to the Polish Delegation to the 
EU-Poland Joint Parliamentary Committee. - 
25 October 1996 Piotr Babinski, Senior Secretary, Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Sejm. 
25 October 1996 Anna Tuz, Secretary to the Polish Delegation to the EU- 
Poland Joint Parliamentary Committee. 
28 October 1996 Dorata Bartyzel, Deputy Editor in Chief and Managing 
Editor, The Warsaw Voice. 
29 October 1996 Jan Borkowski, Under Secretary, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
29 October 1996 Dieter Birkenmaier, Second Secretary, EU Delegation to 
Poland. 
30 October 1996 Marek Tabor, Senior Officer, Department of European 
Integration. 
4 November 1996 Jan Willem Blankert, Head of the, 'EU 
Delegation to Poland. 
5 November 1996 Pawel Samecki, Director of Bureau of Foreign Assistance, 
Department of European Integration. 
6 November 1996 Alan Mayhew, Department of European Integration. 
6 November 1996 Eugeniusz. Piontek, Professor of Law, University of Warsaw. 
7 November 1996 Macieji Gorka, Lawyer, Department of European Integration. 
7 November 1996 John Mc Clintock, Second Secretary with responsibility for 
environment and agriculture, EU Delegation to Poland. 
7 November 1996 Maria Ptoszynska, task manager for the environment, EU 
Delegation to Poland. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Legal and Political Relations from the Cold War 
to the First Generation Agreements 
Introduction 
The map describing Poland's location within Europe has altered dramatically 
over the course of its tumultuous history. Its borders have been drawn, sometimes 
erased, and redrawn. Yet today Poland is situated in a position which Norman 
Davies claims to have been constantly, at "the heart of Europe". ' This description 
applies not merely to its physical location but to the political and spiritual 
position which Poland holds in today's Europe. 
The country sits with the Baltic sea and Russia to its north. To its west lies 
Germany (the former German Democratic Republic, GDR), to its south lies the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia (formally the single country of Czechoslovakia) and 
to its east lies the Ukraine, B elarus and Lithuania ( which were all formally par-t 
of the USSR). Poland covers-a land area. of 311,904 square kilometra-of which 
60% is agricultural land and. 28% is forests. ' The capital city, Warsaw, lies 
towards the east of the country and has a population of 1,638,3002 
This chapteýr-will examine the development of legal and political- relations 
between the then European Economic Community (EEC) and the Peoples 
. 
Republic of Poland from the post war period until the years -preceding the 
Norman Davies, The Heart ofEurope: A Short History of Poland (Oxford University 
Press, 1986). For a fuller picture of the Polish position within European history see 
Norman Davies, Europe: A History (Oxford University Press, 1996). For a detailed 
analysis of Polish history see Norman Davies, God's Playground: A History of Poland, 
Volumes I and II (Oxford University. Press, 198 1); see also Adam Zamoyski, The Polish 
Way, (John Murray, 1987). 
The Economist Intelligence Unitý "Country Profile 1996-97: Poland" at p2. 
The Economist Intelligence Unitfn 2 above at p2. 
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negotiations for the signing of the Polish Europe Agreement. It will describe the 
dramatic changes in relations from the non-recognition of the EEC by the USSR 
through to the concitksion of legally binding agreements. It will analyse the 
adoption of a number of autonomous measures by the EEC during this period, 
including different funding and trade initiatives. The chapter Oill also place in 
context internal political developments in Poland, focusing in particular on the 
progress towards democratic government. 
Poland After World War 2 
After the second world war Poland found itself to the east of the iron curtain and, 
therefore, a member of the Soviet block, under the political control of the 
Soviets. ' It became a member of the Warsaw Pact when that organisation was 
established in 1955. The Polish economy was also under strict Soviet control. The 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) was established in Moscow 
on 8 January 1949. Initially its purpose was to help "build socialism" using Soviet 
methods. ' Essentially the Polish economy was based upon a centrally-planned 
model where prices were deten-nined by a gove7iment body and not by market 
forces, currency was not convertible and foreign trade was a peripheral activity 
where production surplus was exchanged in order to make up for any deficiencies 
within the planned econoMy. 6 By the 1960s, the Soviet economic strategy had 
altered slightly, principal ly as a result of the failure of the Stalinist model to 
achieve economic success but also in response to the achievements of the EEC. ' 
Norman Davies, Europe: A History ( Oxford University Press, 1984) at pI 089 et sec. See 
also Frances Millard, The Anatomy of the New Poland ( Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited, 1994) ppl-28. 
Nonnan Daviesý fn 4 above at pI 10 1. 
John Maslen, 
. 
"The European Community's Relations with ihe State-Trading 
Countries: 1981-1983" (1984) Yearbook of European Law 323 at pp 324-325. 
7 Nonnan Davies, fn 4 above at p 1104.. 
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The new approach sought to enhance the profile of the CMEA as the body 
coordinating joint planning. Edch member state was given a specific area of 
responsibility with varying degrees of success! 
Early. Relations between the EEC and the CMEA 
During this period relations between the EEC and the CMEA were frosty. Each 
failed to recognise the other and the CMEA dismissed the EEC as "the economic 
arm of NATO". 9 The Soviet Union participated in anti- EEC propaganda, 
attempted to prevent the EEC from acceding to international agreements and 
organisations and prevented the establishment of EEC diplomatic missions. " In 
1957 the Soviet Review Kommunist published seventeen theses on the Common 
Marketjustifying Soviet opposition to the EEC. " In 1962 Pravda published thirty 
two theses on imperialist integration in Western Europe. Whilst the theses were 
still very critical of the EEC they did not exclude economic cooperation and, 
more importantly, they implicitly recognised the reality of the EEC. 12 In 1963 an 
aide-memoire from the EEC to the Soviet Union concerning tariff reductions 
indirectly proposed a normalization of relations but little resulted from this 
overture. 13 
For example, the Hungarian economy appeared to thrive when limited free markets were 
introduced in the agricultural sector whereas the German Democratic Republic, Romania 
and Bulgaria resisted the new approach. 
Dian Thomson, "Relations Between the EC and Eastern Europe" (1990) European Access 
34 at p34; Lynn E Ramsey, "The Implications of the Europe Agreements for an 
Expanded European Union" (1995) ICLQ 161 at 161; John Maslen, "The European 
Community's Relations with the State-Trading Countries: 1981-1983" (1994) Yearbook 
of European Law 323 at pp324-326. 
10 John Maslen, "The European Community's Relations with the State-Trading Countries 
of Europe 1984-86" (1986) Yearbook of European Law, 335 at 335. See also John 
Maslen, fn 9 above at p325. 
11 . Bull EC 2-1976, point 1202. 
12 Bull EC 2-1976, point 1202. 
13 Bull EC 2-1976, point 1202. 
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Relations between the EEC and Poland 
Poland was restricted both legally and diplomatically from developing its own 
links with either the. EEC or any of its constituents. The supremacy of the 
Communist party and Poland's alliance with the Soviet Union was formally 
enshrined by a constitutional amendment in February 1976. Tle effect was to 
protect the position of the Soviet Union so that any attempt to alter the position 
of the Soviet Union would be declared unconstitutional. " Moreover, the Polish- 
Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Aid and Cooperation signed on 21 April 
1945 and renewed in 1965 ensured that Poland's ability to act independently was 
almost impossible by-providing that the Soviet Union had the power to interpret 
any Polish action as "unfriendly" and therefore liable to incur penalties. " In short, 
the constitutional amendments and the Treaty enshrined the supremacy of the 
Soviet Union in Poland's internal and external affairs. 
Despite this, some small-scale sectoral agreements were concluded. The first 
bilateral agreements between the EEC and individual CMEA states were 
concluded in the 1960s. " They amounted to voluntary restraint agreements and 
basically consisted of an agreement on the part of the EEC not to charge 
additional levies on the import of certain products provided that the QMEA state. 
did not export below a given price. The first of these agreements was concluded 
with Poland in 1965 and concerned egg imports. " The development of the 
14 Nonnan Davies, The Heart of Europe: A Short History of Poland (Oxford University 
Press, 1984) at pp38-39. 
15 The penalties were provided in the Polish Constitution. 
16 See generally, John Pinder, The European Community and Eastern Europe (Pinter 
Publishers, 1991) at ppIO-1 1. 
17 Pýeg 54/65 of 7 April 1965, OJ 1965 L59/65. Similar agreements were also concluded 
with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania. 
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Common Agricultural Policy, which regulates a common price policy for the 
import and export of agricultural goods, had necessitated the conclusion of this 
type of agreement. " . 
Relations between-the EEC and the CMEA During the 1976s 
Initial contacts between the EEC and the CMEA took place in 1972 during the 
period of Brezhnev's leadership of the Soviet Union; Brezhnev issued statements 
recognising the "realities" in Europe. " The European Parliament responded 
confmning that the EEC `had always been prepared to recognise the realities in 
other parts of the world". " The Conference of Heads of State or Government 
within the EEC, meeting the same year, noted its determination to "promote a 
policy of cooperation with other countries of Eastern Europe". ". On February 16 
1976 there was a meeting between the Council President and the CMEA 
Chairman where the CMEA delivered a message proposing an agreement on 
relations between the two organisations. " A series of contacts, high level 
meetings and experts meetings took place between this time and December 1980 
but it was almost inevitable that little would emerge from the negotiations since 
each side's negotiating position diametrically opposed the other. " The Soviets 
wished to conclude a block-to-block agreement, whereas the EECwished to. enter 
into agreements with individual-CMEA states. Moreover, the Soviets wished the 
The Common Agricultural Policy was introduced for most agricultural goods by the end 
of the transitional period on I January 1970. However even where there was no common 
organisation the national rules were governed by the EEC provisions on free movement 
of goods; 48/74 Charmass9n [1974] ECR 1783. 
19 Bull ECI 1-1974, pointl30L 
20 Bull EC 6-1972, point 2330. 
21 Bull EC 10-1972, point 13. 
22 Bull EC'2-1976, point 1201. 
23 Council communique on relations between the EEC and the CMEA states, Bull EC 1976- id, point 1301; Meetings took place in 1977,1978,1979, Bull EC 1979-9, point 2.243, 
Pull EC 1978-5, point 2.268; Bull EC 1978-11, point 2.2.60, Bull EC 1979-11, point 
2.2.55; Three experts meetings were held in 1980, Bull EC 1980-3, point, 2.2.64, Bull 
EC 1980-7/8, point 2.2.64, Bull EC 1980-10, point 2.2.63. 
20 
agreement with the EEC to be detailed, ensuring the CMEA states would act 
within the political liqlits which it had negotiated. The EEC wanted to conclude 
only a fi-ameWork agre. ement with the CMEA leaving it the freedom to conclude 
more Oetailed trade and cooperation agreements with individual CMEA states. 
Toward the Autonomous Trade Policy 
The EEC's power to develop trade relations and conclude agreements is derived 
from A'rticles 110-115 LC. Article 113 provides for the establishment of a 
common commercial policy (CCP), "based on uniform principles, particularly 
with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade 
agreements, the achievement of uniformity. in measures of liberalisation, export 
policy and measures to protect trade such -as those to be taken in the case of 
dumping orsubsidies". The CCP was to be in place by the end of a twelve year 
transitional period at which point the EEC would have exclusive competence to 
24 conclude trade arrangements. On 27 June 1969 the Council received a 
Commission proposal for a regulation establishing common arrangements for 
21 
products imported without quantitative restrictions from state-trading countries. 
The Regulation established a common list of products to be imported without 
quantitative restrictions. Provision was made to suspend the operation of the.. 
regu at on where the Community's interests were threatened, although it was 
anticipated that this would only be necessary in exceptional cases. " The 
regulation was adopted by the Council on 20 December 1969'. " 
24 The twelve year transitional period ended on 31 December 1969. 
25 Bull EC 8-1969, point 109. The Central and East European countries described by the 
EEC as "state-trading countries" were Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Romania, 
Czechoslovakia, the GDR and the USSR; Regulation 1765/82. 
26 Seqfn 25 above. This prediction turned out to have been correct. There were relatively 
few instances of the operation of these measures under the Regulation. See Marc 
Maresceau, "A General Survey of the Current Legal Framework of Trade Relations 
Between the European Community and Eastern Europe", in Marc Maresceau (ed), The 
Political and Legal Framework of Trade Relations Between the European Community 
and Eastern Europe (Martinus Nijhoff, 1989). 
27 109/70, OJ 1970 L 19/109. See also Bull EC 2-1970, point 77 
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- Not alý products were covered by the 1969 ReguIation; the products most 
sensitive to Member States were excluded. The Regulation did evolve, albeit not 
expansively, and wassubject to a number of amendments. The essence of the 
Regulation was to bring the EEC's position in respect of state-trading countries 
more closely in line with the CCP. -1 
In the absence of official relations between the EEC and the CMEA states it was 
decided that bilateral agreements concluded between the EEC Member States 
and the CMEA states could be negotiated until the end of 1972 at which point 
they would either have expired or would be deemed to have expired at the end of 
28 December 1974. From the beginning of 1975 the EEC assumed responsibility 
21 from its Member States for the trade agreements with the CMEA states. Trade 
negotiations with the CMEA states were to be led by the EEC under the 
leadership of the Commission. 
In November 1974 the Commission sent an outline agreement to a number of 
State-trading countries indicating a number of areas for potential trade between 
the Community and the recipient state. " The agreements envisaged were long- 
term, non-preferential and - reciprocal. They were to include, Most-Favoured; 
Nation (MFN) status, safeguard mechanisms and Joint Committees. 
The absence of a response to the outline agreement prompted the EEC to adopt 
a course of action which would be called the "autonomous trade policy". The 
policy had a number of elements. First, MFN treatment was granted in respect of 
28 Bull EC 11-1974 point 1301. See also, John Maslen, "The European Community's 
Relations with State Trading Countries of Europe 1981-1983" (1983) Yearbook of 
European Law 324 at p325. 
29 Council decision 74/652/EEC of 2 December 1974. OJ 1974 L 358/1, replaced by 
Council Decision 75/2 1 O/EEC of 27 March OJ 1975 L99/1. 
30 The agricultural sector was not excluded. 
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tariffs 0 all CMEA states. " Secondly, the EEC assumed responsibility for import 
quotas which had previously been negotiated with Member States. Member States 
agreements with individual CMEA states had lists of import quotas. The quotas 
wer6 streamlined by the adoption of a Council Decision in December 1974 which 
brought all quotas for state-trading states together in a single legal instrument. " 
The quotas were amended annually thereafter. Thirdly, import conditions, 
primarily anti-dumping and anti-subsidy legislation, applied. " Fourthly, aspects 
of internal EEC policies affected trade with the CMEA states. " For example, the 
Common Agricultural Policy permits a large degree of control over levies applied 
to imports and exports to and from the EEC. 
Agreements between individual Member States and individual CMEA states 
continued to be negotiated after 1975. The relevant EEC legislation covering this 
type of situation is found in Council Decisions 69/494 and 74/393. The former 
Decision provides that Community procedures should govern trade and 
commercial agreements with third states; the Commission having responsibility 
for negotiating such agreements. The latter Decision created a system of prior 
consultation to ensure that agreements concluded between Member States and 
third states are compatible with EEC common policies. In this way,. Poland 
31 Poland was entitled to MFN status in any case by virtue of its membership of the GATT 
which itjoined in 1967; Protocol of Accession of Poland BISD 1967. Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Romania were also GATT members at that time. On Poland and the GATT 
and WTO generally see, Bohdan Boalorucki, "Poland in the GATT and the WTO" 1997 
(Spring) Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 73. 
32 OJ 1974 L358/1; Bull EC. 11-1974, point 1301; Bull EC 12-1974, point 2336. 
33 Regulation 3017/79 OJ 1979 L 339/1. 'Mere was some difficulty in gauging whether anti- 
dumping was taking place since the cost of production was either not known or was 
presented in a non-convertible currency. For an early example of an anti-dumping action 
against Poland see OJ 1972 C5 1/1 conceming urea imported into the EEC from Poland. 
34 See generally John Maslen, "The European Community's Relations with the State- 
Trading Countries" (1993) Yearbook of European Law 324 at 329. 
23 
concluded agreements with a number of Member States such as Germany and 
Italy but the Member States were requirdd to have Council approval before 
negotiations could begin. 
Towards Bilateral Agreements 
In the late 1970s and earlý 1980s steps began towards the conclusion of a number 
of limited bilateral cooperation agreements with the EEC in three sectors: 
agriculture; textiles and iron and steel. Poland concluded an agreement on 
sheepmeat and goatmeat in April 198 1.3' A textiles agreement between Poland 
and the Community-was signed in Brussels on 4 December 1978 and was in 
operation defacto since I January 1979.36 Finally, voluntary restraint agreements 
were concluded between 1978-80 which set minimum prices and quantitative 
restrictions on certain iron and steel products. The most extensive agreement of 
this period was concluded between the EEC and Romania in 1980; it covered all 
aspects of trade relations. 37 
Agreements of the type outlined above were perhaps permitted by the Soviets for 
a number of reasons. It is important to remember the limited importance of the 
agreements in-trade terms; they were, with the exception,, of the, Romanian 
agreement, largely technical and very restricted as they applied only to trade in 
specified areas such as sheepmeat. It is also important to bear in mind the 
economic situation -within the CMEA during the 1980s. If welake the Polish. 
economy as an example a very bleak economic picture existed: the agricultural 
sector could not produce sufficient supplies to feed the nation; in 1980 Poland 
owed more than $27 Billion in foreign debt; and industrial output had fallen to 
an all-time low. " Perhaps most important of all was the change in the political 
35 Council Decision 81/359/EEC of 28 April 1981, OJ 1981 L137/1. 
36 ne agreementwas not initialled until 25 January 1979. See Bull EC 1-1979, point 2.218; 
13th GEN. REP. EC, point 503; Bull EC 12-1981, point 2.2.16. 
37 OJ 1980 L352/1. 
39 For a more detailed discussion see Norman Davies, fn 14 above at pp421-42ý6. 
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climatp; with Gorbachev's rise to power came growing rapprochement in 
relations with the -EEC. With his encouragement of cooperation and 
interdependence in international affairs came a change in approach to foreign 
policy in central and eastern Europe. " His policy of Perestroika, "restructuring", 
aimed to introduce free market principles to the economy. " 
Aid 
A combination of food shortages and price increases contributed to a state of 
crisis. The Polish government appealed to the EEC for assistance in December 
1980. The European Council meeting agreed to respond to the Polish request for 
economic aid "insofar as their resources allowed". " The EEC agreed to sell stock 
piled food below world prices and to donate food. ' ' The climate altered with the 
declaration of martial law on 13 December- 198 1.4' The Commission decided to 
44 donate emergency aid and food aid through non-governmental organisations. 
Money was also donated to assist Polish refugees in Austria. In addition, the 
Council instructed Coreper and the Commission to examine what trade policy 
measures could be taken against the USSR. " By 1984 the situation in Poland had 
stabilised sufficiently for the EEC to state that no further emergency aid was 
envisaged. 46 
39 Frances Millard, fn 4 above at pp207-212. 
40 See Norman Davies, fn 4 above at pp 1120-1121,1108,1109 and. 1 116-1117. 
41 Bull EC 12-1980, point 1.1.14(4). 
42 Bull EC 11-198 1, point 1.1.11. 
43 This is discussed in more detail below. 
Between 1981 and 1984 the EEC donated 41 million ECU in humanitarian aid. Bull EC 
12-1981, points 1.41 to 1.4.6; Bull EC 2-1982, point 2.2.44; Bull EC 6-1982, 
point2.2.71; Bull EC 5-1983, point 2.229, Bull EC 10-1984, point 2.2.31. 
45 This study was undertaken on the understanding that it would be without prejudice to the 
eventual decisions which may be taken; Greece voted against this resolution. Bull EC-1- 
1982, point 2.2.38 (2). 
46 Bull EC 10- 1984, point 2.23 1. It was only two years until the EEC would again donate 
emergency aid to Poland; in 1986 the Commission approved an emergency alJocation of 
25 
Resumption of Negotiations with the CNWA: Towards the Joint Declaration 
In 1985 the CMEA proposed'a new solution to the fai lure of previous 
negotiationsf The. iqea was to agree a joint decl? ration establishing official 
relations between the two parties. Negotiations for the conclusion of a Joint 
Declaration began in 1986. As part of its strategy the Commission sought to 
ensure that the EEC was free to *conclude agreements with individual CMEA 
states. Mr. De Clerq, representing the Commission, considered there to be three 
guiding principles in the Community's policy: 
1. 
. 
Normalization - establishing the normal ties and contacts which the 
Community maintains with other third states and organisations; 
2. Differentiation - treating each country individually taking their 
circumstances into account; " and 
3. Parallelism - the parallel development of relations YAth individual CMEA 
members and the CMEA. 
49 
The policy of "parallel normalisation" was subsequently adopted which-, pursued -- 
parallel negotiations with certain CMEA states. " Consequentlyj the Soviet Union, - 
the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary all announced the accreditation 
-of diplomatic missions to the EEC in June 1988; diplomatic 
500.000 ECU to be spent on the purchase of milk powder for children under three. More 
recently, in 1998, humanitarian aid worth ECU 6.95 million was donated to assist the 
Polish regions which had suffered flood damage in the previous year. 
47 Bull EC 6-1985, points 2.3.37 and 2.3.38; Bull EC. 7/8-1985, point 2.3.3.; Bull EC 10- 
1985, point 2.3.29. 
48 The EU has claimed to continue to pursue this policy of differentiation in the negotiation 
of the Europe Agreements. See chapter two. 
49 Bull EC 10- 1086, point 2.228 . 
so Bull EC 5-1986, point 2.2.37. See generally, Dian Thomson, "Relations Between the EC 
and Eastern Europe" (1990) European Access 34. 
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Poland. and the EEC were established in September 1988. The Joint Declaration 
establishing official relations between the EEC and the CMEA was signed on 25 
June 1988 in Luxembourg. " 
Although the Joint Declaration is a short document, running to brily six clauses, 
its impact upon the development of legal relations between countries of central 
and eastern Europe was far reaching. It established a basis for political relations 
between the parties. The text provides the legal basis for future cooperation 
agreements between the parties "in areas which fall within their respective 
spheres of competence or where there is a common interest". " It is also 
interesting to note that a territorial clause was included ensuring that the 
agreement covered the territory of West Berlin; this was a significant concession 
for the CMEA negotiators at that time. 
Political Developments in Poland- 
Food price increases were not merely a phenomenon of the 1980s in Poland; price 
increases in 1970 and 1976 led to confrontation with the government. " The food 
price increases of August 1980 were to have even greater ramifications. The 
workers in the Lenin Shipyards, Gdansk, rejected a local strike settlement and 
forced the Communist government to sign an agreement guaranteeing workers' 
rights to join trade unions and the right to strike. " An organisation emerged 
representing strike committees from all Polish. provinces.. With roughly ten 
million members it represented more than a quarter of the entire Polish 
51 OJ 1988 L157/35. 
52 Clause 2 of the Joint Declaration. 
53 See, Jacqueline Hayden, Poles Apart: Solidarity and the New Poland (Irish Academic 
Press, 1994) at pp 11-12. 
54 This was the so-called Gdansk Agreement of 31 August 1980; Norman Davies, fn 14 
above at p 17. 
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popul4tion and more than 75% of the working population. " It was led by Lech 
Walesa and was named Solidarnosc (Solidarity). 
A series of strikes took place during 198 1. Solidarity began to flex its political 
muscles, calling for free elections and a referendum on the Polish alliance with 
the Soviet Union on 3 December 1981. Tensibns heightened with the 
mobilization of Soviet and Warsaw Pact'troops along Polish borders. On 13 
December martial law was declared under the leadership of General Wojciech 
Jaruzelski. Solidarity was banned and civil liberties were suspended. " Martial 
law lasted formally until 22 July 1983 although membership of Solidarity was to 
remain illegal for quite some time. 
/I 
As the decade progressed economic conditions worsened. In some desperation, 
the Polish government leaders initiated round table talks with the banned 
organisation, Solidarity, in 1989. The result was partially free elections where 
65% of the seats were reserved for Communist candidates. Solidarity won seats 
in every constituency which it contested. In many constituencies leading 
Communist candidatqs were unable to gain re-election even where they were the 
only candidate standing; voters crossed their names from the ballot paper. " The 
Communists were forced to invite Solidarity to form the new Polish government; 
Tadeusz Mazawiecki, a Solidarity member became Prime Minister. (At this point 
the President was still a member of the Communist party). 
55 - Mark Salter and Gordon McLachlin, Poland. The Historical Framework (Rough Guides, 
1996) at p620. 
56 Frances Millard, fn 4 above at pp 18-23. For a personal account of the lives of Solidarity 
members during the period of martial law see Jacqueline Hayden, fn 53 above. 
57 Norman Davies, fn4 above at ppl 122-'1123. 
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Events. began to unfbld. aý speed. " In 1990 the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact 
became defunct and in December of the same year Lech Walesa became President 
in the first free postwar presidential elections. The Polish political scene in the 
1990g has been marked by a growth in political parties and a swing in popular 
support from the 'right of centre to the left of centre. In the early 1990s 
Solidarity's popularity had begun to wane in the wake of harsh economic realities 
resulting from the free market economic reforms implemented by the finance 
minister, Leszek Balcerowicz. Solidarity began to split into a number of smaller, 
mainly right of centre, parties. At the same time, the Communist party began to 
assert its influence through the emergence of new right of centre parties such as 
the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Polish Peasant's Party (PSQ. 
The main Solidarity parties, the Democratic Union (UD) and the Congress of 
Liberal Democrats (KLP), were unsuccessful in the 1993 elections. " The 
electoral system, a form of proportional representation, favoured the post- 
Communist parties even although- the votes cast were distributed across the 
political spectrum. ' The SLD and the PSL formed an alliance giving them 66% 
of the seats in the lower House (Sejm). " 
On 
_the political 
developments in Poland in the 1990s see generally:. Andrew A Michta, 
"Democratic Consolidation in Poland after 1989", in' The Consolida*ti*o'n'o'f'De"m'ocr'acy*", 
in East-Central Europe, Karen Daisha and Bruce Parrot (editors) (Cambridge University 
Press, 1997); Joanna Regulska, "Democratic Elections and Political Restructuring in 
Poland 19 89-9 1 ", in The New Political Geography ofEastern Europe, John O'Loughlin 
and Herman vaX der Wusten (editors) (Belhaven Press, 1993); and Frances Millard, fn 4 
above, 
59 These parties were later to merge to form the Freedom Union (UW). 
60 The SLD gained 20.4% of the vote, the PSL 15.4%. However, their combined vote of 
35.8% was translated as 66% of the seats in the lower house. The post-Solidarity parties 
received in total 35.8% of the votes but suffered badly as a result of the fragmentation of 
the party; its only parliamentary representation was through the Confedqation for an 
Independent Poland whichireceived under 5% of the seats. The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, fn 2 above. 
61 The structure of government is discussed in more in chapter six. 
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The most recent legislative elections took place on 21 September 1997. The 
election resulted in -the formation of a coalition government between the 
Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS), a coalition of around forty smaller parties and 
pressure groups organised around the Solidarity trade union movement, and the 
62 Freedom Union (UW), a centrist party. The current Prime Minister is Jerzy 
Buzek (AWS). There are two deputy Prime Ministers, Lesek Balcerowicz (UW), 
who is also Minister of Finance, and Janusz Tomaszewski (AWS), who is also 
Minister of the Interior. The President, elected in the November 1995 elections, 
is Aleksander Kwasniewski. The Polish political scene remains very active, with 
new parties emerging all the time. For example, in January 1997, the 
conservative People's Party (SKL) was established through a merger between the 
small Conservative Party and the Peoples' Christian Party. 
The First Generation Agreements 
A number of CMEA states entered into trade and commercial and economic 
cooperation agreements with the EEC in the late 1980s/early 1990s; these came 
to be called the "First Generation Ageements". " Exploratory talks between the 
Commission and Poland on bilateral links were concluded in September 1987. 
Already a difference in expectation between the two sides had emerged: the 
Commission anticipated the conclusion of a trade agreement dealing with 
industrial and agricultural products; the'Polish side sought a much wider 
agreement covering economic and commercial cooperation. ' The Commission 
proposed that the Council grant it a mandate to negotiate a trade and cooperation 
agreement with Poland on 23 December 1988. " The Council granted the 
62 The coalition government may face many challenges in the future over issues such as 
abortion, reform of the security services and the role of former Communists in public life. 
See Financial Time 31 October 1997. 
63 The first agreement was concluded with Hungary, OJ 1988 L327/2. Similar agreements 
were subsequently concluded with: the USSR OJ 1990 L 68/2; Czechoslovakia 1990 OJ 
L 291/28; and Bulgaria. 
64 Bull EC 9-1987, point 2.2.25. 
65 Bull EC 12-1988, point 2.135. 
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Commission a mandate to conclude a trade and commercial and economic 
agreement on 20 February 1989. ' Negotiations opened in Brussels on 21 and 22 
March 1989. ' The negotiations proceeded apace and the agreement was signed 
in Waksaw on 19 September 1989. " The signatories issued ajoint communique 
saying that the agreement came at a crucial stage of political and economic reform 
in Poland. " 
All these so-called "first generation" agreements follow a similar format although 
there are some small differences. For example, the Polish agreement had an initial 
duration of five years, whereas the Hungarian agreement had a duration of 10 
years. The legal basis for the agreements is found in Articles 113 and 235 EEC. 
It is interesting to note that the EEC did not evolve a new type of trade agreement 
to apply tp these states but based the agreement on the approach devised in 1976, 
that is the "Commercial and Economic Cooperation Agreement" which it had 
used with other states. ". 
The lack of substantial differentiation between'the first generation agreements 
reflects the power imbalances between the CEES and the EU side which is 
examined in chapter two. The EU was able to use its superior position to dictate 
the form and content of the first generation agreements. This may be understood- 
66 Bull EC 2-1989, point 2.2.21. 
67 Bull EC 3-1989, point 2.28. 
68 OJ 1989 L339/12. COM(89) 435 final. See also Bull EC No. 9-1989, point 2.2.11. 
69 The agreement was amended by Council Decision 90/115/EEC which suspended Article 
12(l), the provisions covering agricultural concessions in Annexes IV and V to the 
agreement, 'so that the EEC could grant greater concessions under its gencralised 
preferences system. 
70 OJ 1976 L260/1. Indeed Heinz Kramer in "The European Community's Response to the 
'New Eastern Europe"' (1993) Journal of Common Market Studies 213 notes. at p226, "In . the beginning this [the Agreements] was not conceived as a special policy approach by 
the Community in reaction to the changes in Central and Eastern Europe, but was more 
of a 'standard procedure' in, EC bqhaviour towards 'newcomers' in the field of 
Community foreign relations. " 
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by using the Nash bargaining model which predicts that states which require 
unilateral or coalitional policy adjustments by others in order to achieve domestic 
policy goals gain more from cooperation. Where asymmetry of power exists in 
this way then the state which has most to gain from cooperation is likely to grant 
71 the greatest number of concessions in order to secure the agreement. Poland 
accepted both the lack of differentiation and the content of the first generation 
agreement because signing the agreement improved its economic position. It did 
not improve Poland's economic position in the best possible way but at that time 
4an" the status quo, that is small the agreement represented a better alternative th 
"" 
scale sectoral agreements with the EU. Moreover, it the best trade agreement 
with a large trading group which Poland could secure; there were no alternative 
offers representing equivalent opportunities with other trading groups which 
would have improved Poland's economic position in a superior way. 
The issues of power imbalance is examined in detail in chapter two and 
developed throughout the thesis'. 
Main Features of the First Generation Agreement 
The agreement has four titles and runs to 25 Articles. Title I deals with trade and 
commercial cooperation and begins with the parties reaffirming their commitment 
to accord each other MFN treatment, in accordance with Article 2 of the GATT. 
The title provides for the phasing out-of quantitative- restrictions on imports for 
certain products with the liberalisation of the more sensitive products tdldng 
longer. ' The parties agreed to "make every effort to promote, expand and 
diversify their trade" on the basis of non-discrimination and reciprocity. ' To this 
end, the Agreement encourages the use of arbitration to settle disputes. ' The 
71 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choicefor Europe, (UCL, 1999) at pp64-65. 
72 Article 8 and 9 of the agreement. 
73 Article 16 of the agreement. 
74 Article 17 of the agreement. 
32 
parties also agree to consult each other where import quantities "may cause or 
threaten to cause serious injury to domestic producers" and to ensure the 
publication of commercial data. " 
Title Il deals with economic cooperation. Article 18 provides tha4t the aim of the 
title is to strengthen and increase economic links between the parties and to 
contribute to the development of their economies. " It was hoped that the parties 
would make particular efforts to encourage economic cooperation in a number of 
sectors including industry, agriculture and mining. " Suggestions are made as to 
how the objective of -economic cooperation could be realised such as measures 
from the development of an investment climate to the encouragement of joint 
research and development projects. " 
Title III provides for the establishment of a Joint Committee comprised of 
representatives from both parties. It Was the task of the Joint Committee to ensure 
the proper functioning of the agreement. " Whilst the Joint Committee was given 
a role to play in trade disputes it did not have the power to take legally binding 
decisions; it was restricted to issuing recommendations.. " 
The final title, Title IV deals with general and financial provisions ensuring, inter 
alla, that the agreement does not conflict with any-right or obligation arising 
under the GATT, 
75 Articles 15 and 16(l) of the ageement. 
76 Article 18(l) of the agreement. 
Article 18(2) of the agreement. 
78 Article 18(3) of the agreement. 
79 Article 20(2)(a) of the agree'ment. 
so [The Joint Committee shall] "seek appropriate means of avoiding possible difficulties in 
the fields of trade and cooperation", Article 20(2)(b). 
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A number of commentators have described the first generation agreements as 
limited, both legally Iand economically, * but are quick to acknowledge that the 
importance df the agreements did not lie in their scope but in their very 
existeInce. " They provided an important stepping stone to the development of 
relations between the associated states and the EEC. 
i 
PHARIý 
In the late 1980s the level of the economic crisis and the need for restructuring 
and development within Poland and Hungary was becoming apparent. The G7 
Summit of He* of State held its annual meeting in Paris in July 1989 and 
affirmed their readines's to deliver economic aid supporting the moves towards 
restructuring the Polish and Hungarian economies. They also. considered that 
other interested institutions and states should act together with the G7 and the 
European Commission was invited to coordinate the aid programmes. " This role 
was an important recognition of the status of the Commission as an actor in the 
international arena and it proceeded not only to carry out its coordinating role but 
to propose an action plan at the meeting in Brussels on 26 September 1989.83 By 
now the G24 group of countries was involved together with-the IMF, the World 
Bank and the Paris Club. " A programme of coordinated -assistance in a number 
of sectors began to develop which became a fi-amework for EEC action and the 
Commission proposed that 200 million ECU should be donated from the 1990 
budget. 85 The Commission also suggested improving market access conditions for. 
Poland and Hungary by abolishing all quantitative restrictions imposed upon the 
Dan Horovitz, "EC-Central/East European Relations: New Principles for a New Era" 
(1990) CMLRev, 259 at 269; Heinz Kramerfn 70 above; and Richard Behar, "Towards 
a New Federal Europe" (1992) New Law Journal 664 at p660. 
82 Bull EC 718 1989, point 1.12. 
83 Helen Wallace and William Wallace, Policy Making in the European Union (Oxford 
University Press, 1996,3rd edition) at p 359. 
84 Seefn 82 at point 2.27; Bull EC 10-1989, point I. I. I. 
85 The sectors at this point were: agriculture and food; access to markets; investments, 
vocational training; and the environment. 
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two countries by virtue of their status as State-trading countries. 8' In this way 
Poland and Hungary *would be in the same position vis-a-vis the EEC as other 
non-State-trading couniýies. 87 The Council accepted the Commission's 
proposal. " In addition, the Council asked the Commission to examine the non- 
specific quantitative restrictions ýpplying to Poland and Hungary. Agreements 
were quickly reached detailing the phased removal of such restrictions by the end 
of 1994 for Poland and by the end of 1995 for Hungary. " 
The Commission proposal for the establishment of a legal basis for economic aid 
to Poland and Hungai-y was transmitted to the Council on 25 October 1989.90 The 
proposal was accepted by the Council on 4 December 1989.9' 
In tl-ýs way the PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Aid for the Restructuring of 
Economies) programme came to be launched. The French acronym was 
deliberately chosen as aý pun, the PHARE (lighthouse) programme was to act as 
a beacon for the new EEC response towards the CEES. Initially, PHARE funding 
had one objective: assisting economic restructuring in Poland and Hungary. 
However, as relations developed a secondary objective emerged, namely helping 
92 the states prepare for European Union membership. The programme was 
widened on a number of occasions to include nine other states. 93 Between 1990 
86 That is the abolition of Regulation 3420/83, OJ L 346,8/12/83 which governed trading 
conditions with State-trading countrieý at that time. 
87 
. 
At that time such trade was governed by Regulation 288/82, OJ L 35,9/2/82. 
98 Regulation 3381/89, OJ 1989 L 32616. 
89 OJ 1989 L339/1; OJ 1989 L327/1. 
90 OJ 1989 C 296/6; COM(89)53 6final; Bull. EC 10-989, point 1.1.18. 
91 Regulation 3906/89, OJ 1989 L 375/11; Bull EC 12-1989, point 2.2.25. 
92 European Commission, PHARE in Poland. An Initiativefor Poland's Membership ofthe 
EU (PHARE Information Office, 1995). 
93 Regulation 2698/90 amended Regulation 390&89 to include Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
the German Democratic Republic, 'Romania and Yugoslavia. Regulation 3800/91 
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and 1994 PHARE funds of 1,011.6 million ECU were made available to Poland 
in the form of capital grants, guarantees, credit lines and investment in 
infi-astructure-development . 
94 The PHARE budget for 1995-1999 is in excess of 
I billion ECU and will be paid in annual instalments of 203 million ECU. 
The European Bank for Recons truction and Development (EBRD) 
The EBRD was established on 29 May 1990. " The bank has three aims: 
1. To contribute to economic progress and reconstruction; 
2. To foster the transition towards open market-oriented economies; and 
3. To promote private and entrepreneurial initiative in the CEES. " 
The EBRD's broad purpose is to make public sector money available to fund 
private sector developments. It may make or guarantee loans not only to private 
enterprises but also to public sector enterprises which are being privatised or run 
on the basis of ftee competition. In addition, it can invest in and- finance. such 
enterprises. 
extended the programme to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and removed the German 
Democratic Republic. Regulation 1764/93 removed Czechoslovakia and introduced the 
Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. Regulation 1366195 included Croatia. 
94 Making PHARE the leading grant funder to Poland during this period. 
95 OJ 1990 L472/4; Bull EC 5-1990, point 1.3.1. For discussion of the events leading up 
to the EBRD's establishment see Dunnet D, "The European Bank forReconstruction and 
Development: A Legal Survey" (1991) CNIILRev 571; Weber S, "Origins of the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development" (1994) International Organizations 1. 
% Article one of EBRD agreement. 
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The EBRD is not, strictly speaking, a European Union institution. " Thereare 42 
shareholders: the EEC, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and forty states 
including the US, Japan, Korea, Egypt, Morocco and Israel. The EEC and the EIB 
have the majority share in the bank (5 1 %); the US has the next largest share at 
10%. 98 The EBRD is run along similar lines to the EIB and the EEC is 
represented by the Commission. 99 
There has been some criticism both of PHARE and the EBRD. "' Some consider 
these responses to the problems of the CEES to be ad hoc, displaying a lack of 
will to provide a solution which was political as well as technical and which was 
long term. 'O' During the Europe Agreement negotiations the Polish negotiators 
sought to have a separate financial protocol inserted which would have overtaken 
the PHARE and EBRD funding creating a more bilateral rather than an 
autonomous arrangement. 102 Balazs describes the EU's use of autonomous legal 
form of actions as "strikingly characteristic" . 
103 
The ability of the EU to pursue autonomous legal forms of action again reflects 
the power imbalance between Poland and the EU discussed above. Poland, with. 
97 Lasok and Bridge, Law and the Institutions ofthe European Union (Butterworths, 1994'. 
6th edition) at p238. 
98 Helen Wallace and William Wallace, fn 83 above. 
99 
. 
Lasok and Bridge, fn 96 above at p238. 
For a critical review of the operation of PHARE in Poland see: Pawel Samecki, "The 
Necessary Changes in PHARE" delivered at the round table conference, "Calender for 
Europe" International Vienna Council, Trieste, February 29 March 1996; Pawel 
Samecki, "Polish Reforms and Foreign Assistance Strategies and the Role of Economic 
Assistance to Central and Eastern Europe" in Hannut Elsenhanz (ed), Transformation 
Strategies and the Role of Economic Assistance to Central and Eastern Europe, 
(forthcoming) University of Leipzig. See also the special report on the functioning and 
transparency of PHARE, OJ 1997 C 175/2. 
101 Helen Wallace and William Wallace, fn 83 above at p369. 
102 This is discussed in more detail in chapter two. 
103 Peter Balazs, in Marc Maresceau (ed), . fn 26 above at p369. 
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its relatively weak position, was unable to compel the EU to sign a contractual 
obligation on financial commitments. Perhaps inevitably, as the recipient of 
financial assistance,. Poland was unable to achieve its favoured objective; a 
separate financial protocol. However, because receiving ftinding through PHARE 
and the EBRD'is preferable to receiving no flinding and Poland tLs no alternative 
sources offering comparable levels of funding, Poland has accepted the status 
quo. 
It is clear that the EU side do not agree with the implication that this 
disadvantages Poland; EU officials are keen to stress the PHARE-funded projects 
are "demand driven", that is Poland must bring forward proposals to the 
Comi-nission and the Commission may not finance its own projects. " In addition, 
they state that the Commission would only refuse to fund a project under PHARE 
if it did not fall within the PHARE fi-amework. This interpretation is not shared 
by Polish officials. Onq official considered that funding for a project may be 
refiised for at least one of three reasons: 
1. In the eyes of the donor the project does. not. qualify because of poor past 
experience. This could be, for -example, because of poor management or 
lack of experience. In 1995 the Polish government hoped to spend 13 
million ECU on further support for privatisation but the Commission 
pointed out that between 1992-94 progress in this area had been rather 
slow and so further funding-was not merited; 
2. The Polish government prepared proposals in sectors which were not 
considered to be priorities by the Commission. For example in 1996 the 
Polish govenunent. proposed a small programme designed to counteract 
domestic violence against women and children. The- Commission 
considered that the project was an isolated one which did not sit well with 
social sector reforms. The Polish side accepted that whilst thiý may have - 
104 Interview with Michel Pireti. 
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been true, social security reforms were not due to start until the preceding 
year and they wished to attempt to ta . ckle the problem of domestic 
violence in the- interim; and 
N 
3. Links with disputes. For examýle in the 1996 programme programmes 
proposed by the Polish side were refused by the Conunission because of 
arguments connected to steel restructuring. (This dispute is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 6). " 
So it is clear that the funding mechanisms which regulate EU-Polish relations are 
not without controversy. Indeed, recently there has been a change to the PHARE 
programme. The Commission has introduced PHARE horizontal programmes as 
part of the pre-accession strategy, this is discussed in chapter four. These 
programmes are to cover actions which the Commission considers to be essential 
to the pre-accession strategy but which are not requested by the partner state. 
Such programmes are to be created and run by the Commission directly and will 
account for 5% of the PHARE budget. 
Tempus 
Tempus (Trans-European Mobility Scheme for University Students) was 
established on 7 May 1990. " It was originally envisaged as a five year 
programme but was extended so that TEMPUS 11 will-run until 1998; 1'ýThe- 
programme aims to establishjoint training programmes between Central and East 
European Universities and enterprises and similar bodies in the Member States. 
It also promotes travel for teachers, students and administrators. Initially the 
programme operated only in Poland and Hungary, but it was quickly extended to 
include certain former Soviet Union states and states eligible for PHARE funds. 
105 . Interview with Pawel Sarnecki. 
106 OJ 1990 1,131/21; COM(90); Bull ECI/2-1990, point 1.2.6; Bull EC-5 1990, point 1.3.2. 
107 Council Decision 93/246, OJ LI 12/134,1993. 
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There are a number of additional programmes open to participants from the 
CEES. The Youthfor-Europe programme promotes cooperation programmes for 
young people. 'O' The Socrates Programme promotes the development of quality 
in education and training and contributes to the establishment of a European area 
for cooperation in education. 109 The Leonardo da Vinci programme established 
an action programme for vocational training. "' The TA CIS programme provides 
technical assistance for training programmes. "' Finally, the European Training 
Foundation aims to help adapt training systems to new market conditions. "' 
Conclusions 
The development of legal and political relations between Poland and the EEC 
from the postwar period until the early 19 . 90s has been dramatic. The changes 
reflect the wider political and economic climate of the period. The tensions of the 
cold war period are given expression in the non-recognition of the EEC by the 
CMEA. Despite this, ýelations between the EEC and individual CEES were 
developing. Small-scale sectoral agreements were concluded between the EEC 
and some CEES. 
In 1969 the EEC began to deyelop its autonomous trade policy., This approach to 
relations with the CEES persists today. Chapter four will examine the use of 
autonomous legal measures by the EU side in the 1990s. Chapter eight analyses 
the impact of autonomous legal measuresupon-the -implementation process of the 
Europe Agreement. 
108 OJ 1995 L87/1. 
109. Decision 819/95, OJ 1994 L87/10. 
Ito Decision 94/819, OJ 1994 L 340/8. 
III Regulation 2053/93, OJ 1993 Ll 87/1. 
112 Regulation 3906/89, OJ 1989 L375/1 1; Bull EC 1,2-1990, point 1.2.6. 
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- The 1980s saw the start of a growing closeness in east-west relations with 
Gorbachev's rise to power in the USS_R. His policies ofperestroika and glasnost 
paved the way for the conclusion of the Joint- Declaration on Mutual Recognition 
in 1988 and ultimately for the adoption of far-reaching and legally binding 
agreements. 
i 
This chapter has demonstrated how developments in Polish-EEC relations were 
shaped by the political and economic developments of the time. This thesis shall 
demonstrate, in the chapters which follow, how the wider political and economic 
context is equally relevant to Polish-EU relations today. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Europe Agreement Negotiations: 
Power Imbalance and Galanter 
-4 
Introduction 
The Polish Europe Agreement entered into force on I February 1994. ' Just two 
months later, on 5 April, Poland submitted its official application for membership 
of the European Union. The speed at which the membership application was 
submitted could be perceived as a failure in that the Agreement could not, and 
did not, meet the needs of Poland at that time. The Europe Agreement had barely 
begun to be implemented, any potential for positive effects whether economic, 
legal or social could not have hoped to have taken effect. ' Meneks believes the 
quick membership application did not arise from a disappointing evaluation of the 
performance of the Agreement? In his opinion the motivating force was "a gap 
between the political aspirations of Poland (and the other Visegrad Group 
countries) to membership in the Union and the other European (WEU) and 
transatlantic (NATO) integration groupings and the political response of these 
institutions to our expectations"! 
This chapter will examine the negotiations of the Europe Agreement. Any 
analysis of the Europe Agreement must' Proceed hand-in-hand with'an' 
examination of the pertinent aspects of accession negotiations. The negotiation 
process often established a pattern. analogous to the implementation process; 
conflicts arose on a number of occasions and similar positions have been adopted 
I OJ 1993 L348/2. 
Although the evaluations which had been carried out by this point were, on the whole, 
positive. See Jerzy Menkes, "Evolution of the Europe Agreement and Changes in Poland- 
EU Relations" (1995) Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 81 at pp82-83. 
Jerzy Menkes, fn 2 above pp8l-83. 
Jerzy Menkes, fn 2 above at p84. 
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by the parties. This chapter will demonstrate how the final text agreed between 
the parties reflects the conflicts which took place during the negotiation process 
and how some of the implementation disputes which were to follow have their 
genesis here. Moreover, the chapter will also demonstrate, using Galanter's 
Iramework, how the power imbalance between the parties shapea the negotiations 
process. Chapter seven will demonstrate how the power imbalance has impacted 
upon the implementation process in the same way. 
The Competence of the EU in the External Field 
This thesis is not principally concerned with the competence of the EU to 
conclude agreements with third parties. However, it is important to understand 
the law relating to the division of competence between the EU and its Member 
States in the external field before examining the negotiations for the Europe 
Agreement. This is because the division of competence between the EU and its 
Member States is neither clear cut nor static. This is especially true in and 
agreement such as the Europe Agreement which, being a mixed agreement, 
requires the participation of both the EU and its Member States. ' This has 
significance for implementation because a complex institutional framework is 
required to implement an agreement where the third party, in this case Poland, 
negotiates with a non-unitary institutional structure. Chapter six demonstrates 
how the Europe Agreement requires the involvement of many layers of 
institutions in the process of policy implementation. Chapter seven examines a 
number of implementation disputes, some of which are aggravated because of the 
non-unitary nature of the EU side. Chapter seven analyses a number of trade 
disputes between the EU side and Poland which have arisen in the context of the 
Europe Agreement. Some of these disputes, such as the steel dispute, "vere 
prolonged and to an extent inflamed by the division of power between the EU and 
its Member States. In this dispute Poland, negotiating through the Commission, 
believed it had agreed a deal on steel. When the Commission presented the deal 
to the Member States certain Member States found it unacceptable. Moreover, the 
The law relating to mixed agreements is examined below. 
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division of power between the EU and the Member States means that the 
negotiating interests of the two may not necessarily coincide. Again the disputes 
in chapter seven illustrate this point. For example, during the tanneries dispute 
Italy pursued a domestic trade policy which, although of sectoral importance to 
Italy, was negligible in terms of overall trade between Poland and the EU. 
As the discussion below will demonstrate the Commission will often represent 
the EU side, that is the EU and its Member States, in negotiations with third 
states. This may lead to a degree of confusion on the part of the third state which 
may assume that the EU side is unitary in its internal policies. This is 
understandable since it is in the Commission's interest to present a unitary policy 
preference on behalf of the EU side. Chapter seven clearly illustrates the 
difficulties which may arise during implementation as a result of the non-unitary 
nature of the EU side. 
Competence 
The legal competence of the EU is derived from its founding treaties. The EU 
has competence to conclude agreements in the external field within the limit 
provided by these treaties. The Member States have transferred certain 
competences to the EU on accession. The ECJ has described the consequences 
of this: 
"By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its 
own personality, its own legal capacity, and capacity of representation on the 
international plane, and more particularly, real powers stemming from a 
limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the 
Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within 
limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both their 
nationals and themselves. 116 
6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 at 593 and 594. 
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The question as to whether the EU or its Member States has competence in the 
external field is complex. 'The ECJ distinguishes between EU competence (either 
expressly provided in the treaties or arising impliedly) and competence shared 
between the EU and the Member States! 
Express Competence 
Express competence relates to those powers expressly conferred in one of the 
founding treaties. The scope of any express competence is deten-nined by the 
reference to the treaty article, the practice of the Council and the case law of the 
ECP Express competence derived from the Treaty of Rome may be described in 
three categories: 
I. Power to conclude agreements; 10 
2. Power to foster cooperation at the international level; and 
3. Power to cooperate with international organisations. 
See generally, Leopold, "External Relations Power of the EEC in Theory and Practice" 
(1977) 26 ICLQ 54; K. R. Simmonds, "The Evolution of External Relations Law of the 
European Economic Community" (1979) 28 ICLQ 644; C W. A. Timmermans and E. L. M. 
Volker, Division ofPoivers Between the European Community and their Member States 
in the Field of External Relations (Kluwer, 198 1); Groux and Manin, The European 
Communities in the International Order (European Perspectives, 1985); and 1. MacLeod, 
I. D. Hendry and Stephen Hyett, The External Relations of the European Coinnizinilies 
(Clarendon Press, 1996) pp 37-74. 
8 Opinion 2/91 (Re ILO Convention) [ 19931 ECR 1- 106 1. 
Opinion 1194 (Re TVTO Agreement)[ 1995] 1 CMLR205 at para52; ECR15267. 
10 The Treaty of Rome only granted express competence in two areas: common commercial 
policy (Article 113) and association agreements (Article 23 8). Subsequent treaties have 
extended the use of express powers: Article 109(3); Article 130i: Article 130m; Article 
130r(4); and Article 130y. 
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Implied Powers 
The use of express competence in Treaty of Rome was rather limited. As a result, 
the ECJ developed the doctrine of implied competence in a series of cases. " The 
doctrine provides that: 
" [A]uthority to enter into international commitments [which] may arise not only 
from an express attribution by the Treaty, but may also flow implicitly from its 
provisions .... [In] particular... whenever Community law created for the 
institutions of the Community powers within its internal system for the purpose 
of attaining a specific objective, the Community had authority to enter into the 
international commitments necessary for the attaininent of that objective even in 
the absence an express provision in that connection. At paragraph [20] in its 
judgement in Joined Cases 3,4 and 6/76 Kramer and Others [ 1976] ECR 1279, 
the Court had already pointed out that such authority could flow by implication 
from other measures adopted by the Community institutions within the 
framework of the Treaty provisions or the acts of accession. "' 2 
Implied competence is created in one of three ways: 
I. Measures have been adopted by the EU institutions using an internal 
power; 
2. Power to legislate internally exists but has not been exercised; and 
Power to act externally is implicit in a treaty article conferring an internal 
power. " 
22/70, Commission v Council [ 197 1] ECR 263; Opinion 1/76 (Re European Laying Up 
Fundfor Inland Watenva Vessels) [1997] ECR754. y 
12 Opinion 219, fn 8 above. 
13 See 1. MacLeod, I. D. Hendry and Stephen Hyettfn 7 above at pp50-53. 
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In practice, the adoption of the doctrine of parallelism by the ECJ, -, 6vhich ascribes 
corresponding competencies in the external field where these exist in the internal 
field, has removed the need for a distinction between express'and implied 
powers. " 
Exclusive and Shared Competence 
Exclusive Competence 
In certain areas the EU has sole power to act in the external field. The ECJ has 
made it clear that in such situations Member States are prohibited from acting in 
the same area. " 
Exclusive competence exists in relations to the following areas: 
1. Common commercial policy (Article 113); 16 
2. Conservation of fisheries (Article 102); " 
3. Competition (Articles 85 to 90); 8 
4. Supply of ores, source materials and special fissile materials; ` 
14 Opinion 219, fn 8 above. 
15 Opinion 1/75 (Re OECD Local Costs Standard) [1975] ECR 1355 at para 17; 804/79 
Commission v UK [ 198 11 ECR 1045 at paras 17,18 and 20. 
16 Opinion 117, fn 15 above at para 1364. 
17 804/79 Commission v UK [ 198 1] ECR 1045 at para 17. 
18 Opinion 1/92 (Re EEA) ECR 1-2821 at paras 32-33. 
19 Ruling 1/78 (Re the Draft Conventions on the Physical Protection offuclear Materials, 
Facilities and Transports) [1978] ECR 2151 at para 14. 
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Nuclear common market; " and 
6. Ownership of nuclear materials covered by the Treaty. 21 
Shared Competence 1. 
The EU and Members States may share competence in certain areas. Where 
competence is shared the right of the EU and the Member States to act in the 
external sphere co-exist. Shared competence arises in five ways: 
Where the treaty provisions provide that the EU competence does not 
prejudice the Member States' competence in the external field; " 
2. Where the EU has the power to adopt common rules but has not yet done 
SO; 23 
3. Where the agreement includes areas within the exclusive competence of 
the Member States and areas within the exclusive competence of the 
EU ; 24 
4. Where the EU's external competence is derived from internal rules setting 
minimum standards; " and 
5. In areas such as intellectual property where it is possible for EU level 
trade marks and Member State level trade marks to co-exist. 
20 Ruling 1178, fn 19 above at para 18. 
21 Ruling 1178, fn 19 above at para 27. 
22 See for example Articles 109(5) and 139r(4). 
23 3,4 and 6/76 Kramer [1976] ECR 1279 at para. 39. 
24 Opinion 1/78 (Re Natural Rubber Agreement) [ 1979] ECR 287 1. 
25 Opinion 219, fn 8 above. 
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The division of competence between the EU and the Member States is neither 
clear cut nor static. The Council and the Commission have tended to adopt 
differing positions on the issue of competence. " The traditional perception has 
been that the Member States, representing their interests in the Council, have 
tended to adopt strategies aimed at minimising the role of the EU in external 
relations. This may be manifest in the Member States' reluctance to act at all in 
the international arena, especially where this would lead to an extension of the 
scope of the conu-non commercial policy. " The Commission's strategy has been 
to attempt to maximise the EU's role in external relations. 28 
Mixed Agreements 
Where both the EU and the Member States are parties to an agreement then that 
agreement is considered to be a mixed agreement, 29 Many commentators argue 
that the only "truly" mixed agreements are those where certain provisions fall 
within the competence of the EU whilst other provisions fall within the 
competence of the Member States? o This is the case with the Europe Agreement. 
Member States were required to be party to the Agreement for two reasons. First, 
26 See Dominic N4cGoldrick, International Relations Laiv of the European Union 
(Longman, 1997) pp 109-113. 
27 See Weiler J, "The External Legal Relations'Of Non-Unitary Actors: Mixity and the 
Federal Principle" in O'Keefe and Schermers (eds), Mixed Agreements (Kluwer, 1993)35, 
75. On the extension of the common commercial policy and criticism of the ECJ's 
opinion in the WTO case (Opinion 1/94 (Re World Trade Organisation) [1994] ECR I- 
5267) see: Bourgeris, "The EC in the WTO and Advisory Opinion 1/94: An Echternach 
Procession" (1995)32 CMLRev 763; M. Hilf, "The ECJ's Opinion/94 on the WTO-No 
Surprise but Wise T' (1995) 6 EJIL 245; N. Emiliou "The Death of Exclusive 
Competence? " (1996) 21 ELRev 294. 
28 See A. Dashwood, "The Limits of European Community Powers" (1996) 21 ELRev 113 
at 126. 
29 See generally, O'Keefe and Schermers (eds), fn 27 above; E. L. M. Volker, C. W. A. 
Timmermans, The Division ofPoiver BeAveen the Communities and the Member States 
in the Filed of External Relations (Kluwer, 198 1); N. Neuwal, ', 'Joint Participation in 
International Treaties and the Exercise of Powers by the EEC and its Member States: 
Mixed Agreements" (1991) 28 CMLRev 717. 
30 See for example, 1. MacLeod, I. D. Hendry and Stephen Hyett fn 7 above at pp 142-144. 
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the Agreement contains provisions which are not present in any of the three 
founding treaties so certain aspects are not within the competence of the EU. 
Secondly, the funding for some projects contained in the Agreement is derived 
from the Member State rather than the EU. 31 
-1 
Duty of Close Cooperation 
The fact that the Europe Agreement is a mixed agreement has consequences for 
the processes of negotiation, conclusion and implementation. The Member States 
and the institutions are bound by the duty of close cooperation. This duty has 
been stressed by the ECJ in a series of cases. " The court considers the duty to be 
33 
one of the fundamental principles of the external relations of the EU. More 
recently the ECJ has described the duty in the following terms: 
"It must be remembered that where it is apparent that the subject-matter of an 
agreement or convention falls partly within the competence of the Community 
and partly within that of its Member States it is essential to ensure close 
cooperation between the Member States and the Community institutions, both in 
the process of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfilment of the 
commitments entered into. That obligation to - cooperate flows , 
from--the 
requirement of unity in the international representation of the Community. "34 
Where the duty of cooperation applies the institutions and the Member States are 
bound to "take all necessary steps to ensure the best possible cooperation"ý 35 
31 Such as the PHARE programme. 
32 Ruling 1/78, fn 19 above; Opinion 2/91, fiz 8 above; Opinion 1194, fn 9 above; and 25/94 
Commission V Council [ 1996] ECR 1- 1469. 
33 Ruling 1178, fn 19 above at para 35. 
34 25/94 Commission v Council, fn 32 above at paras 48-50. 
35 Opinion 2191, fn 8 above at para 38. ' 
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General Negotiation Procedure 
The respective roles of the institutions and the Member States in the negotiation 
of external relations agreements is contained in Article 228(l) EC which 
provides: 
"Where this Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements between the 
Community and one or more States or international organisations, the 
Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorize 
the Commission to open the necessary negotiations. The Commission shall 
conduct these negotiations in consultation -with the special conunittees appointed 
by the Council to assist it in this task and within the framework of such directives 
as the Council may issue to it. In exercising-the powers conferred upon it by this 
paragraph, the Council shall act by qualified majority, except in the cases 
provided for in the second sentence of paragraph 2, for which it shall act 
unanimously. " 
In this way the Commission has the dominant role in negotiations. Even in the 
ca&. of a mixed agreement the Commission, "ill usually negot iate on behalf of the 
EU. The Council may appoint special conu-nittees which may be consulted during 
the negotiations process and often play an important role in ensuring that any 
agreement reached is acceptable to the Member States. 36 
The Commission conducted the negotiations for the Europe Agreements on 
behalf of the EU and its Member States. For this reason and because of the "duty 
of close cooperation" described above, this thesis refers collectively to the EU 
institutions and its Member States as the "EU side". It is important to bear in 
mind however that the EU is not a unitary actor. The consequences of the non- 
unitary nature of the EU will be examined through an analysis of the parameters 
of the "duty of close cooperation" carried out in chapters seven and eight. 
36 Article 113EC provides A similar procedure to Article 228EC in relation to the common 
commercial policy; the relevant special committee is called the Article 113 Committee. 
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Exploratoty Talks 
In May 1990, Poland submitted a memorandum to the Commission on the 
opening of association negotiations. " The first unofficial meeting between the EU 
side and the Polish side took place on 25 July 1990 in Poland. " The Commission 
delegation took part in exploratory talks on an association agreement and agreed 
to use the Polish government memorandum. The talks quickly defined the scope 
of the agreement; there would be no customs union, only a free trade area was on 
offer. In addition, these talks also highlighted some of the issues which were to 
become contentious in the months to follow such as the question of whether the 
agreement was linked to accession and the treatment of the so-called"'sensitive 
sectors" of agricultural products, textiles, steel, coal and fisheries. Both sides 
appeared to agree in principle to the inclusion of a financial protocol and a title 
on political cooperation. The Commission representatives stated that they 
considered that the talks would proceed quickly with negotiations proper 
beginning towards the end of 1990 or the beginning of 1991 and the completion 
of the ratification process by January 1992.39 
The Commission issued a communication on the conclusion of association 
agreements with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which was 
c6nsidered by a special meeting of the European Council. 40 The Communication, 
formally adopted on 27 August 1990, provided details of the aims and content of 
the association agreements to be known as "Europe Agreements". The. 
agreements would contain provisions on political dialogue, free trade, freedom I 
37 Renata Stawarska, "Poland's Association with the EEC" (1992) Polish Western Affairs 
77 at p79. 
38 Marek Tabor, "Dynamika I Uwarunkowania Procesu Negocjacji Ukladu Europejskiego" 
in Polska JV Procesie Integracjlze Wspolntami Europejskimi 1994 (Wydawnict-*Vo 
Naukowe PVIN, 1994) translated by Joanna Kazic July 1997. 
39 Marek Tabor, fn 38 above. 
40 Conclusions of the special meeting of the European Council held in Dublin; Bull EC 4- 
1990, point 1.2. 
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of movement and economic, financial and cultural cooperation andwould include 
institutional provisions. " 
At a second preliminary meeting it was agreed that the free trade area would 
comply with the terms of Article XXIV of the GATT. Agreement was also 
reached on the inclusion of provisions on the development of border cooperation 
and regional policy. " However, disagreement emerged in a number of areas. The 
Commission proposed that due to its sensitive nature, agricultural provisions 
should be contained in a separate document. It also became apparent that the 
scope of the provisions on free movement of services was likely to be limited; the 
Commission stressing that the power to regulate treatment of non-EU nationals 
was largely within the control of individual Member States. The issue of Poland's 
accession to the EU was again raised. The Commission explained that some 
Member States would find the economic and political costs of Polish accession 
too high. 
These preliminary meetings served to set the tone for the official rounds which 
followed, highlighting some of the issues whichwere to prove controversial. 
The Negotiation Rounds: Issues and Conflicts 
The Commission's mandate was to negotiate Europe Agreements not only with 
43 Poland but also with Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Later agreements would also 
be negotiated with other CEES. " The draft directive provided for an association 
41 Bull EC 7/8-1990, point 1.4.5. 
42 Marek Tabor, fn 38 above. 
43 Bull EC 12-1990, point 1.4.6. See also Bull EC 11-19990, point 1.4.1. OJ 1993 L 347/2 
(Europe Agreement with Hungary). With the dissolution of Czechoslovakia separate 
Europe Agreements were negotiated with the Czech Republic and Slovakia. See OJ 1994 
L360/2 and 359/2 (Agreements with Czech Republic and Slovak Republic). 
OJ 1994 L358/3,357/2,373/1,374/1,375/1 ( Europe Agreements with Bulgaria, 
Romanian, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). COM (1995) 341 final (Europe Agreement 
with Slovenia). 
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agreement covering political dialogue, free trade, freedom of movement and 
economic, financial and cultural cooperation with an institutional framework. " 
In total, eight official rounds of negotiations took place between the Polish and 
the Commission negotiators before the Europe Agreement was initialled on 22 
November 199 1. The negotiations, although not lengthy, were certainly longer 
than the Commission had anticipated during the preliminary talks (see below). " 
This was due in no small part to the conflicts which arose during negotiations. 
It is instructive to examine the conflicts in more detail in order to better 
understand some of the reasons why similar conflictswere to arise later when the 
Europe Agreement came to be implemented. 
In manyways the most prominent and symbolic issue was Polish accession to the 
EU. It was apparent from the start of the negotiation process that Poland was not 
content with mere associate status and that accession was the principal economic 
and political objective of the Polish government. " Poland wanted the association 
agreement to stipulate explicitly that Poland was in a pre-accession phase so that 
the association agreement would, as had been the case in the Portuguese 
agreement, provide the legal, economic and political basis which would lead to 
accession. It should be noted in this context that. an apparent promise of 
membership does not necessarily result in accession. Turkey is a case in point. 
The membership promise contained in the 1973 association agreement between 
the EEC and-Turkey is as yet unfulfilled.. However, it is equally true that the 
promise of membership can have important political consequences. It has been 
43 Bull EC 7/8-1990, point 1.4.5. 
46 Certainly a number of Polish commentators considered the negotiations to be protracted. 
See Ilona RomiszeNvska "The European Communities and the Central and East European 
Countries: from Aloofness through Co-operation to Association and Membership T' 
(1992) Polish Western Affairs 61 at p69 and Jerzy Menkes, fn 2 above at p 85. 
47 See for example, Renata Stawarskafn 37 above at p79. 
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judged that the membership promises contained in the Greek and Portuguese 
association agreements added political support for these governments in their 
adoption of pro-European integration strategies. " 
Menkes denounces the failure to link the Europe Agreement"more closely to 
membership as a "weakness of political support" and believes that "feelings of 
frustration (and even accusations of being betrayed or scorned by the West) are 
aroused by an unwillingness or inability to make gestures that cost nothing 
(financially) in support of efforts and sacrifices of societies which are having to 
pay the price for unswerving adherence to reform. "" Indeed the European 
Parliament Committee on External Economic relations considered the EU's 
approach to the issue to be "inappropriate and unsuitable". " Commissioner Frans 
Andriessen, suggested a compromise whereby certain CEES would be granted 
affiliate membership status. " In this way these states would have full membership 
rights and obligations in only limited areas, initially the financial and political 
fields only. The idea was treated sceptically both by the CEES and the EU side 
and was not developed any further. 
The deadlock was broken by an extension to the Commission's negotiation 
mandate on 15 April 1991. The draft preamble was amended to read: 
7 
48 "Report of the Committee on External Economic Relations on a General Outline for 
Association with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, " European Parliament, 13 
March 1991, EN/RP/105815. 
49 Jerzy Menkes, fn 2 above at p84. 
so "Report of the Committee on External Economic Relations on a General Outline for 
Association with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, " European Parliament, 13 
March 1991, EN/RP/105815, pI 1. 
31 Helen Wallace and William Wallace, Policy-Making in the European Union (Oxford 
University Press, 1996,3rd edition) at p367. 
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"Recognising the fact that the final objective of Poland is to become a 
member of the Community and that this association in the view of the 
parties will help to achieve this objective. " 
The EU would not concede that membership was the aspiration of "all parties" 
to the Europe Agreement and no obligation to admit Poland to the EU was 
created. Despite this, the Polish side was reasonably pleased with this concession. 
Tabor remarks that the Polish negotiators found "the relative easiness with which 
the consent to include a provision on the accession to the Community was 
achieved a bit surprising". " Indeed the negotiators were hopeful that the 
"concession" demonstrated the Commission's readiness to adopt a more liberal 
approach in relation to the Agreement's economic provisions. 53 The Polish 
reaction to the change to the Preamble probably demonstrates a certain degree of 
naivety and lack of experience. In truth the Commission had conceded almost 
nothing although the Polish side continued to stress the symbolic importance of 
the amendment. 
The Europe Agreement provides for a free trade area created on an asymmetrical 
basis: the EU agreed to open its markets more quickly than Poland. " This model 
does'not apply, however, in the case of the sensitive sectors. " From the third 
round of negotiations these sectors caused '-'the most severe clashes". " Indeed, on 
two occasions disputes over agriculture almost led to the collapse of the 
52 Marek Tabor, fn 38 above. 
53 Marek Tabor, fii 38 above. 
54 The asymmetry within thp Agreement reflects the asymmetry of bargaining power 
between the parties discussed in chapter two. This is discussed in more detail in chapter 
f ive. 
55 Stanislaw Soltysinski, "Agreement on Association of Poland with European Communities 
(Legal and Economic issues)" (1991-1992) Polish Yearbook of International Law 179 at 
p 184. 
56 Marek Tabor, fn 38 above. 
56 
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negotiation process . 
In order to understand the cause of the conflict it is 
instructive to undertake a brief examination of the crucial role of these sectors 
within the Polish economy described in table three below. " 
Table Three: Employment in Poland in 1991 
Sector Percentage of population employed G. D. P. 
Agriculture 27.4% 6.2% 
Textiles 4% 2.6% 
Iron and Steel 1.2% 1.4% 
Between 1990 and 1992 there was a large decline in Polish trade with its former 
CMEA partners. At the same time, exports to the EU increased significantly from 
32% of total Polish exports in 1989 to 60% in 1992. '9 
The importance of access to EU markets for these sectors becomes clear when a 
breakdown of these exports is examined. In 1991, Poland exported the lion's 
share of goods in these sectors to the EU: 64% of all agricultural exports; 67% of 
all textiles exports; and 66% of iron and steel exports. " 
The Polish negotiators sought to maximise market access for these sectors. 
Stawarska believes that the Commission's reaction provided "a textbook-like 
example of the protectionism applied by the Community with regard to [these] 
products". " Both Ireland and France resisted the granting of concessions in 
57 Interview with Eugeniusz Piontek. 
58 Based on figures from Elizabieta Kawecka-Wyrzykoska and Jozef'Misala, "Sensitive 
Products in Poland's Exports: Access to the EC Market Under the Europe Agreement" 
Paper no. 42, Foreign Trade Research Institute, 1993, Warsaw. 
59 Elizabieta Kawecka-Wyrzykoska and Jozef Misalafn 58 above at p4. 
60 Elizabieta Kawecka-Wyrzykoska and Jozef Misalafn 58 above at pp4-5. 
61 Renata Stawarska, fn 37 above at p84. 
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relation to agriculture. " Portugal took a similarly strong stance in relation to 
63 textiles. The question of beef and lamb quotas almost led to a breakdown in the 
negotiations after the seventh round. 6. France proposed the solution of 
"triangular assistance" whereby the additional agricultural goods which Poland 
i 61 
sought to import into the EU would instead be imported into the Soviet Union. 
An agreement increasing beef and lamb quotas was eventually agreed on 30 
September 1991 by the Council of Ministers. Despite this small achýievement, the 
Polish side gained little in ten-ns of widening market access for goods from 
sensitive sectors, reflecting the asymmetyr of power between the parties which 
is analysed below. The limited scope of the relevant Europe Agreement 
provisions is discussed in detail in chapter five. 
The Polish negotiators had made clear their desire for a separate financial 
protocol defining the levels of financial support to be provided for each of the 
Agreement's objectives . 
66 Polish negotiators considered that long-term funding 
was necessary in order to expedite financial- planning and presented proposals for 
a detailed draft protocol. This was rejected. The title on financial cooperation 
contained within the Europe Agreement falls short of this goal and has been 
61 compared unfavourably with other associatioft - agreements. Polish 
commentators consider that the financial provisions lack coherence and need to 
be improved if the EU wishes to respond more effectively to Polish problemS. 61 
62 Marek Tabor, fii 38 above. 
63 Marek Tabor, fn 38 above. 
64 Marek Taborfn 38 above. 
65 This proposal was also supported by the smaller states of Ireland, Greece and Spain. 
66 Andrzpj Harasmovicz and Jaroslaw Pietras, "State and Prospects of Poland's Relations 
with the EU" (1994) Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 59 at p73. 
67 Article 96-101 of the Europe Agreement. See Renata Stawarska, fn 5 at p9 1. 
69 Eugeniusz Piontek, "Europe Agreement EEC- Poland (Legal Concept of a Scheme) 
(1991-1992) Polish Yearbook of International Law 133 at p 146; Ilona Romiszewskafn 
14 above at p69; and Jacek Saryusz-NVolski "The Reintegration of the 'Old Continent': 
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In relation to free movement of workers, Polish negotiators were unable to 
achieve many concessions in relation to the rights of migrant workers; the 
provisions essentially grant equivalent treatment to those workers already legally 
established in a Member State . 
69 In this area it was the UK, a champion of the 
Polish cause on market access, who was firmly opposed to any expansion of 
immigration policy. By contrast, the provisions on movement of services and the 
right of establishment are more generous. Winters draws attention to the different 
treatment of professionals, which is reasonably positive, and labour intensive 
occupations which is very limited. ' Indeed the Polish provisions on services are 
considered to be more advantageous than the equivalent provisions contained in 
the Hungarian Agreement. 71 
Even a cursory look at the competition provisions of the Europe Agreement 
reveals that the Polish negotiators had little impact in the creation of the 
provisions. They are derived almost verbatim from the Treaty of Rome. Piontek 
believes that Poland was keen to accept the competition rules because it 
demonstrated its desire to achieve a fully functioning market economy and the 
rules which go along with that. " Alan Mayhew adopts a more critical position 
arguing that the competition provisions reveal a lack of experience on the part of 
Polish negotiators. He believes that the negotiators should not have accepted the 
inclusion of provisions equivalent to the EC competition law provisions since the 
Avoiding the Costs of the 'Half Europe"' in Simon Bulmer and Andrew Scott (editors), 
Economic and Political Integration in Europe: Internal Dynamics and Global Context 
at p22. 
69 This is discussed in more detail in chapter five. 
70 A. Winters, "The Association Process: Making it Work for Europe" in Material 
Konferencji EWGpomviecnejumoivam europejskim, Brussels 27 February 1992 at p6. See 
also, Lynn E Ramsey, "The Implications of the Europe Agreements for an Expanded 
European Union", (1995) 44 ICLQ 161 at p 167. 
71 Stanislaw Soltysinski, fn 55 above at pI 88., 
72 Eugeniusz Piontek, fn 68 above. 
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Europe Agreement's anti-dumping provisions were sufficient to protect the 
Europe Agreement's objectives. " 
Asymmetry of Bargaining Power 
This thesis argues that there is a power imbalance between Poland and the EU 
side. This power imbalance determined the nature and the scope of the Europe 
Agreement and directly impacts upon the process of implementation of the 
Europe Agreement. 
The Nash bargaining model is employed here to explain the concept of 
asymmetry of power. The model is built upon a rational actor thesis which 
assumes that states actively pursue policies which they consider to be in their own 
best interest. The essence of the Nash model applied to international negotiations 
is quite simple; the state which will benefit most from the signing of an 
agreement is most likely to grant greater concessions in order to secure the 
agreement. Moravcsik follows the Nash model to develop an analytical 
framework relevant to European integration. 74 It must be accepted that 
Moravcsik's work deals with inter-EU ba rgaining and he tests his theoretical 
framework against agreements reached between EU Member States, such as the 
Single European Act. This thesis clearly deals with external EU bargaining. 
However, Moravcsik's approach is still relevant since one of his central claims 
is that the study of EU integration is not sid generis. Rather he argues that 
European integration is merely one example of regional integration and that his 
theoretical approach may validly be applied to other forms of regional 
cooperation. The Europe Agreement represents an example of regional 
cooperation between the EU, its Member States and Poland. Furthermore, the 
Agreement may be viewed as a stepping stone to closer European integration for 
two reasons. First, the Agreement binds Poland to many EU legal standards. 
Secondly, the Agreement has come to be used as a mechanism to test Poland's 
73 Interview with Alan Mayhew. 
74 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choicefor Europe (UCL Press: 1999). 
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fitness to join the EU. " Moravesik argues that economic necessity is the only 
really important causal factor propelling European integration. Whilst this thesis 
accepts the primacy of relative economic strength in detennining the outcome of 
negotiations between states it also argues that other factors, for example 
geopolitical, historical and institutional factors, play an important role in 
determining the asymmetry of power between Poland and the EU side. 
Poland came to the negotiations table as the economically weaker party. Chapter 
one demonstrated how Poland faced, and continues to face, the financial burden 
of economic and political restructuring. Poland requires financial assistance from 
the EU, such as access to the PHARE programme which supports economic 
restructuring. Poland's traditional guaranteed markets with Russia hnd the other 
CEES had all but disappeared with the collapse of COMECON. In these 
economic circumstances Poland required access to EU markets. Moreover, if 
Poland, hoped to be able to compete in these new markets it required access to 
know-how and technical expertise. In stark contrast the EU had little to gain in 
economic terms by negotiating a closer trade agreement with Poland; the EU and 
its Member States had an array of alternative trading options and access to Polish 
markets and those of the other CEES merely represented an new economic 
opportunity to be exploited. In short, the EU had little to gain in economic terms 
by granting Poland a very favourable agreement. 
For Poland the Europe Agreement represented an advance on its position under 
the first generation agreement. In economic terms its position under the Europe 
Agreement was better than the status quo. It did not have the luxury of 
considering other more beneficial trade agreements with other states or trading 
blocks. So, applying the Nash model, Poland would benefit more than the EU 
side from the signing of the agreement and for this reason was prepared to agree 
to greater compromises in order to secure the agreement. 
75 This discussed in chapter four. 
61 
There were other factors, such as historical and institutional factors, which also 
contributed to the asymmetry of power. As this chapter makes clear, Poland was 
relatively inexperienced in international negotiations. For many years as part of 
the Soviet Union it was precluded from negotiating on its own behalf in the 
international arena. 76 Poland was in the unenviable position bf attempting to 
evolve-a negotiating style and strategy in foreign affairs whilst simultaneously 
attempting to deal with problems of economic and democratic restructuring. In 
comparison, the EU side, represented by the Commission, were experienced in 
negotiating both external trade agreements in general and association agreements 
(which are an EU "creation") in particular. The Agreement was based upon a 
draft prepared by the Commission and was used in negotiations with other CEES. 
These factors worked together to ensure and reinforce the EU side's strength in 
the processes of negotiation and implementation. 
Another important factor to consider is the role of the EU institutions in the 
process of negotiating, concluding and implementing an association agreement. 
The significance of the role of the institutions in the policy-making process has 
received growing recoignition in the work of the new institutionalists. " In essence 
these writers argue that "institutions matter" and that a methodology which takes 
this into account is better able to deliver'a more rounded appreciation of the 
process of European integration. " Although this thesis does not strictly speaking 
adopt the methodology of new ipstitutionalism, certain aspects of this 
methodology offer insight into the issue of power imbalance in the Europe 
Agreement. Three aspects in particular are worthy of consideration. 
76 This was discussed in chapter one. 
77 See generally: Kenneth Armstrong and Simon Bulmer, The Governance ofthe European 
Market (Manchester University Press, 1998); Laura Cram, Policy-inaking in the EU. ' 
Conceptual Lenses and the Integration Process (Routledge, 1997); Armstrong, 
"Regulating the Free Movement of Goods: Institutions and Institutional Change" in Shaw 
and Moore (eds), New Legal Dynamics of the European Union (OUP, 1995); Tamara 
Hervey, European Social Law and Policy (Longman, 1998). 
78 Laura Cram, fn 77 above at p27. 
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First, it is important to stress the non-unitary nature of the EU side which has 
been outlined above. Armstrong and Bulmer emphasis that the EU is "a multi- 
level system of governance: a confederation located between inter-state and intra- 
state patterns of rule". 79 
i 
Secondly, recognition should be made of the fact that the institutions which 
comprise the EU side do not have equal roles to play in determining policy. As 
a result the institutional gructure itself may determine the form of the policy 
process. Annstrong and Bulmer argue that the strong position of the Council 
"privileges national governments and their civil servants in the policy process". 'O 
The respective roles of the Council, the Commission and the Member States in 
the Europe Agreement have been outlined above. 
Finally, the Commission itself is not a monolithic unit. " It is made up of twenty 
three Directorates General, each one responsible for certain aspects of EU policy 
and each one having evolved different working practices. Moreover, the interests 
and goals of the various Directorates General may conflict. During the Europe 
Agreement negotiations there was conflict between DGI and DG Ill. " 
These three factors combine to produce a very complex institutional structure. In 
the context of the Europe Agreement, Poland must negotiate with the EU side. 
EU law and policy determines that the Commission represents the EU side in 
theses negotiations. At the same time the Member States and the Council have the 
power to determine the scope of the Commission's mandate. The European 
Parliament, the institution most critical of the Commission's approach to EU 
79 Kenneth Armstrong and Simon Bulmerfi177 above at p66. See also Laura Cram, fii 77 
above at p26. 
so Kenneth Arrnstrong and Simon Bulmerfn 77 above at p57. 
81 Laura Cram, fn 77 above at pp I 55et sec. 
82 Helen Wallace and William Wallace, fn 51 above at p372. 
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relations with the CEES, is largely excluded from external relations matters. 83 
More importantly, the approval of all Member States is required before any 
agreement reached by the Commission can become effective and it is the task of 
the Commission to mediate between the Member States. 84 
In the early stages of Poland's negotiations with the EU it had been felt that there 
was consensus within the EU side as to how to respond to the CEESs. The 
process of negotiations was not without controversy. Sederneier and Wallace 
observe that: 
"[S]ome of those involved on the CEES sidewere able to observe, as fast as they 
indentified issues on which they wanted to press for more open market access, 
they found that an EC-based 4obby had beaten them to the EC negotiators". 8' 
The EU institutional structure places Poland at a distinct disadvantage in the 
negotiations process since it must negotiate at arms length from the institutions 
which have the real decision making power, namely the Council and the Member 
State. There are many examples of individual Member States pursuing national 
interests to the detriment of the Polish side. These are discussed in detail below 
particularly in chapters seven and eight. 
For all the reasons outlined above the EU side may be considered to be more 
powerful than Poland. This power imbalance allows the EU to adopt a variety of 
negotiating strategies which helps to reinforce and strengthen its dominance over 
the Polish side. 
83 See European Parliament, fn 50 above. 
84 Kenneth Armstrong and Simon Bulmerfn77 above at p74. 
85 Helen Wallace and Ulrich Sedelmeier, "Policies Towards Central and Eastern Europe" 
in Helen Wallace and William Wallace, fn 51 above at p371. 
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The complexity and multi-layered nature of the institutional structures involved 
here has direct impact upon the implementation framework chosen to analyse the 
Europe Agreement in this thesis. Table five in chapter three demonstrates that 
where more than one institution exists then each institution will adopt 
implementing goals for the Agreement. In general these implem. enting goals will 
seek to favour the position of each institution and as a result there may be conflict 
between the implementing goals of the institutions. The conflicts which arise as 
a consequence and the implications of these conflicts upon both the balance of 
power between the parties and the process of implementation is discussed in 
chapters seven and eight. 
It has been argued that the imbalance in power between the negotiating parties 
wýs clear at the outset and was a crucial factor determining the course of 
i1 86 
negotiations. Marc Galanter has developed a framework for analysing how the 
basic structure of the legal system creates and defines the ability of the law to 
attain redistributive change. " The approach considers how differences in size, the 
state of the law and resources mean that some actors will regularly make use of 
the courts whereas others will do so rarely. He classifies actors as one-sh9tters, 
those who rarely have recourse to the courts, -and repeat players, who may qNn 
participate in similar litigation. Between the two extremes of one-shotter and 
repeat player there may be other categories of actor, such as the recidivist 
criminal. Galanter counsels that the one shotter-repeat player classification should. 
be treated as a continuum rather than as a dichotomous pair. The repeat player is 
the larger actor so that for her, the stakes in any case are relatively small. By 
contrast, the one-shotter is smaller and so for her the stakes in any case would 
86 Helen Wallace and William Wallace, fn 51 above at p370: "The asymmetry of bargaining 
power made the shape of outcome rather predictable. " 
87 Marc Galanter, "The Architecture of the Legal System" in Law and Society, C. M. 
Campbell and Paul Wiles(editors) (Martin Robertson and Co, 1979). Based upon Marc 
Galanter, "Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change" (1974) 9 Law and Society Review 95. 
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tend to be high, such as personal injuries or a criminal accused. " A model of the 
'ideal type' repeat player and one-shotter is provided in table four below: 
Table Four: Model of the 'ideal type' repeat player and one-shotter 
Repeat Player One-Shotter 
Anticipates repeated litigation Claim large (relative to size) 
Low stake in case outcome Cost large relative to outcome 
Resources to pursue long-term goals Limited resources 
Applying Galanter to the Asymmetry of Power within the Europe Agreement 
Galanter's model focuses upon a number of factors in order to understand the 
dynamics of the litigation process. He uses these factors to explain the relative 
strength and success of parties within that process. The process of court room 
litigation has many parallels with external relations negotiations because the 
ability of parties to achieve a successful outcome is dependent upon a number of 
comparable factors. First, it is important to consider the parties relative economic 
strength. Galanter stresses the importance of the resources available to the parties; 
the Repeat Player has sufficient financial resources to enable him to continue to-. 
pursue legal action until he reaches a favourable outcome. The Nash model 
demonstrates how the economically stronger party is better able to resist attempts 
to accept a compromise to the agreement; Secondly, the relative expertise of the 
parties plays a significant role in determining the outcome. For Galanter, the 
greater the party's experience of the litigation process the more effective their 
performance during the litigation. Similarly, as is argued below, the EU side have 
been able to use its superior knowledge and negotiating experience to 
disadvantage Poland in the Europe Agreement negotiations. Finally, Galanter 
emphasises the importance of the Repeat Player's relatively low financial interest 
in the outcome of any individual case. This parallels the application of the Nash 
88 By, contrast the one-shotter could find that the cost of enforcing a claim outweighs the 
rewards of a successful action. Marc Galanter, fn 87 above at pI 6 1. 
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model discussed above which places importance upon the relative gains to be 
realised; the party which would benefit most from the agreement will agree to 
greater compromise in order to secure a deal. 
Both the litigation process and external relations agreements ýperate within an 
environment constrained by rules of procedures and norms of behaviour. For 
example, all parties involved in litigation are constrained by rules of evidence. 
Similarly, the parties to external relations agreements must operate within the 
framework of other international agreements to which they are signatories. For 
example, the parties to the Europe Agreement are all signatories to the WTO 
agreement and so any agreement reached must not infringe the rules of the 
89 WTO. 
Galanter's model is particularly helpful in assessing the concept of power in 
external relations agreements because he makes it clear that his concept of power 
is both relative and fluid. Diagram one, below, demonstrates how the balance of 
power between the parties may change over time. This may be due to factors such 
as a change in economic circumstances or because of the influence of an external 
influence. 
Galanter's classifications for the "architecture of the legal system" may be 
usefully employed when considering the asymmetry of bargaining power within 
the Europe Agreement. The EU may be classified as the Repeat Player and 
Poland the One-Shotter. The EU is clearly the larger party to the negotiations in 
terms of financial resources. In economic terms the EU did not need to conclude 
a trade agreement with Poland. 'O Furthen-nore, the EU could use the Europe 
89 Indeed certain parts of the Europe Agreement, such as those relating to textiles, are 
currently being re-written in light of commitment agreed at the GATT Uruguay round. 
These will dealt with by the adoption of autonomous legal measures on the part of the 
Council. 
90 Although there were other imperatives, such as security concerns, which drove the 
negotiations. 
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Agreement as a staging post in its developing relations with Poland. Poland, on 
the other hand, entered the negotiations in a financiallyweak position. It required 
financial assistance and grants from the EU, was in need of greater access to EU 
markets, in part because of the decline in trade with the former Comecon states, 
and it was also keen to become a member of the EU. Although Polish negotiators 
had some experience of complex international negotiations during the GATT 
pegotiations they were at a disadvantage facing the Commission. This was really 
Poland's first attempt at negotiating such a complex agreement. 
The Galanter model is used to demonstrate how the asymmetrical relationship 
identified using Nash may be exploited by the stronger side in the negotiation and 
implementation process. Galanter's nine indicators help to demonstrate how the 
EU side used their superior power in order to control both the negotiations 
process and the outcome of the negotiations. " Galanter's model also helps to 
explain that power between the parties is relative and to understand the role of 
external influences upon the balance of power between the parties. 
Galanter outlines nine ways in which a repeat player has an advantage during .. 
litigation. In a similar way these advantages may be ascribed. to -the - EU ih - 
association agreements in general and in the case of the Polish Europe Agreement 
in particular. 
1. Repeatplayers, having done it hefore, have advance intelligence, - they 
are able to structure the next transaction and build a record. It is the 
repeat player who writes the form contract, requires the security 
deposits and the like. 
The Commission had greater control over the direction of negotiations. All the 
Visegrad states were involved in negotiations using a draft drawn up by the 
Conimission. The draft was in English, rather than their native language, and this 
91 This is sometimes referred to as "agenda setting7. See for example, 
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placed additional strains upon the CEES negotiating teamS. 92 In addition, the 
Conunission had extensive past experience of negotiating association agreements 
and were able to follow a uniforar procedure in their negotiations with each of the 
CEES. 
2. Repeat players develop expertise and have ready access to specialists. 
They eidoy economies ofscale and have low start-tip costsfor any case. 
The Commission had access not only to the expertise of DGIA, which has 
responsibility for external relations to the CEES, but also to expertise across the 
range of issues topics covered by the Europe Agreement. 9' For example, DGIV 
could advise on the competition law articles. Many of the provisions contained 
in the Europe Agreement are derived either from the EC treaty, such as the 
competition law provisions, or are to be found in many other association 
agreements, such as the institutional framework, providing the EU side with a 
working knowledge of the subject matter. 
It is clear that Poland was at a comparative disadvantage. Whilst it was relatively 
easy to have access to specialists in relation to the more general aspects -of the 
Agreement, the Poles found much greater difficulty in finding specialists outwith 
the Commission who could provide expertise on the more specialist or technical 
aspects of the Agreement. " Moreover, while the Polish negotiating team may 
have. enjoyed a relative advantage in size over the rival Visegrad negotiating 
teams they could not match the size and expertise of the Commission and 
Member States negotiating teams. " 
92 See, Renata Stawarskafn 37 above at p8 1. 
93 The role and work of DG IA is discussed in chapter six. 
94 Interview with Macieji Gorka. 
95 Interview with Geoffrey Harris. 
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3. Repeat players have Offortunities to develop facilitative informal 
relations with institutional incumbents. 
The Commission has had a long history of working with the Council and the 
Member States in negotiating external relations agreemeýts. Poland had 
relatively restricted experience of contact with international institutions. A limited 
relationship had been built up with the EU institutions through the small trade 
96 agreements and the first generation agreement. 
It has also been suggested that Polish inexperience was apparent in its failure to 
use the media to its advantage during the negotiation process. " Poland was 
unsuccessful in persuading thewestern media both of the importance of trade in 
sensitive goods for the Polish economy and the limited threat of such imports for 
EU industries" 
4. The repeat players must establish and maintain credibility as a 
combatant. His interest is in his 'bargaining reputation' which serves 
as a resource to establish 'commitment' to his bargaining positions. 
With no bargaining reputation to maintain, the one-shotter has more 
difficulty in convincingly committing himself in bargaining. 
The Commission has been careful to develop and protect its power to negotiate 
external relations agreements. It has clear pre-eminence to negotiate in areas 
where the EU has exclusive competence. At the same time, Member States' 
negotiators were quick to defend their domestic interest during the course of the 
negotiations. 
96 These are discussed in more detail in chapter one. 
97 Renata Stawarskafn 37 above at p82. 
98 Starwarska says this can be compared with sympathetic coverage of striking French 
farmers during the negotiations. 
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The Polish approach during the negotiations was not the approach which would 
be adopted by what Galanter would call the 'ideal type' one-shotter. Poland was 
willing to adopt a strong stance during the negotiations in an attempt to establish 
a bargaining reputation. The reason for this could be that Poland is not always a 
one-shotter in its relations with the EU. The aims of the Polish government is to 
join the EU and therefore Poland had a vested interested in maintaining and 
developing a relationship with the parties to the Agreement. In this way Poland 
is not at the one-shotter end of the continuum but edging towards repeat player 
status: 
Diagram One: Poland's position on the one-shotter/repeat player continuum 
Midpoint I 
IDEAL TYPE IDEAL TYPE 
ONE-SHOTTER RFPEAT PLAYER 
These dynamics are also found in the implementation process (see chapters seven 
and eight). 
5. Repeat players play the odds. The larger the matter at issue loomsfor 
the one-shotter, the more likely he is to adopt a strategy Minimizing- the. - 
probability of maximum loss. Repeat players can adopt strategies 
calculated to maximise gain over a long series of cases, even where this 
involves risk of maxintunt loss in sonte cases. 
Political desire within Poland contributed to the pressure to conclude the 
negotiations as quickly as possible. This stemmed partly from the desire of the 
incumbent government to conclude the Europe Agreement before the impending 
parliamentary elections. During the negotiations an internal rift developed within 
the Polish government. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed the political 
importance of the Europe Agreement and pressed to sign as quickly as possible 
in the hope that amendments could be negotiated at a later date. Other cabinet 
members disagreed and believed that the quality of the Europe Agreement was 
crucial and that their negotiators should hold out in order to achieve thq best deal 
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possible. " Geoffrey Harris considers that Poland concluded the Europe 
Agreement too hastily and that as a result they made concessions which they may 
not have done had the negotiations been less rushed. In particular he feels the 
constant demands for membership weakened their position because they no 
longer had the threat of refusing to join the EU. "O -1 
6. Repeatplayers can playfor rules as a spell asfor immediate gains. The 
repeat player may expend resources influencing the creation of rules 
through, for exaitýple, lobbying. 
A good example of this type of strategy may be seen in the asymmetrical nature 
of the Europe Agreement. The EU was content to make more rapid concessions 
in market access than Poland safe in the knowledge that ultimately both sides 
must reach the same standards. In this Way the EU could appear to make 
concessions which wcre relatively generous without giving away any ground in 
the long terrn. 
7. Repeat players can also playfor the rules in litigation itsetf The one- 
shotter is unconcerned with the outcome of similar litigation. in the. - 
future. The repeat player will consi4er that anything that will 
favourably influence the outcome offuture cases is a worthwhile result. 
The Europe Agreements concluded with the Visegrad states were to be used for 
the conclusion of almost identical agreements with other CEES. The Commission 
negotiators were aware that where concessions were granted in say the Polish 
Europe Agreement this would create an expectation in subsequent negotiations 
with other CEES. 
99 The Commission negotiators appear to have been unaware of these divisions within the 
Polish government. Internal divisions have also affected the Polish side during 
implementation. See for example, the discussion on the citrus fruit dispute in chapter 
seven. 
100 Geoffrey Harris, fn 95 above. 
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8. Repeat players, by virtue of experience and expertise, are more likely to 
be able to discern which rules are* likely to 'penetrate' and which are 
likely to remain merely symbolic commitments. They can trade off 
symbolic defeatsfor tangible gains. 
The conflicts and the solution accepted over accession illustrate this. The 
Commission was aware that the reference to accession in the Preamble did not 
amount to a firrn commitment on Polish membership of the EU. The Polish side 
however, regarded the solution as a concession on the part of the EU and a 
significant step on their path to membership. 
9. Since penetration depends in part on the resources of the parties 
(Awaidedge, attentiveness, expert services, money), repeat players are 
more likely to be able to invest the matching resources necessary to 
secure the penetration of rulesfavourable to them. 
In blunt terms, Poland's eagerness to join meant that it had far more to lose than 
the EU had to gain. In many respects the EU was holding all fhe cards. Polqnd 
required to trade with the EU, whereas Poland was a marginal market for the EU. 
Poland required EU grants and loans to help finance the economic restructuring 
programme. There was however one goal which was common to all parties; 
security. Poland sought closer links with the EU partly to alleviate the threat of.. 
the Soviet Union. The EU is all too aware of the dangers caused by instability 
within the CEES and is keen to ensure that its castern-most borders are strong. "' 
Galanter's framework helps to bring into focus the parties' relative position of 
advantage. In particular it helps to illustrate how certain advantages, such as 
101 The Moscow Coup which took, place during the negotiations heightened awareness of the 
wider security dimension. On the importance of "security externalities" see Joanna Gowa, 
Allies, Adversaries and International Trade (Princeton, NJ, 1994); Joseph Grieco, 
Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America and Non-tariffBarriers to Trade (Ithaca, 
NY, 1990). 
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economic power, tend to reinforce and augment other advantages, such as 
expertise. There are clear differences with the context in which Galanter operates 
and the present context. In particular within the context of litigation a third party, 
the judiciary, -would ultimately decide the outcome. In the context of negotiating 
association agreements it is for the parties to agree on the outcome. "' What 
Galanter's framework helps to demonstrate is the relative positions of the parties 
and as a consequence their power to influence the outcome of the negotiations. 
Cooperation Amongst the Visegrad States 
In Galanter's framework he suggests that lawyers may help to equalise the 
parties' positions. 103 There was a route open to Poland which could have similarly 
strengthened its bargaining position: cooperation with the Visegrad states. 
Mayhew believes that had the three states better coordinated their positions they 
could have achieved a better agreement. "' Perhaps more a-symmetry in trade, 
perhaps more in agriculture, perhaps in freedom of services, perhaps even in 
financial cooperation. Lack of coordination between the three states made it easier 
for the Commission to negotiate by playing states off against each other. 'O' Even 
one of the negotiators has admitted that "cooperation and exchange of 
information would have improved the bargaining position of each candidate". "' 
Although half-hearted attempts at cooperation were made and meetings between 
the three states took place on a number-of occasions, there was little evidence of 
102 However, the implementation disputes which have taken place have shown a tendency to 
involve third parties or external standards in the dispute resolution process, see chapter 
seven. 
103 Marc Galanter, fn 87 above. Although Galanter suggests that the repeat player, having 
access to greater resources, would also have accession to superior legal advice. 
104 Alan Mayhew, fn 73 above. 
105 Alan Mayhew, fn 73 above: "They would say that they quite understood the Polish 
position butjust the other day they agreed "x" with Hungary and so they could not now 
agree "y" with you. " 
106 Renata Stawarska, fn 37 above at p8 1. 
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real cooperation. The reasons are complex. It appears that both Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia were eager to distance themselves from the disagreements and 
delays which dogged the Polish negotiations. The Hungarian Prime Minister, Mr. 
Antall, urged the Commission to ensure that delays with the Polish Europe 
Agreement did not affect the date of signing of their Europe Agreement. ` The 
three states became fiercely competitive, each wishing to be first to sign the 
Europe Agreement and ultimatelyjoin the EU. The Commission insisted that all 
three states sign their respective Europe Agreements at the same time. 
Negotiations with Hungary and Czechoslovakia had concluded some two months 
before Poland. During this period the two states attempted to bring political 
pressure upon Poland to conclude negotiations. "' Historical factors contributed 
to the unwillingness to cooperate. The three states had been subject to a unified 
"foreign policy" for more than forty years, as members of the Warsaw Pact. This 
led the states to emphasize their role as independent actors in the field of foreign 
affairs. Their relative lack of experience may also explain the reluctance to adopt 
a more pragmatic approach through cooperation. 
In many ways the Europe Agreement negotiations took place at a time of historic 
and economic change both within Poland and the EU. Piontek states that the EU 
seemed to be overwhelmed by the speed of events and neither Commission 
officials nor the Member States were fully prepared to respond to developments 
in the CEES. '09 This wider context influenced both the content oý the Europe 
Agreement and the shape of the negotiations. For example, the Moscow coup 
forced the Council of Ministers to bring forward their internal discussions on 
progress with the Europe Agreements. "O Another factor which influenced the 
107 Marek Tabor, fn 38 above. 
109 Marek Tabor, fn 38 above. 
109 Eugeniusz Piontek, fn68 above. 
110 The meeting scheduled for 30 September was brought forward to 20 August as a result 
of the coup d'etat. 
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Europe Agreement was the unsympathetic economic climate. "' With recession 
starting to bite in several Member States, EU largesse was not at its most 
generous. The signing of the Europe Agreement also coincided with the 
negotiations to amend the Treaty of Rome which resulted in the Maastricht 
Treaty. As a result, many commentators believe that the EU 'was absorbed by 
internal disputes and unable to grant the Europe Agreement proper attention. ' 12 
The Europe Agreement negotiations were marked by a conflict on the part of the 
Member States between protecting domestic industries, such as French 
agriculture, or domestic concerns, such as the British position in relation to 
immigration. "' These concerns were pursued with vigour even where they 
threatened wider political goals such as security concerns or longer term 
economic development such as wider markets for EU goods. Member States 
continued to adopt this type of negotiating stance right up to the very end of 
negotiations. Ninety minutes prior to the ceremony to sign the Europe Agreement, 
Spain insisted that the Europe Agreement could not be concluded unless the 
Visegrad states agreed to sign an additional protocol on steel. "' The reasons 
behind the Member States' behaviour are manifold and stem from political, 
economic and historical origins. The conflict arises due to. the competing roles of 
the Council of Ministers. Council members are acutely aware that they are 
responsible to their own nationals who have the power to deten-nine whether or 
not they return to office. The negotiations saw individual Member States act 
III See generally, Andrzej Harasmovicz and Jaroslaw Pietras, fn 66 at pp66-67. 
112 Ilona Romiszewskafn 46 above at p62; and Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, fii 68 above at pp19- 
20. 
113 See generally, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, fn 68 above at p23 et sec. 
114 On this occasion the Visegrad states stood firmly together and rejected the pýotocol. 
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primarily to protect domestic industries: the French and Irish in relation to 
agriculture; the Spanish and Germans in relation to steel; and the Portuguese in 
relation to textiles. "' 
Tabor believes that the French attitude during the negotiatio'ns can also be 
attributed to their fears of an expanded EU where the power base would shift 
towards the east, increasing the power of Germany. He also believes that it was 
a fear of expansion, and the subsequent demands on the structural funds, which 
motivated the smaller states such as Greece and Ireland to lobby against Polish 
interests. 1 16 
Conflicts between short and long term goals are detrimental to the development 
of coherent EU foreign policy. "' Too often during negotiations Member States 
reacted adopting a protectionist attitude rather than analysing the most beneficial 
long term interest both of their domestic economy and consumers. This conflict 
which characterised the Europe Agreement negotiations has continued to plague 
the implementation process. "' 
Conclusion 
Analysis of the Europe Agreement negotiations is central to the analysis of the 
implementation of the Europe Agreement itself which follows. It highlights 
issues on which the parties disagree, demonstrates the importance of the interests 
of individual Member States and explains how the content of the Agreement 
reflects the negotiations process. These themes are developed in chapters five, six 
and seven. 
115 Helen Wallace and William Wallace, fii 51 above at p372. 
116 This was also an issued raised in the Agenda 2000 documents discussed in chapter four. 
117 The conflict within the Council was mirrored by the conflict within the Commission 
where DG I and DG III clashed. See Helen Wallace and William Wallace, fn 51 above 
at p372. 
118 This is discussed in more detail in chapters seven and eight. 
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Galanter's framework demonstrates how the power imbalance between the parties 
shaped the course of the negotiations process. It also demonstrates how the 
stronger side to the negotiations, the EU side, could more easily control the 
outcome of the negotiations. Chapter five builds upon this theme analysing the 
text of the Europe Agreement in order to demonstrate the wýys in which the 
Agreement favours the EU side's objectives. 
The chapter which follows analyses Sabatier and Mazmanian's implementation 
framework. Together with the analysis of Galanter's framework in this chapter 
it will provide the basis for implementation framework used in this thesis. 
Chapter eight explains how these studies may be consolidated and modified in 
order to develop a theoretical framework for implementation. This may be used 
to evaluate the implementation both of the Polish Europe Agreement and other 
European external relations agreements. 
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CHAPTER THRE E 
Theoretical Framework for Implementation 
Introduction -t 
This study uses as the basis for its theoretical framework Sabatier and 
Mazmanian's classic work on the implementation of public policy. ' This 
framework has been selected for a number of reasons. First, whilst it is clear that 
Sabatier and Mazmanian's context of domestic public policy differs in a number 
of respects from the context of an external agreement, here an association 
agreement, there are many features common to both contexts. In both it is 
possible to identify general stages in the implementation process from negotiation 
and enactment to the final impacts of the legislation. It is also possible to identify 
variables which may affect effective implementation and to examine the relative 
importance of those variables. Secondly, the framework does not merely consider 
a top-down approach to implementation but also takes into account the extent to 
which public and private actors require to change their behaviour. ' Thirdly, the 
frýmework acknowledges the dynamic nature of implementation and considers 
the means by which changes in socio-economic conditions and other factors may 
impact upon implementation. This aspect is particularly relevant within the 
context of external relations. The Europe Agreements were designed to run for 
an initial ten year period and it is clear that political, social and economic events 
will have altered significantly over this period. Finally, Sabatier and Mazmanian's 
framework, whilst acknowledging and building upon earlier implementation 
studies, addresses some of the short-comings which may be identified in these 
theories. (Principally, the works of Martin Rein and Francine Rabinovitz, 
Daniel Mazmanian and Paul Sabatier, Effective Policy Implementation (Lexington, 1983). 
2 Which was one of Snyder's criticisms of earlier implementation studies discussed in the 
Introduction. See Francis Snyder, "The Effectiveness of European Community Law: 
Institutions, Processes, Tolls and Techniques" 49 in T. Daintith (ed), Implementing EC 
Ldiv in the United Kingdom: Structuresfor Indirect Rule (J. Wiley, 1996). . 
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Berman, Bardach, Van Meter and Van Horn). 3 Sabatier and Mazmanian's 
framework attempts to understand the links between individual behaviour and the 
wider context (political, economic and legal) in which it occurs. It places special 
emphasis on the extent to which the legal measure (in Sabatier and Mazmanian's 
study the statute, in this study the association agreement) cah "structure" the 
implementation process. It also stresses the relevance of how difficult the 
problem is to solve. This is especially pertinent in the analysis of an association 
agreement because of the range and complexity of issues addressed by the 
agreement. Finally, previous studies largely ignored the evaluation of 
programmes which related to the behaviour of private actors. This is important 
in the context of this thesis since association agreements deal not merely with 
goods and services but also with private individuals in, for example, the non- 
discrimination provisions and environmental standards provisions. 
This chapter -will examine 
Sabatier and Mazmanian's framework for 
implementation and will highlight those aspects which are pertinent within the 
context of European external relations. It will also indicate some of the 
weaknesses which- exist within the framework. These will be expanded in 
subsequent chapters. 
Sabatier and Mazmanian's Framework 
Sabatier and Mazmanian divide their analysis into three categories 
A. The tractability of the problems; 
B. Ability of the statute to structure implementation; and 
Martin Rein and Francine Rabinovitz, Implementation: A Theoretical Perspective, 
Working Paper No 43 (Cambridge, Mass: Joint Centre for Urban Studies, March 1977); 
Paul Berman, "The Study of Macro- and Micro-Implementation, " (1978) 26 Public 
Policy 157; Eugene Bardach, The Implementation Game (MIT Press, 1977); Donald Van 
Meter and Carl Van Horn, "The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual 
Framework, " (1975) 6 Administration and Society 445. 
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C. Non-statutory variables. 
These categories may be modified to provide a framework for analysis of the 
Europe Agreement. Within each broad category Sabatier and Mazmanian have 
devised a number of variables which may impact upon implementation. 
A. The Tractability of the Problems 
This would pre-suppose that the agreement addresses any problems at all. The 
agreement certainly attempts to alter the status quo and therefore if we consider 
that the reason for such a course of action is disquiet at the status quo it may be 
reasonable to interpret the agreement's objectives as problem solving. Indeed one 
must assume that the provisions are not to be designed for their own sake but to 
attain some objective. So that, for example, the competition law provisions are 
not designed merely to incorporate EC competition law standards into Polish law 
but represent an attempt to improve the regulation of competition within Poland'. 
Similarly, in relation to agriculture, one must assume that the motivation for the 
inclusion of the requirement for Poland to meet EC law agricultural standardswas 
motivated not by a desire for harmonisation for harmonisation's sake but to 
improve the standards within Polish agriculture. ' Of course one may ascribe many 
motivations or objectives to the provisions of the Europe Agreement. The limited 
nature of the trade provisions could be perceived as maximising EU accession to 
Polish maýkets whilst at the same time adopting a protectionist stance in relation 
to their own markets. Are the trade provisions designed to improve trade between 
the two states or to protect EU markets from cheap imports from Poland ? Could 
both objectives be ascribed to the agreement ? 
One measurement of the Europe Agreement's objectives would be to use the 
Preamble to the Agreement and consider the objectives it outlines. It must be 
accepted though that the perception of success or failure of implementation will 
The competition law provisions are discussed in chapter five. 
The agricultural provisions are discussed in chapter five. 
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vary depending upon which party makes the assessment. Generally speaking, 
par-ties will favour the course of action which best protects or advances their 
interests. Nonetheless the Preamble provides a useful starting point to gauge the 
Europe Agreement's objectives. They may be summarised as follows: 
4 
I. Strengthening the links between the EU and Poland; 
2. Allowing Poland to participate in European integration; 
3. Strengthening political and economic freedoms; 
4. Contributing to stability within Europe; 
5. Full implementation of the Europe Agreement linked to successful 
political, economic and legal reforms within Poland; 
6. Establishing political dialogue; 
7. Securing EU support for the process of reforin. within Poland; - 
8. Establishing instruments of cooperation, economic, technical and 
financial assistance; 
9. Ensuring free trade in line with the GATT (now WTO) principles; 
10. Establishing a new climate for economic relations, development and trade 
and investment; 
11. Establishing cultural cooperation; 
12. Establishing exchanges of infonnation; and 
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13. Helping Poland to become a member of the EU. 
The extent to which Sabatier and Mazmanian's view of implementation may be 
adopted wholesale in the context of EU external relations must be questioned. 
Whilst it is true that the Preamble suggests a wide range of objectives it must be 
accepted that in a tripartite agreement such as the Europe Agreement the issue of 
identifying objectives is more complex. This is because the perception of what 
constitutes the Agreement's objectives will vary depending uponwhich party's 
view is considered and each body's objectives must be considered to be valid. 
Some of the main objectives for each of the parties to the Europe Agreement are 
surnmarised in the table five below. The table is not intended to be exhaustive but 
merely highlights the main objectives for the parties. 
Table Five: Main objectives for the parties to the Europe Agreement 
Poland Alember States Commission 
" Strengthen political 0 Strengthen democracy - Exporting EC legal 
links with the EU and within the CEES models to CEES 
its Member States - Promote security and - New markets 
" Tojoin the EU peacein Europe - Trade liberalisation 
" Financial and other - Expanding political - Progress towards 
assistance for economic influence in CEES enlargement 
reforms - New trade markets - Protecting wider 
" Increase exports to the - Protect domestic European interest (e. g. 
EU markets protection of natural 
" Protect domestic environment) 
industry - Expansion of EU role in 
" Security concerns external relations 
The objectives are wide ranging but may be grouped within a number of broad 
categories such as economic objectives, political objectives and security 
objectives. In addition there are a combination of short term objectives, such as 
access to immediate financial support, and longer term objectives, such as EU 
membership. There may also be wider foreign policy objectives. So that for 
Poland an objective may be to be treated as an independent actor on the 
international stage. The Commission may wish 'to develop its capacity to 
represent the interests of the EU within the field of external relations. By contrast 
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the Member States may wish to ensure the minimum erosion of their competence 
to conclude international agreements and consequently seek to restrict the 
Commission's role. 
In relation to the Member States' objectives, it should be born' in mind that the 
objectives are not necessarily common to all the Member States. There may be 
differing views, as there were during the negotiations for the Europe Agreement, 
as to the openness of trade, the speed of accession, how different sectors are to be 
protected, the development of free movement of persons and agriculture. In 
addition, the ranking of objectives by the various Member States may vary. So 
that whilst all Member States may hope that the conclusion and implementation 
of the Europe Agreement contributes to the security and political stability with 
the CEES, this objective may be ranked more highly by those states which have 
common borders or which are geographically closer to the East. 
Some of the objectives -would appear to go beyond that which may be reasonably 
attained within the framework of the Europe Agreement. For example, accession 
to the EU will not automatically result from the successful implementation of the 
Agreement although it will be one of the factors taken into-account. Economic 
refonn will be as, if not more, dependent upon Polish government economic 
policy and world markets than successful implementation. Similarly, security 
issues must be j Udged within a'wider context than the EU so that such issues are 
dependent upon many variables such as relations with NATO and other CEES. 
It would be an impossible task to design an exhaustive list of objectives for any 
party to the Europe Agreement. This is not merely because the objectives were 
never articulated in this way but also because the number and ranking of 
objectives may vary over time as a reaction to other influences be they political, 
economic, social or legal. The Preamble does not rank or prioritise the 
objectives. However, the Europe Agreement itself gives some indication of 
ranking in two ways. First, the Europe Agreement contains a timetable for 
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implementation, running for a period of ten years further subdivided into two 
periods. So for some parts of the Agreement a definite and agreed timetable 
applies. Secondly, the Europe Agreement varies in the degree of detail contained 
within the articles. This necessarily results in a ranking of the provisions to be 
implemented potentially for pragmatic reasons, if no other. It ihay be relatively 
easy for the Polish authorities to comply with, for example, detailed standards 
where the levels of tariffs to be implemented are clearly expressed. In contrast, 
other areas of the Agreement merely provide for further cooperation leaving the 
detail of that cooperation to be agreed at a later stage. 
The limitations of any implementation analysis in this field must therefore be 
made clear at the outset. First, the perception of success or failure of 
implementation must vary depending upon which party is making the assessment. 
Secondly the perception of the relative success of implementation may vary as the 
parties review their ranking of the objectives. Thirdly, any implementation can 
only provide a snap shot of the progress towards successful completion of the 
Agreement's objectives. The Europe Agreement is designed to run initially for ten 
years. Implementation work taken one year or three years hence may paint quite 
a different picture. Finally, this thesis argues that the implementation outcomes 
of"the Europe Agreement will reflect the relative power of the parties. The 
explanation of party preferences for the Europe Agreement is grounded in 
economic, political, security and geopolitical concerns. The party which will gain 
most from the agreement, that is Poland, has compromised most during 
negotiation and implementation in order secure implementation. Whereas, the 
parties which will gain least form the implementation of the Europe Agreement, 
that is the EU side, will impose conditions on the implementation procesS. 6 
This reflects Moravcsik's analysis of European integration: ".. the EC was shaped by more 
than convergence of national preference in the face of economic change. There were 
important distributional conflicts not just within states but among them. " Andrew 
Moravcsik, The Choicefor Europe (UCL, 1999) at p3. 
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Sabatier and Mazmanian suggest four variables within this category: 
1. DýO-tculties hi handling change. 
This variable stresses the need for some sort of causal link' If the outcome 
contained in the Agreement is achieved will it result in a change in the problem? 
Sabatier and Mazmanian give the example of environmental pollution. Will 
reducing sulphur emissions from power plants (the statute's objective) reduce the 
levels of sulphur dioxide and improve public health (the target problem)? Sabatier 
and Mazmanian also point out that the success of a statue may be dependent upon 
the ability of technology to achieve the objective. Again using the environmental 
example, is there a reliable and affordable method of removing sulphur from coal 
either before or after it is used in power generation? In the absence of such 
technology it will be impossible to meet the statute's objective. 
So, within the Europe Agreement, it may be relatively easy to see that, for 
example, the abolition of quanttative restrictions and measures having equivalent 
effects has taken place. The broader objective may be to improve trade between 
the parties. The volume of trade may be assessed by reference to trade figures but 
the interpretation of the figures may be less easy. There may be many reasons 
why trade may have increased such as the improved performance of Polish 
companies, the loss of traditional Polish markets, or even an increase of foreign 
direct investment. 
Technological limitations could also affect the ability to achieve the objectives 
of the Europe Agreement. The most obvious example would be in the field of 
environment. Similarly, technology lag within Poland, most noticeably within the 
telecommunications sector, may inhibit or hinder the possibility of achieving 
objectives contained in other parts of the Europe Agreement such as economic 
cooperation. 
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Z Diversity ofproscribed behaviour. 
The scope of the Europe Agreement is extensive. Chapter five describes in detail 
the range of activities covered. Within each of the sectors addressed much 
legislation and ultimately "behaviour" in the broadest sense milst be altered. So 
that for example, Article 68 relates to harmonisation of Polish legislation. It is 
intended to cover a variety of areas including: customs law, company law, 
banking law, company accounts and taxes, intellectual property, protection of 
workers, financial services, rules on competition, protection of health and life of 
humans, animals and plants, consumer protection, indirect taxation, technical 
rules and standards, transport and the environment. If the example of the 
environment is considered, the adoption of almost 100 regulations on issues 
ranging from sewerage to car exhaust standards is required. It is estimated that it 
will cost Poland 927 billion ECU to comply with the envirom-nental standards 
required for accession to the EU. 7 
The harmonisation of legislation is an extensive task requiring not merely that 
legislation is transposed into the Polish domestic legal system but that the 
legislation achieves the standards proscribed. The question is whether Sabatier 
and Mazmanian's proposition is correct and whether a diversity of 
behaviour/objectives necessarily means that the framing of clear regulations 
becomes more difficult. 
Sabatier and Mazmanian admit that economic incentives may be used to reduce 
the impact of this problem. This is a way of ensuring compliance through the use 
of sanctions such as taxes or fines. 
3. Percentage of population within a political jurisdiction whose 
behaviour needs to be changed. 
k 
Financial Times, 3 March 1998. 
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Very few constituents of Polish society will remain untouched by the Europe 
Agreement. The Polish legislature is required to ensure that they implement the 
targets contained within the Agreement and that existing legislative provisions do 
not conflict with these standards. The civil service will be required not only to 
draft appropriate legislation but to develop new methods of Arking to ensure 
that the standards are consistent between government departments. In addition, 
they will require to adapt to working closely with the EU and Member States 
officials. The Polish courts will be required to apply the Europe Agreement to the 
extent that it is considered to be superior to Polish domestic law. ' The Polish 
business community will be required to act with the European framework of 
standards within areas such as company law. Also, certain features of the Europe 
Agreement, such as the rules on cumulation of origin, may force Polish 
manufacturers to cooperate more with certain states than others. Individuals may 
be affected in many ways because the scope of the Europe Agreement is so wide. 
So for example, Article 76 deals with educational cooperation. Implementation 
of this title may impact upon educationalists, teachers, lecturers and pupils. The 
Polish legal profession will be required to understand the Europe Agreement in 
order to ensure that clients both comply with its terms and make the best use of 
its opportunities. Within the EU, the Europe Agreement may have a direct effect. 
on creating rights and obligations for individuals. ' The EU institutions will have 
to grow accustomed to cooperation with Polish officials and representatives. At 
the level of Members States govenunents similar cooperation strategies and 
mechanisms must be developed. " 
See Ewa Skrzydio-Telfelska, "Polish Practice in International Law" (1995-96) 12 Polish 
Yearbook of International Law 208; See also Wladyslaw Czaplinski, "International Law 
and Polish Municipal Law: A Case Study" (1995) 8 Hague Yearbook of International 
Law 3 1. 
9 The Court has said that the purpose, spirit and general scheme and the terms of the 
agreement must be considered: Joined cases 21724/72 International Fruit Company NV 
v Produktschap voor Groeten en Fruit [1972] ECR 1219. See generally, P. Pescatore 
"The Doctrine of Direct Effect: An Infant Disease of Community Law" (1983) 8 ELRev 
153. 
10 Chapters five and six deal with inter-institutional relations. 
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A good example of a specific subject area would be agriculture. The number of 
employees involved is very large. The problem to be aware of here is that 
agriculture is not really covered in any great detail within the text of the Europe 
Agreement, see chapter five below. 
From the foregoing, it would suggest that in terms of Sabatier and Mazmanian's 
analysis the large size and diversity of the Europe Agreement's target group 
would imply that implementation may be rather difficult. 
4. Extent of Behavioural Change Required of Target Groups. 
The greater the amount of behavioural change required, the more problematic 
successful implementation, ie some problems are more tractable than others. 
This could impact upon the Europe Agreement in a number of ways. For 
example, the environmental changes required are very onerous as compared with 
the free trade provisions. (See above). Another example is found in competition 
law where it would appear easier for Poland to comply with Article 85 than with 
state aids. 
It should be borne in mind however, that Sabatier and Mazmanian caution against 
puttiog too much emphasis on this point. Instead they call for work. towards 
developing a more adequate causal theoty. 
B. Extent to which the statute coherently structures the implementation 
process 
Sabatier and Mazmanian believe that statutes not only stipulate the problems to 
be addresýed and the objectives to be pursued they may also provide a means of 
structuring the implementation process. The statute does this by selecting the 
implementing iqstitutions, providing legal and financial resources to these 
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institutions, biasing the likely policy orientation of agency officials and regulating 
participation by non-governmental actors in the implementation process. Sabatier 
and Mazmanian consider that the ability of a statute to structure the 
implementation process enhances the success of the implementation process and 
may even off-set the difficulties where a significant degree of behavioural change 
is required. 
Some of the indicators which Sabatier and Mazmanian use under this broad 
heading are helpful to the present analysis. Others are less relevant. In addition, 
whilst some of the indictors may be valid within the present context they may not 
necessarily derive from the statute or the character of the statute. They may 
instead derive from the funding for the CEES, external relations practice, issues 
relating to the EU institutions, issues of diplomatic relations or issues of Polish 
domestic governance. 
Sabatier and Mazmanian list seven categories. 
1. Precision and clear ranking of statutory objectives. 
Sabatier and Mazmanian consider the precision, clarity and ranking of statutory 
objectives provides "an indispensable aid in program evaluation .. [an] 
unambiguous directive to implementing officials and a resource available to 
supporters of those objectives". 
k 
Applying this to the Europe Agreement, three points may be made. First, the 
precision of the Agreement varies from article to article. The trade provisions are 
the most detailed and provide the level of quotas or duties to be altered or 
abolished, listings of the products covered and a timetable for achieving these 
standards. By contrast, many other articles are in the style of framework 
provisions, providing only for cooperation sometimes within a wide subject area, 
for example the title on culture. Within these framework articles, no targets or 
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timetables are set, indeed all that is expressed is the desire to work together at 
some point in the future. 
Secondly, to an extent, the level of detail provides a basis for the ranking of the 
Agreement's objectives. In addition, the use of the interim agreen%ent ensured that 
the trade provisions were given pre-eminence in implementation. This reinforces 
the perception that the trade provisions are considered to be more important than 
the other provisions of the Agreement. 
Finally, the ranking may change over time, perhaps as new structures evolve. The 
Conu-nission's White Paper on the Single Market provided clarity on the issue of 
the nature and scope of the hannonisation outlined briefly in Article 76 and also 
established a new priority of action for the Polish implementors. " 
2. The validio, of the casual theory incorporated into the statute. 
Sabatier and Mazmanian state that all major reforms contain a causal theory 
explaining how the objectives are to be attained. The causal theory need not be 
explicit. They consider two features to be essential: 
a. That the main causal links are understood; and 
b. That the implementing officials have sufficient jurisdiction to attain the 
objectives. 
This raises issues similar to those considered above in relation to category (A) on 
the "Tractability of Problems". The understanding of causal links may vary 
depending upon which party's perspective is considered. Whilst the Europe 
Agreement may indeed imply a variety of causal theories, again these may not 
necessarily accord with each party's view of valid causal theories. 
11 The Commission's White Paper is discussed in chapter four. 
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The Europe Agreement provides for a restricted institutional framework,. 12 If this 
were the only mechanism for implementing the Europe Agreement one may have 
concluded that in Sabatier and Mazmanian's words the Agreement lacked 
sufficient "jurisdiction over a sufficient number of critical link-ages to actually 
attain the objectives". In fact very complex structures for implementation have 
evolved both within Poland and in conjunction with the EU and its Member 
States. These structures are not made explicit within the Europe Agreement and 
indeed are only implied to the extent that the Agreement contains provisions 
relating to political dialogue. " 
3. Financial resources available to the implementing agency. 
Sabatier and Mazmanian state that "a threshold level of funding is necessary for 
there to be any possibility of achieving the statutory objectives and the level of 
funding above this threshold is (up to some saturation point) proportional to the 
probability of achieving those objectives". 
Within the context- of implementing the Europe Agreement, financial resources 
derive from a variety of sources. First, is the extent to which the Polish 
government may make resources available. Secondly, resources may be available 
through EU related sources such as through PHARE funding or EIB loans. " 
Thirdly, other international organisations or. states may provide a source of grants 
or loans. Finally, foreign direct investment may, indirectly, help to fund 
implementation. It is apparent from the foregoing that none of the resources is 
specifically provided for within the Europe Agreement. In the case of PHARE 
funding Alan Mayhew has said that the fact that the scope of the Europe 
12 This is discussed in chapters five and six. 
13 Both political dialogue and the institutional framework are discussed in chapter five. 
14 PHARE funding is discussed in chapter one. 
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Agreement and PHARE overlap is more to do with coincidence than strategic 
planning. " 
In addition to the level of financial resources available, an important issue must 
be the level of resources available. For example, the level of e! ýpertise amongst 
implementing officials within the EU, Member States and Poland. 
4. The extent of hierarchical integralimi within and ainotig implementing 
institutions. 
Sabatier and Mazmanian consider that one of the most important attributes of any 
statute is the extent to which it hierarchically integrates the implementing 
agencies. They cite two factors as important: 
a. the number of veto/clearance points involved in attaining the statutory 
objective; and 
b. the extent to which supporters of the statutory objectives have sufficient 
inducements and sanctions to assure acquiescence amongthosg- with a 
potential veto. 
Chapter six examines in detail the implementation structures for. the Europe 
Agreement. Part of this analysis considers the question of veto/clearance points. 
It is important to reiterate at this point, however, that many of the implementation 
structures and consequently the veto/clearance points do not arise directly from 
the Europe Agreement itself. 
The issue of inducements or sanctions is one which varies depending upon which 
party is considered. One of the main inducements is the desire of the parties to 
attain the Agreement's objectives. It has been noted that the perception of 
Interview with Alan Mayhew. 
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objectives varies depending upon which party makes the assessment. The Europe 
Agreement itself provides a number of inducements and sanctions, principally the 
anti-dumping procedures and the dispute resolution procedure. Again, there are 
also inducements and sanctions which do not arise from the Europe Agreement 
itself but which may be relevant to the implementation of the A 'reement such as 9 
accession to the EU, proceedings before the European Court of Justice or the 
Polish Courts and the GATT/WTO mechanisms. 
It is submitted that any analysis under this head should consider the complexity 
of veto/clearance points and whether they apply in a linear fashion. 
5. Evient to ivhich decision-rules of implementill'-, agencies are supportive 
ofstatutory objectives. 
Sabatier and Mazmanian believe that the statute can bias the implementation 
process by stipulating the formal decision-rules of the implementing agencies. 
This is relevant to the extent that the institutional structure provided for within 
the Agreement is covered. Certain powers are provided. In addition, the 
arbitration process is provided as a mechanism for dispute resolution. -- 
However, many implementing agencies are not mentioned in the Europe 
Agreement, let alone their implementing rules. That said it must undoubtedly be 
the case that the rules of the implementing agencies could have a significant 
impact upon the process of implementation. For example, the Sejm's provisions 
to check for consistency with the acquis or the systems within the civil service 
for cooperation between governmental departments which are discussed in 
chapter six below. 
6. Assignment of implementing agenciesloffi-cials committed to t1le 
statutory objectives. 
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Officials in implementing agencies must be strongly committed to the 
achievement of the statute's objectives. Sabatier and Mazmanian point to a 
number of "statutory framers" which may help ensure that the implementing 
officials are so committed. 
a Assigning implementation to agencies whose policy orientation is 
consistent ivith the project. 
Sabatier and Mazmanian say this is most likely where a new agency is created to 
administer the implementation issues. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that 
the Poles have created new agencies and structures with the specific task of 
working towards European integration. In addition, within the EU delegation 
there are a number of officials dealing solely with implementation. 
b. Stipulating that top implementing officials are selected from social 
sectors which are supportive ofthe legislation's objectives. 
This type of analysis would require an extensive in-depth analysis in its own right 
which goes beyond the scope of this particular work. However, what is relevant 
and may be the subject of discussion is the levels of expertise and competence of 
the implementing officials and the support mechanisms available to such 
officials. This will be covered as part of the analysis of implementation structures 
in chapter six. 
7. The extent to which opporttiiiiiiesforparticipatioiz by actors external 
to the implementing agencies are biased to ivards supporters ofstatutory 
objectives. 
This relates to the difficulties for consumers in general to find the necessary 
standing in order to challenge the implementation of a programme. Again, this 
would require an independent study in its own right which must exclude it from 
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the scope of this thesis. The extent to which the Europe Agreement may give rise 
to direct effect is discussed above. 
C. Non-Statutory Variables 
Sabatier and Mazmanian believe that the process of implementation is driven by 
at least two influences: 
1. the need for constant and/or periodic infusions of political support to 
overcome inertia; and 
2. the effect of changes in socioeconomic and technological conditions on 
support for the objective(s). They go on to examine how, what they 
describe as "the major non-legal variables" may affect policy output. 
Within the context of analysing an association agreement some of these variables 
inevitably prove to be more relevant than others. In addition, some of the 
variables have appeared in a slightly different form within the previous two 
categories. Whilst this may have been necessary for Sabatier and Mazmanian's 
approach, given the restrictive approach to implementing agencies in the second 
category which as was discussed above, it is not really helpful within the context 
of an association agreement. 
1. Variation over time and antong governmentaIjurisdiction in social, 
economic and technological conditions affecting the attainability of 
statutory objectives. 
Sabatier and Mazmanian give four ways in which such conditions affect 
implementation: 
a. Variation in socioeconomic conditions can affect perceptions of the 
relative importance of the problem addressed by statute; 
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b. Local variation in socioeconomic conditions can render implementation 
more difficult; 
C. Support for regulation aimed at environmental or consumer protection or 
worker safety seems to be correlated with the economic 'Viability of target 
groups and their relative importance in the total economy; and 
d. Change/lack of change in technology is crucial in the case of policies 
(such as pollution control) that are directly related to technological 
conditions. 
Each of these categories would appear to impact, to a greater or lesser extent, 
upon the implementation process. Category (a) is particularly relevant and is 
discussed in some detail in chapter seven below. Category (b) relates to the 
variations in implementation which may take place across Poland. For example, 
unemployment rates vary widely across Poland. Whilst unemployment in the big 
cities such as Warsaw, Gdansk, Krakow or Poznan may be falling in the rural 
areas it may be as high as 27%. '6 Category (c ) refers to an area where the 
problems facing Poland are extensive. Recently the Estonian environment 
minister admitted that the public did not share the government's enthusiasm for 
environmental standards. A recent opinion poll ranked environment in I Oth place 
"because there are more important problems such as security, education, health 
care and the economy". 17 Polish experience is likely to be similar. Sabatier and 
Mazmanian suggest that the lower the diversity and prosperity of the target group 
the less likely subsidies are to be effective and the greater the need for police 
power (meaning some form of sanctions). Category (d) would apply to the 
implementation of the Europe Agreement in a number ofways. For example, 
privatisation, harmonisation of telecommunications and restructuring. 
16 Interview with Dorata Bartyzel. 
17 Financial Times, fn 7 above. 
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2. The antount andcontinuity of media attewimi to theproblem addressed 
bi, a statute. 
Sabatier and Mazmanian highlight two ways in which the media may impact upon 
implementation: N 
a. May affect the perception of changes in socioeconomic conditions by the 
general public and political elites; and 
b. The short attention span of media 
It is certainly the case that during the course of implementation there has been a 
fair degree of media reporting. To the extent that such reporting provides 
information on the nature and content of implementation disputes these reports 
are discussed in chapter seven. In addition, the use of the media by the 
Commission during i6ýplementation disputes is also examined. The wider role of 
the media described by Sabatier and Mazmanian would provide the basis for an 
interesting inter-disciplinary study which would provide an additional dimension 
to the understanding of legal implementation studies. However, such a. study 
would necessarily take this aspect outwith the framework of this thesis. 
3. Variations over time andjurisdiction in public supportfor statutory 
objectives. 
Sabatier and Mazmanian stress three factors: 
a. Public opinion can strongly affect the political agenda; 
b. Substantial evidence that legislators are influenced by their constituents 
on issues salient to those constituents, particularly when opinion within 
the district is relatively homogeneous; and 
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C. Public opinion polls. 
It is relatively easy to identify public opinion polls which seek to assess popular 
support for EU membership. Such polls consistently point to very strong support 
for EU membership, the most recent demonstrates support in thd region of 64%. " 
A recent survey of the Catholic clergy in Poland showed even higher levels of 
support for EU membership at 84%. " However, there has been no work carried 
out analysing the impact of public opinion on the implementation process. 
This thesis will however consider how Polish officials may modify their 
implementation strategy or alter the pace of implementation to take account of 
public opinion. This may be seen in the discussion on implementation disputes 
in Chapter seven. 
Sabatier and Mazmanian's remaining three heads would require in-depth studies 
in their own right which must take them beyond the scope of this thesis. " 
Modification of Sabatier and Mazmanian's Framework 
This thesis uses Sabatier and Mazmanian's framework as a basis. It has; been 
necessary to adapt this fi-amework from the outset for four main reasons. First, as 
was acknowledged at the beginning of this chapter, Sabatier and Mazmanian's 
framework is designed to operate within a specific context, namely domestic 
public policy. The implementation of domestic public policy necessarily differs 
Is Figures from study commissioned by tile Institute of Public Affairs, a non- Partisan think- 
tank reported in the Financial Times, 24 March 1998. 
19 This is significant given the strong role of the Catholic church especially in the 
countryside where 40% of the Polish population live. Financial Times, 24 March 1998. 
20 4. Changes in resources and attitudes of constituency groups toward statutory 
objectives and the policy outputs of implementing institutions; 
5. Continped Support for Statutory Objectives among sovereigns and implementing 
institutions; and 
6. Commitment and Leadership Skill of Supportive Implementing Officials. 
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from the implementation of an association agreement. Contrasts may be identified 
in relation to the following: 
a. The scale and nature of the content; 
14 
b. The relative impact of external factors such as global politics, global 
economics and EC and international law; and 
C. The scale of the intended impact both in terms of the scope of behavioural 
change required and in terms of the number of actors affected. 
Secondly, there is a degree of overlap in Sabatier and Mazmanian's framework. 
A number of indicators are included under more than one category without adding 
additional levels of analysis or information to their framework. 
Thirdly, Sabatier and Mazmanian, in Section B of their framework focus largely 
upon the extent to which legislation structures implementation. It is submitted 
that an over-reliance upon implementation structures derived from legislation 
excludes the examination of other possible levels and structures .. 
for 
implementation. For this reason this' thesis has re-oriented Sabatier and 
Mazmanian's framework in order to take a broader approach whichwill examine 
different levels of implementation structures. 
Fourthly, it must be recognised that the EU is not a monolithic institution and that 
the structure of the EU is very complex. " This should be borne in mind, 
particularly when considering heads three and four for the reasons discussed 
below. 
Head three requires consideration to be given to "the extent of hierarchical 
integration within and among implementing institutions. Head four requires 
21 This was discussed in chapter two. 
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consideration to be given tp "the extent to which decision-making rules of 
implementing agencies are supportive of the Agreement's objectives. Chapter six 
demonstrates the complexity of the institutional structure which governs the 
Europe Agreement. The EU side itself is non-unitary and is comprised of the 
Member States and the various EU institutions. Chapter two highlighted the lack 
of certainty which exists in the division of competences between the EU and its 
Member States in association agreement such as the Europe Agreement and 
demonstrated how this may directly impinge on the process of negotiation. Here 
it is possible that the competing interests of the various institutions may conflict 
in a way which may threaten to disrupt the implementation process. For example, 
the Spanish intervention in the Europe Agreement just prior to the official 
ceremony marking the signing of the agreements with the Visegrad states was an 
attempt to agree a special protocol on steel which would have protected Spanish 
domestic interests. Similar issues in the process of implementation are discussed 
in chapter seven. Moreover, as table five clearly demonstrates, each of the Parties 
to the Europe Agreement will have specific objectives for the Europe Agreement. 
Some of these objectives appear to overlap, such as Poland's concerns about the 
military threats posed by count-ies to its east and the Member States's desire to 
promote peace in Europe. However, it is equally obvious that there is potential 
for conflict between the Parties' goals. For example, Poland's desire to increase 
exports to the EU as compared with theMember States' desire to protect their 
domestic markets. Chapter seven analyses a number of conflicts which -arise 
principally because of such a clash of objectives. 
Finally, some features of Sabatier and Mazmanian's framework must fall outwith 
the scope of this thesis. This requirement arises for two main reasons. Some 
indicators necessarily require an in-depth empirical study in their own right. This 
may be seen in relation to category C5 relating to the commitment and leadership 
skill of supportive implementing officials. Alternatively, certain indicators require 
analysis dependent upon inter-disciplinary study such as certain aspects of 
category C2 relating to the media. In both scenarios these indicators are 
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considered to b-- valuable additions to the implementation framework and worthy 
of further research. However, they must necessarily be considered to fall beyond 
the scope of this study. 
The Implementation Framework for this Thesis 
Using Sabatier and Mazmanian's framework as a base and taking into account the 
modifications made for the reasons outlined above, or for language reasons, the 
implementation framework for this thesis may be summarised in table six below: 
Table Six: Modified Sabatier and Mazinanian framework 
A. B. C. 
Tractability of the Coherency of the Variables Affecting 
Problems Structure of the Implementation which 
Implementation Process are not Derived from 
the Agreement 
I. Difficulties in handling I. Precision and clear I. Variation over time in 
change ranking of the Europe social, economic and 
2. Diversity of proscribed Agreement's technological 
behaviour objectives conditions affecting 
3. Percentage of 2. Financial resources the attainability of the 
population within a available to the Agreement's 
political jurisdiction implementing objectives 
whose behaviour needs institutions 2. The amount and 
to be changed 3. The extent of' continuity of media 
4. Extent of behaviour hierarchical integration attention to the 
required of target within and among problem addressed by 
groups implementing the Agreement 
institutions 3. Variations over time 
4. Extent to which andjurisdiction in 
decision-making rules public support for the 
of implementing Agreement's 
agencies are supportive objectives 
of the Agreement's 
objectives 
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Conclusions 
Sabatier and Mazmanian's framework examines the problem-centred, statutory 
and political variables which affect the implementation process. They suggest that 
legislative staff and other statutory framers could employ their checklist of 
variables to estimate the probability that a statute will achieve its mandated 
objectives. 
This thesis seeks to use the check list of modified variables above to determine 
which aspects of implementation may be problematic. Chapters four, five, six 
and seven will provide an in-depth analysis of some of the crucial issues relating 
to the implementation of the Polish Europe Agreement: an analysis of the 
autonomous legal measures which regulate Polish-EU relations; an analysis of the 
text of the Agreement; an analysis of the structures which have evolved to 
implement the Agreement; and an analysis of five implementation disputes. These 
chapters will provide the basis for a final analysis of Sabatier and Mazmanian's 
modified framework in chapter eight which will assess the extent to which it 
indicates potential problems for the implementation of Europe Agreement. It will 
then compare these indicators against the experience of implementation thus far. 
This analysis will then be used to assess the extent to which the framewoik assists 
in understanding implementation in the -context of the Europe Agreement. 
Proposals for the modification of the framework in the light of this analysis will 
be discussed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Towards Pre-Accession: 
The Legally Binding and Autonomous Legal Measures 
Regulating EU-Polish Relations 
Introduction 
The issue of accession has been central to Polish-EU relations since the Europe 
Agreement negotiations began in 1990. The EU side has responded to the 
challenge of enlargement to the cast in a manner which has at times appeared to 
be ad hoc. This chapter will examine the developments which have taken place 
since the conclusion of the Europe Agreement negotiations. It will examine the 
legally binding and autonomous measures which have been employed in order to 
demonstrate the complexity of measures which regulate Polish-EU relations. This 
has implications for the implementation process which will be further developed 
in chapters seven and eight. 
Interim Agreement-. 
Although the Europe Agreement was signed on I March 1992, it did not enter 
into force until almost two years later on I February 1994. The Europe 
Agreement, being a mixed agreement, required to be ratified by each Member 
State's parliament. ' This proved to be a time-consuming process and, in order to 
ease the delay, interim agreements were enacted covering those areas falling 
wholly within the EU's competence, that is trade and trade -related aspects. 2 The 
interim agreement entered into force on I March 1992. ' 
I Mixed agreements are discussed in more detail in chapters five and seven. 
OJ 1992 Ll 14/1. 
Interim agreements with the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and Hungary also 
entered into force on I March 1992; OJ 1992 LI 1511, LI 1611. 
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The Development of Accession Criteria 
Meanwhile, pressure continued upon the EU to develop a more appropriate 
response to the needs of the CEES. ' The European Councils were to provide the 
forum where policy developments would be announced. Poland submitted formal 
requests for membership to the EU on I April 1994. Article 0 Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) provides that "Any European State may apply to become 
a member of the Union". The conditions for accession are not articulated, instead 
these are to be the "subject of an agreement between the Member States and the 
Applicant State". At the Copenhagen Summit of June 1993 the members of the 
European Council outlined the conditions which it considered necessary for 
accession to the EU as follows: 
The need for stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and respect for the protection of minorities; 
2. The ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence 
to the aims of political, economic and monetary union; 
3. The Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the 
momentum of European integration; and 
4. The existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. ' 
Although both the Maastricht and Lisbon Summits had agreed to examine the 
general implications of enlargement this was the first occasion where, albeit 
vague, membership criteria had been articulated; it marked a more concrete 
As part of this evolving process DGI was fonnally divided and DGIA was created 
dealing with external relations issues concerning the CEES. 
These conditions were first proposed by the Commission; "Towards a Closer Association 
with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe" SEC(93) 648 final. 
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acceptance of eventual accession. The Summit also agreed to open EU markets 
more rapidly. ' The conditions specified were both political and economic and 
depended not merely upon the performance of the CEES but also upon the 
development of the EU itself. 7 
The next milestone on the road to accession came with the Essen Summit in 
December 1994 which accepted two important Commission proposals, one 
focusing upon the political dimension (the structured relationship with the EC 
institutions), the other focusing upon the economic dimension (the White Paper 
on the Single Market). 
The "structured relationship" was designed in part to address concerns relating 
to the bilateral nature of the Europe Agreements by creating multilateral 
frameworks. Members of the European Council and the President of the 
Commission meet with their counterparts from the CEES at least once a year. 
There are also regular meetings at ministerial, political director, European 
correspondent and working group levels. The pattern of meetings has developed 
slowly towards more substantial dialogue, especially at ministerial level. 
The principal aim for the structured relationship is to "develop practical 
cooperation between the governments of the Member States and of the associated 
countries' in areas of common interest.. It -was hoped that the Associated States 
would become familiar with the workings of the EC institutions through their 
attendance at certain Council and European Council meetings. Obviously the 
6 Market access to sensitive sectors was also increased although to a more limited degree; 
OJ 1994 L25/1. 
7 For an analysis of the conditions see: Lynn E Ramsey, "Towards a Wider European 
Union: A Commentary on the Possible Accession of Poland and Hungary to the European 
Union" (1995) European Public Law 189. 
See generally Pal Duncay, Tomas Kende and Tomas Szucs, "The Integration of Central 
and Eastern Europe into the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European 
Fifteen' 'in Marc Maresceau (ed) Enlarging the European Union: Relations Between the 
EU and Central and Eastern Europe (Longmans, 1997) at pp 316-346. 
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structured relationship is limited. It does not grant the Associated States the 
ability to propose, vote on or oppose EU policy. It merely provides the 
opportunity for consultation. However, it does serve to move consultation onto 
a multilateral basis enabling the development of cooperation between the CEES. 
(This will be very important if internal conflict within an expanded EU is to be 
minimised). In addition, it provides the CEES with the opportunity to present 
ideas at the highest EU level. 9 
The structured relationship builds upon and to an extent overtakes the provisions 
on political dialogue discussed in chapters two and five. 
The White Paper on "Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of the Union" was 
published by the Commission in May 1995.10 It is a very detailed document 
running to 478 pages and was drafted in response to the Essen Council's 
exhortation that the integration of the Associated States into the internal market 
was "the key element in the strategy to narrow the gap". " The main aim of the 
White Paper is to help the Associated States Prepare for the internal market. The 
paper does not cover the entire acquis coninninautaire, which must be adopted 
by all Member States, but only those aspects which relate to the internal market. " 
The White Paper was designed to act as a pre-accession "blue-prine' for the 
Associated States. It defines "key measures" in each sector of the internal market 
and suggests the order in which the approximation of legislation should be 
Pal Duncay, Tomas Kende and Tomas Szucs, fn 8 above at p 324. 
10 COM(95) 163 final and annex COM(95) 163 flnaV2. 
See generally, "EU Builds Bridges in Eastern Europe" June (1995), Issue no 95 -VI, 
Financial Times East European Business Law, 8. 
12 Helen Wallace and William Wallace, Policy-Making in the European Union (Oxford 
University Press, 1996,3rd edition) at p382 suggest that in drawing up tile White Paper 
in'this way implies that certain aspects of the acquis, that is those aspects directly relating 
to the more commercial aspects, are more important than others. 
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addressed. " Support for achieving these goals is provided through a multi- 
country PHARE programme and technical assistance is provided through 
the 
establishment of technical assistance information office (TAIE - 
14 
,- mmission. 
For Drawing up the White Paper was coordinated across the Co 
example, DGXV had responsibility for regulatory convergence and DGI 
A had 
responsibility for the PHARE aspects, although there was some internal conflict 
before the division of responsibilitYwas agreed. " 
The standards contained within the White Paper overlap with some aspects of 
the 
Europe Agreement, an important qualitative difference being that the 
Europe 
Agreement created legal rights and obligations vis-a-vis the parties. The 
White 
Paper imposes no obligations on Poland, or any of the Associated States. 
It is 
intended to assist with pre-accession strategy and should also assist "'Vith 
the 
implementation of the Europe Agreement because it provides guidelines 
for 
implementation and additional financial resources through PHARE. 
The Madrid Summit decided that the Commission should forward -its . 
first 
I 
Opinions on membership applications to the Council "as soon as possible -aftert 
the conclusions of the Intergovernmental Conference". The Commission took 
the 
novel approach in formulating its Opinions by issuing a questionnaire to each 
applicant state in April 1996. The Document was extensive; at around 150 pages, 
and covered more than 1000 questions. The main part of the questionflaire was 
common to all applicant states. There were additional annexes covering 
issues 
which related to particular states. 16 
13 P2 of the White Paper. 
14 P35 of the White Paper. 
15 Helen Wallace and William Wallace, fn 12 above at pp382-383. 
. For example the Lithuanian question contained additional questions oil f-isherieS 
Interview with Jorgen Mordenstein. 
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The Questionnaire did not follow the format of the White Paper nor was it 
restricted to the content of either the White Paper or the Europe Agreement. It 
contained questions covering general background infon-nation requiring statistics 
on, inter alia, demography, production, trade, employment, health care, economic 
growth and school population. It also contained questions requiring precise 
information on the legal and administrative framework in sectors falling within 
EU competence. Information on the application and enforcement of legislation 
in these sectors was required. 
Polish officials complained that they were given insufficient time to respond to 
the questionnaire. " The applicants were given the opportunity to present 
additional information at bilateral talks held in May 1997. 
The Opinions and Agenda 2000 
The Commission's Opinions on the applicants together with its views on the 
impact of accession for the EU were published together in the communication 
Agenda 2000. " The Commission prepared its reports using a variety of sources 
drawing not merely upon the questionnaires and bilateral reports but also upon 
Member States' assessments, European Parliament Reports and resolutions and 
reports from international organisations, non-governmental organisations and 
what are described as "other bodies". " In addition, progress in implementing the 
Europe Agreement, the White- Paper and other aspects of the acquis. was 
considered. A report was prepared for each of the applicants assessing their 
ability to join the EU by measuring their performance under each of the 
Copenhagen Summit criteria outlined above. The opinions are based upon both 
factual evidence and predictions based on economic and political criteria. None 
17 Indeed the Commission took longer to draw up the questions than the recipients were 
granted to submit their replies to the often complex questions. Interview with Krysztof 
Treczynski. 
I& Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union, COM(97) 2000 final, 15.07.1997 
19 Fn 18 above, Volume I at p41. 
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of the applicants was considered to satisfy all of the criteria. However, the 
Commission considered that Poland, Hungary, Estonia, the Czech republic and 
Slovenia could reach the necessary standard in "the medium term" provided "they 
maintain and strongly sustain their efforts of Preparation". The main findings of 
the Polish opinion are discussed in chapters seven and eight. 
The Commission recommends that the existing pre-accession strategy be adapted 
to better prepare the applicants f6r membership. There are four features to the 
new pre-accession strategy. First, the Commission envisages that pre-accession 
aid, in addition to monies under PHARE, should be granted to the applicants. " 
There would be two aspects to the aid: agricultural development, at ECU 500 
million per year; and structural aid, at ECU I billion each year. The structural aid 
is to be used to familiarise the-recipients with the EU arrangements for 
implementing structural funds, especially the Cohesion Fund. 
Secondly, a new instrument is to be createdwhich is to be "the key feature of the 
reinforced strategy", the Accession Partnership. Two elements will exist. The first 
element will require the applicants to accept precise commitments on democracy, 
macro-economic stabilization and nuclear safety. In addition, a -national 
programme to adopt the aqquis has been drawn up between theCommission and 
the Applicants using priorities identified in the Opinions. Each programme will 
have a timetable and implementation will depend upon ý'accession conditionality" 
with evaluation procedures and continuous dialogue with the Commission. 
Financial assistance will be on the basis of annual agreements, conditional upon 
achieving the programme's objectives. The second element deals with the 
resources necessary to prepare for accession. The Commission calls for a 
"mobilisation of all resources available" both from the EU and also from 
20 Fn 18 above, Volume I at pp62-63. 
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international financial institutions, suggesting that PHARE is used as away of co. 
financing projects with the EIB, the EBRD and the World Bank. 21 
The preparation of the Accession Partnerships began in the second half of 1997 
and progress will be regularly reported to the European Councif. The first report 
is due to be submitted at the end of 1998, thereafter an annual report will be 
presented. 
Thirdly, participation in"Community programmes and mechanisms to apply the 
acquis is to be open to applicants. 22 The Europe Agreement provided for this and 
participation in certain progress is already underway (see chapter two). The 
Commission recognises the need to ensure that participation in programmes is 
effective and suggests that PHARE funding is used to co-finance participation 
beyond the 10% limit specified at the Essen Summit. The motivation for 
extending participation to the applicants is an attempt to better prepare them for 
membership by helping with the adoption of the acquis and helping to resolve 
more technical problems. 
Finally, the creation of the European Conference which would meet once a year 
at the level of Heads of State or Govdrnment and the President of the 
Commission and at ministerial level, where necessary. 23 Membership would be 
open to the EU Member States and all European states "aspiring-to membership" 
with an association agreement. The Conference would provide a forum for 
consultation on issues related to Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice 
and Home Affairs. The Commission suggests that issues, including inter alia 
security, relations with Russia, drug trafficking, money laundering and illegal 
21 The Commission proposes that pre-accession aid to states preparing to join the EU should 
total 3 billion ECU a year for 2000-2006. It considers that PHARE should support two 
priorities; strengthening administrative and judicial capacity and investments related to 
the adoption and application of the body of law. IP/98/258. 
22 Fn 18, Volume I at p64. 
23 Fn 18, Volume I at pp66-67. 
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immigration, could be discussed in order to improve cooperation and to develop 
joint actions and declarations. 
The first meeting of the European Conference took place in London on 12 March 
1998. It was decided to focus initially upon: combatting transnýtional organised 
crime, improving environmental protection and promoting sustainable 
development; foreign and security policy; competitive economies and regional 
cooperation. 
Agenda 2000 highlighted the impact of expanded membership for the EU. The 
Commission estimates the cost of absorbing the proposed new members will be 
around 1.27% of the EU GDP between 2000 and 2006 . 
2' The EU institutions will 
have to be reformed if they are adequately to deal with the additional demands 
which a significantly larger Union will bring. 2' Although the Treaty of 
Amsterdam made some changes to the functioning of the institutions, the 
Commission considers that they merely represent "a new step on the road to the 
unification of Europe". It proposes that it is necessary to reform the weighting 
of voting in the Council and reduce the number of Commissioners to one per state. 
before the first enlargement. But it stresses that these reforms alone will -not be 
sufficient to proceed with a substantial enlargement. It suggests that an 
Intergovernmental Conference be convened as soon as possible after 2000 to 
reform the composition and functioning of the institutions. Perhaps more 
controversially the Commission also called for reform of the EU budget spending 
(discussed below). 26 
The Luxembourg Council approved the Commission's Agenda 2000 
communication and agreed that the accession process would begin on 30 March 
24 This ceiling was agreed at the Edinburgh Summit in December 1992. 
25 Fn 18 above, Volume I at pp5-6. 
26 Fn 18 above, Volume I at ppl4-34. 
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1998. Bilateral conferences will be convened in the spring of 1998 to begin 
negotiations with Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia on the conditions for their entry into the Union. 
Overview of Pre-accession and Agenda 2000 
Poland's inclusion in the Commission's list does not mean that EU membership 
is now automatic. Progress in implementation of the acquis must be maintained 
and enforcement mechanisms are to be strengthened. Difficult areas remain such 
as agriculture, steel, iron, coal, road networks and privatisation. Moreover it is 
clear that accession cannot proceed unless the necessary reforms to the structural 
funds and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) take place. On 18 March 1998 
the Commission set out its proposals for future policy in these areas which 
currently represent over 80% of the EU budget. 27 
The Commission proposals would reduce the coverage of regions eligible for 
structural funds support from 51% of the EU's population to 35-40%. The aim 
is to direct spending into the least developed regions. Under the Commission 
proposals no Member State will have an increase in the number of regions 
benefiting and the Objective I list ( regions where the GDP per head of 
population is lower than 75% of the EU average) is likely to be cut in all Member 
States except Greece. 
The CAP reforms are designed to improve the competitiveness of EU agriculture 
by reducing the risk of surplus and avoiding over-compensation. To this end the 
Commission proposes: a reduction in payments to large farms; that Member 
States may choose to make payment conditional on environmental standards; and 
that intervention prices for dairy, arable and beef sectors are fixed for the period 
of Agenda 2000. 
27 IP/98/258. 
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The Commission hopes to finalise Agenda 2000 by the beginning of 1999. 
However, reaching agreement on the budget reforms may prove to be particularly 
difficult. " Member States are reluctant to commit to higher contributions to the 
EU budget particularly when they have had to adopt tight domestic spending 
strategies to meet the criteria for economic and monetary union (EMU). This is 
compounded by the fact that Germany is financially weakened by the process of 
unification; past budget reform, such as those in 1988 and 1992, were 
substantially funded by the German government. The Commission is scheduled 
to consider contributions to the EU budget in October 1998 but the financial 
climate coupled with pressure from some Member States, principally Germany 
and the Netherlands, may compound the difficulties in reaching agreement. " 
The Agenda 2000 documents have raised some more general issues about 
accession to the EU. All new Member States must have ratified the ECHR prior 
to joining. 3' This despite the fact that an existing Member State, the UK, has not 
yet incorporated the Convention. " The Treaty of Amsterdam, which amends the 
32 TEU, was signed on 2 October 1997. The new treaty incorporates the Schengen 
acquis into the framework of the EU with a new chapter on an "area of freedom, 
security and justice" which aims to acWeve the free movement by relaxing. police 
and customs controls on persons and goods at borders. The result is that all 
applicants would be obliged to accept that part of the acquis in full. " This may 
28 See Financial Times 19 March 1998. 
29 "The Budget is Done; Let the Battle Begin", The European (409) 23-29 March at p 16. 
30 Commission's Opinion on Poland's Applicationfor Membership of the European Union, 
COM(97) 2002 final at p5. 
31 Although the present UK government is currently in the process of incorporating the 
ECHR into its domesýic law. 
32 The new Treaty will not enter into force until ratified by all Member States. 
33 Fn 30 above at p89. 
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be problematic since its is unclear exactly what the Schengen acquis iS. 34 
Moreover, only seven of the current Member States apply the convention, 
although six are working towards implementation. 
The European Council has excluded the possibility of partiaf adoption of the 
acqjjiS. 35 Derogations agreed during the negotiation process will still be 
available. Some of the standards which new Member States must achieve have 
been clarified. It had been feared by some conunentators that full participation in 
the third stage of EMU would be required. " The Commission has stated that EU 
membership only implies acceptance of the goal of EMU; applicants will have to 
achieve the convergence criteria but not necessarily on accession. 37 
One of the Commission's recommendations which may prove to have a decisive 
impact upon the course of negotiations is the decision that the simultaneous 
opening of negotiations "does not imply that negotiations will be concluded 
simultaneously". 3' The Visegrad states resented that they were required to sign 
Europe Agreements at the same time. Hungary considered that Poland was too 
confrontational and impeded its progress. All the applicants are fiercely 
competitive and eager to ensure that their state is the first to join., At -the same 
time, a number of commentators have noted that greater concessions may have 
been achieved under the Europe Agreement had the Visegrad states adopted 
common negotiating positions. It will be interesting to see how these factors.. 
influence the leading group of applicants. Will they seek to achieve the most 
34 Protocol 2, Article 8 Treaty of Amsterdam provides: 
"For the purposes of the negotiation for the admission of new Member States into the EU, 
the Schengen acquis and further measures taken by the institutions within its scope shall 
be regarded as an acquis which must be accepted in full by all the state candidates for 
admission". 
35 This is the same approach adopted in all other accessioq negotiations. 
36 Lynn E Ramseyfn 7 above at pp195-196. 
37 Fn 30 above at p57. 
38 Fn 18 above, Volume 1, Final Recommendations at p69. 
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favourable deal by establishing negotiating pacts? Or, will they become 
adversaries in a bid to become the first CEES to join the EU ? It will be 
interesting to monitor the Polish approach . 
-1 On the whole, Poland will be content with the outcome o Agenda 2000. Jan 
Kulakoski, a lawyer and former secretary general of the International Labour 
Organisation, has been appointed Poland's chief negotiator in the forthcoming 
accession talks with the EU. Already the Polish side is attempting to adopt a 
tough stance, particularly in relation to agriculture where it is calling for the EU 
to extend the same levels of agricultural support currently enjoyed by existing EU 
farmers to Polish farmers. " Only time will tell how successful the Polish 
approach will be but what is clear is that the next few years will be crucial in 
establishing Poland's role within the EU. 
Conclusions 
One analyst suggests that the Europe Agreement is now largely irrelevant as a 
result of the White Paper and membership application. " Whilst the trade 
provisions may continue in importance, because they provide concrete goals and 
obligations, such provisions were in any case mostly covered by-the interim 
agreements. 
This interpretation is flawed for four main reasons: 
1. The Europe Agreement is the only legally binding instrument which 
applies between Poland and the EU. If progress towards accession were 
suddenly to slow down or even halt the Europe Agreement would 
continue to bind the parties; 
39 Financial Times 17 March 1998, "Farming is not an aýea where we warýt to strike bad 
compromises. We want the same duties and the same rights. - 
40 Jorgen Mordenstein, fn 16 above. 
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2. Progress on implementation of the Europe Agieement was one of the 
main indicators used by the Commission in drawing up its Opinions; 
3. The Luxembourg Council stressed the continuing importance of the 
Europe Agreement; it considered that the Agreements rerained "the basis 
of the Union's relations with these States"; and 
4. The Association Council spends the majority of its time on issues related 
to the Europe Agreement rather than on the White Paper. " 
I This chapter has described the evolution of legal and non-legal measures which 
regulate Polish-EU relations. The goal of accession has been the driving force 
behind pressure for developments from Poland and the other CEES. The EU side 
often appear to have reacted in an unstructured way. ' For example, the accession 
questionnaire issued to the applicant states does not directly relate to the content 
of either the Europe Agreement or the White Paper. 
Table seven below demonstrates the complicated picture which has emerged 
during the 1990s. In addition to the legally binding agreements a series of binding 
and autonomous measures has been adopted. Poland has played no role in 
determining the content of the autonomous measures. It has no control over when 
or whether the EU adopts such measures and no guarantee that compliance with 
such measures will result in EU accession. Evans believes that this type of 
"voluntary harmonisation" may not work in the CEES's favour. He considers that 
while it may improve legal access to the Community market it may "do less to 
assist such countries develop their capacity to exploit the trading opportunities 
entailed [and] encourage their real economic qualification [for EU 
41 Interview with Jan Willem Blankert. 
42 Balazs considers that the extensive use of autonomous legal measures reflects "an 
extremely cautious attitude towards (lie CEES and towards tl 
" 
ie whole process of preparing 
the eastem enlargement of the EU". Peter Balazs in Marc Maresceau (ed)fn 8 above at 
p370. 
117 
membership]". " This is because the autonomous framework is unable to take 
account of structural economic problems as severe as those faced by the CEES. 
I Whilst this may be true, it is equally apparent from the discussion in chapter two 
that where legally binding agreements are concluded between the parties the 
inequality in bargaining positions has often meant that the outcome reflects the 
EU standards (often pre-determined) and not some compromise which reflects the 
particular dynamics of the economic or other difficulties facing the CEES. 
Table Sewn: Measures Regulating EU-Polish Relations in the 1990s 
Binding Legal Measures Autonomous legal measures 
Interim agreement PHARE 
Europe Agreement Structured dialogue 
White Paper 
Agenda 2000 
Various Summit declarations on accession 
Once again the pursuit of autonomous measures by the EU side reflects and 
reinforces the asymmetry of power between the parties. If Poland chooses to 
comply with the autonomous measures, as is likely, its decision to pursue closer 
European integration arises because of its weaker position. Again, employing the 
Nash model, Poland will choose to adopt these measures, notwithstanding their 
lack of input into their formulation, because they hope that this Nvill improve their 
economic, geopolitical and security position. 
The use of autonomous measures demonstrates how the EU side is able to exploit 
the asymmetry of power in order to set the agenda. This chapter has demonstrated 
however, that agenda setting on the part of the EU side has been neither clear cut 
not systematic. The piece-meat approach to policy vis-a-vis the CEES reflects a 
lack of clarity of purpose within the EU side. This in turn reflects the absence of 
a unified institutional structure within the EU side which was discussed in chapter 
two. For example, divisions have appeared between the Member States and 
43 Andrew Evans "Voluntary Harmonisation in Integration Between the European 
Community and Eastern Europe" (1997) 22 ELRev 210 at 219. 
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between the Commission and the Council in the approach to the question of 
accession to the EU. " A number of approaches were mooted. The so-called 
regatta option advocated that the EU open negotiations with all applicants at the 
same time. This approach was supported by five Member States: Austria, 
Sweden, Finland, France and Denmark. The differentiated al3proach favoured 
opening negotiations with a select group of states: Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic. This was proposed by the German government. The route which 
the EU side has chosen to follow was proposed by the Commission in an attempt 
to find a solution which could appear to be objective and a-political. The ultimate 
result was Agenda 2000 where the Commission "tested" the applicants suitability 
for membership against criteria determined by the EU side. This provided a 
compromise result which, as was discussed above, approved the accession of 
certain CEES who were deemed to have met the criteria. The remaining CEES 
would have their applications reviewed annually. 
In terms of implementation, a real problem emerges. Namely, that there is no 
clear hierarchy which should apply to the range of measures which now exist. Is 
Poland more likely to strive to comply with the Europe Agreement because it is 
a legally binding document ? Is compliance with. the White Paper a greater 
priority since it is a more recent and more precisely detailed document ?A very 
complex structure of measures now exists which has direct implications for the 
implementation of the Europe Agreement. This is further examined in chapter 
eight. 
44 See generally, Lykke Friis, "The End of the Beginning of Eastern Enlargement- 
Luxembourg Summit and Agenda-settingý' European Integration online papers Vo12 
(1998) No7. 
119 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE POLISH EUROPE AGRE EMENT: 
TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 
-1 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a textual analysis of the Polish Europe Agreement. It also 
highlights some aspects of the Agreement which may prove problematic in terms 
of implementation. Unless otherwise stated all article references are to the Europe 
Agreement. 
On I February 1994 the second generation of agreements between the European 
Community and Poland entered into force. ' This was one of the first of the so- 
called Europe Agreements. 
The Europe Agreements share a common framework although each agreement 
purports to consider the needs of the individual CEES. The principal features are: 
a. A common legal basis and fon-n; 
b. Political dialogue and institutions of association; 
c. Free movement of trade; 
d. Move'ment of workers; 
e. The right of establishment; 
f. The provision of services; 
1993 OJ L348/1. T lie Polish Europe Agreement was signed on 16 December 1991. 
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g. Financial cooperation, competition provisions and State aids; 
h. The approximation of legislation; 
i. Economic cooPeration; 
Cultural cooperation; and 
k. Finuncial cooperation. 
a. Legal Basis and Form 
The Polish Agreement was concluded between the EU and its Member States, on 
the one part, and the Polish Republic on the other. The first thing to note is that 
the Agreement is adopted under all three of the treaties founding the European 
Communities: the European Coal and Steel Treaty, the Euratom Treaty (Article 
10 1 (2)) and the EC treaty (Articles 23 8 and 228(3)(2). Article 23 8 EC provides 
the Community with the power to conclude association agreements. The precise 
nature of association agreements is not defined or described within the treaty and 
the structure, scope and content of association agreements varies quite 
considerably. However, Article 238 does detail certain features common to all 
association agreements. They involve reciprocity of rights and obligations, 
common actions and special procedures. 
Where a mixed agreement, such as the Europe Agreement, has been concluded 
the EU and the Member States have an obligation to work together. The ECJ has 
described this duty of close cooperation as the "requirement of unity in the 
international representation of the Community" and considers it to be one of the 
2 fundamental principles of the external relations of the EU. The extent to which 
Ruling 1178 (Rebraft Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials) 
[1978] ECR 215 at para 35. 
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the Member States and the EU observe the duty of close cooperation is discussed 
in chapter eight. 
One of the most interesting aspects to consider in relation to the nature of each 
of the Europe Agreements is the membership of the Agreement. "The Agreements 
are not block-to-block agreements unlike the Lome Conventions or the agreement 
on the European Economic Area? The impact this has had upon the negotiation 
strength of parties is discussed in chapter two. 
Although the Agreement is not the product of block-to-block negotiations it is 
really a multi-lateral rather than a bi-lateral agreement because one "party" to the 
Agreement is composed of 15 states in addition to the EU. ' 
Preamble 
The preamble is more or less identical in all the Agreements and is interesting in 
two respects. First, it sets the tone and highlights the philosophy underlining 
much of the Agreement. Secondly, it introduces some of the innovative and 
important features of the Agreement. The preamble may also be employed to 
identify the Agreement's objectives, see chapter three. 
The traditional links and common values of the contracting parties are 
emphasised. As one w6uld expect no attempt is made to define-or provide 
examples of these. Indeed it is interesting to consider whether a strong case could 
be made for the existence of such bonds between the existing EU membership. 
The preamble considers the Agreement to be one of the cornerstones in the 
creation of "a system of stability based on co-operatioW'. It must be presumed 
Lome 1 1976 OJ L? 5/1; Lome 111980 OJ L347/1; Lome 1111986 OJ L86/1; Lome IV 
1993 OJ L280/26; Agreement on the European Economic Area 1994 OJ LI/l. 
Agreements amended to take account of the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden 
to the EU in 1995. 
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that "stability" includes not only economic stability but also wider political and 
defence issues. in addition, a link is claimed between full implementation of the 
Agreement and the full implementation of Poland's technological modernisation. 
One of the most significant aspects of the Preamble for Poland is that it 
recognises that its ultimate goal is full membership of the EU. However, the 
preamble does not make accession a common goal and creates no legal obligation 
to admit Poland as a member of the EU. ' 
It is important to emphasise at the outset that the Europe Agreement was not 
designed to be a pre-accession agreement. This is relevant to the discussion 
summarised in tables eight to ten which clearly demonstrate how the Europe 
Agreement favours the EU side. Subsequent events may now lead us to view the 
Europe Agreement as a pre-accession blueprint for Poland however, when Poland 
signed the Europe Agreement it did not complete an application form to join a 
I pre-existing club. Whilst it is true that "the EU's strategy seems to have been to 
govern through the prospect of membership" the Europe Agreement is essentially 
6 
an association agreement between Poland, the EU and its Member States. The 
Europe Agreement has specific a0 ! imited objectives and the text reflects the 
power imbalance discussed in chapter two. However, it is now apparent that 
during the negotiations for the Europe Agreement and the implementation of the 
Europe Agreement there was also a set of sotto voce negotiations relating to the 
broader question of accession of Poland to the EU. The precise content of these 
negotiations cannot be known but it is clear from the discussion in chapter four 
that the lack of unity within the EU side meant that at times the EU's agenda was 
unclear and not so tightly drawn. ' Once accession negotiations were opep to 
See chapter two. 
Lykke Friis, "The End of the Beginning of Eastern Enlargement- Luxembourg Summit 
and Agenda-setting" European Integration online papers yol. 2 (1998) No. 7. 
In order to build up a detailed and exact picture of agenda setting within the EU side at 
this time access to minutes of tile meetings of the various institutions would be required. 
These documents are not available to researchers. 
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Poland this agenda became explicit and so the issue of accession continues to play 
an important role in shaping the asymmetry of power between the parties. 
Poland's eagerness to join the EU undennines its ability to negotiate effectively 
during implementation allowing the EU side to control the pattern and process of 
implementation. 
14 
This chapter clearly illustrates the ability of the EU side to conclude an agreement 
which protects their objectives in three ways: 
I. Through the adoption of provisions pennitting the adoption of 
protectionist measures; 
Through the adoption of provisions enabling consultation to take place on 
issues beyond the scope of the Europe Agreement; and 
Through the adoption of provisions based upon EC law standards. 
These provisions are surnmarised in tables eight to ten below. 
Geiteralprhiciples 
The provisions contained in the Agreement are designed to be gradually 
implemented over a period of 10 years. The transitional period began from -the 
date which the Agreement entered into force and is to be divided into two stages 
each lasting in principle for 5 years although this length may be varied by the 
Association Council! The two stages do not apply to the provisions on the free 
movement of goods which are discussed below. 
b. Political Dialogue and the Institutions of Association I 
Political Dialogue must be considered to be the Agreement flagship. It is 
mentioned both in the Preamble and in Article 1, which details the Agreement 
Article 6 of the Agreement. 
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aims, and is devoted an entire Title. This is the first association agreement to 
include a title on Political Dialogue. 
Three broad aims exist. First, to facilitate Poland's full integration "into the 
community of democratic nations" and cons-olidate the rapproclement between 
the EU and Poland. Secondly, to support the political and economic changes in 
Poland and finally, to contribute to the establishment of new links of solidarity. 
Consultation is to take place at the highest possible level between the European 
Council President, the Commission President and the President of Poland. In 
addition, talks are to take place at ministerial level within the Association Council 
and at parliamentary level within the Parliamentary Association Committee. 
Consultation is not restricted to the EU and Polish institutional framework. 
Rather the Agreement appears to encourage the establislurient of cooperative 
culture urging that ftill advantage be made of "all diplomatic channels including 
the regular briefings by Polish officials in Warsaw, consultations on the occasion 
of international meetings and contacts between diplomatic representatives in third 
countries". The provisions on political dialogue have the potential to be very wide 
ranging and the different levels of interaction in the Agreement are designed only 
as building blocks to be developed and supplemented. Article 4 provides that the 
mechanisms and procedures for political dialogue should follow "any another 
means which would make a useful contribution to consolidating, developing and 
stepping up this dialogue". 
The inclusion of the title on political dialogue does present the EU with a sphere 
of influence which it does not normally have in external relations agreements. 
The meetings which take place within the framework of this title are not restricted 
to the subject matter of the treaty. Discussion at ministerial level may take place 
within the Association Council on "any matter which the parties might wish to 
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put to it". 9 The aims and objectives for the title in no way imply that matters 
outwith the scope of the Agreement should be excluded from the ambit of 
political dialogue but rather are couched in the widest possible terms. Political 
dialogue and cooperation aim to "bring about better mutual understanding and an 
increasing convergence of positions on international issues", "enable each party 
to consider the position and interests of the other in their respective decision- 
making processes" and to "enhance security and stability in the whole of Europe". 
The limitations of political dialogue have been discussed in chapter four where 
it was also noted that the title has been overtaken to a significant extent by the 
creation of the structured relationship. The principal difference between political 
dialogue and the structured relationship is that the former is contained -within a 
legally binding agreement whereas the latter is part of an autonomous policy 
adopted by the EU. However in real ternis this distinction has little practical 
import since the provisions on political dialogue do not really create any legally 
binding obligations on the parties, they are rather provisions aimed at establishing 
a framework for cooperation. 
Institutional Framework" 
The Agreement has its own institutional framework which is designed to ensure 
that the Agreement funedons as smoothly as possible and facilitates political 
dialogue. Three institutions are created which are loosely modelled on EU 
institutions. The most important body is the Association Council which 
supervises the implementation of the Agreement and can adopt binding decisions 
Article 3 of the Agreement. The practical significance of this provision is discussed in 
chapter seven. 
10 The nature and frequency of meetings held by the Europe Agreement institutions is 
discussed in chapter six. 
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and non-binding recommendations. " It meets at least once a year at ministerial 
level in order to examine issues arising not only from the Agreement but also 
from any other "bilateral or international issue of mutual interesf'. The 
Association Council comprises members of the Council of the European 
Conununities and the European Commission on the one part ana members of the 
Polish government on the other. The presidency rotates between Poland and the 
EU Council. 
An Association Committee has been created to assist the Association Council. It 
may adopt binding decisions where the Council has delegated the power to do so. 
The Committee is composed of representatives of the members of the EU Council 
and the European Commission on the one part and representatives of the Polish 
government, normally at senior civil servant level, on the other. 
The final institution is the Association Parliamentary Committee. It consists of 
members of the European Parliament and the Polish Parliament. It has rather 
limited powers and may request information relating to the implemencation of the 
Agreement, is to be informed of Association Council decisions and may make 
recommendations. 
Article 105 outlines a dispute resolution mechanism in the case of the failure to 
reach an agreement between the parties. The arbitration procedure is discussed ., - 
in detail in chapter seven. 
, c. Free movement of trade 
This title is one of the central features of the Agreement. It seeks to establish a 
free trade area, conforming with the relevant provisions of the GATT and WTO, 
over a transitional period of 10 years. The provisions in the Agreement are not 
The Association Council may also adopt decisions to resolve disputes referred by either 
party to tile Agreement. (Article 105) 
In addition, it has the power to set up a special committee or body to assist it perform its 
duties. (Article IN) 
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designed to be static. They have been adapted to take account of changes, for 
example, as a result of the GATT Uruguay round. This is significant because the 
Agreement does not exist in isolation but may be adapted, indeed must adapt, as 
a result of decisions made outwith its framework. The EU's tariff cuts were 
accelerated at the Copenhagen and Essen Sununits. " One of the main features of 
the provisions is asynunetry: the EU side have agreed to introduce "concessions" 
more quickly and over a wider range of products than Poland. Ultimately, all 
parties will have implemented the same standards. 
The title is divide up into four chapters: industrial products, agriculture, fisheries 
and common provisions. 
Industrial products 
Chapter I requires the abolition of customs duties and measures having 
equivalent effect and quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent 
effect which apply in relation to imports obligations for the EU and Poland. " The 
EU is to abolish such tariffs more quickly than Poland. For example, the EU is 
to ensure that all quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect 
are abolished. from the date -of entry into force of the -Agreement. 
" Whereas 
Poland must abolish quantitative restrictions and measure having equivalent 
effect only in relation to certain products from the date of the entry into force of 
the Agreement. For other products abolition is to be phased in over a period of 10 
years. " 
12 Protocols to the interim agreement 1994 OJ L 25/1; 1994 OJ L378/1. 
13 Can have a more rapid reduction in tariffs if the general situation permits this. 
14 This is not really a new provision but merely repeats the provisions contained in the first 
generation agreement. 
Article 10 provides that other products will be dealt with in the manner specified in 
Annex V. 
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In other respects though, the obligations contained are quite symmetrical. Both 
parties undertake to abolish measures having equivalent effect to customs duties 
applying to imports and quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent 
effect applying to exports from the date on which the Agreement enters into force. 
Both also agree to abolish customs duties on exports and 'measures having 
equivalent effect by the end of a five year period. 
Article 17 is very interesting because it enables agricultural products to be 
excluded from the provisions of the chapter on industrial products. It provides 
that the provision of the chapter do not preclude "retention of an agricultural 
component in the duties applicable to the products listed in Annex VIP. 
Agricufture 
The provisions on agriculture are much more restrictive than those which apply 
to industrial products. They fall short of the creation of a free trade area and relate 
mostly to the abolition of quantitative restrictions in relation to certain products 
and some reduction in quantitative restrictions and customs duties in relation to 
others. Measures having equivalent effect to either type of tariff are not 
mentioned. " The Chapter covers trade in "agricultural products", the relevant 
products are listed in Chapters I to 24 and Annex 1. There is a separate protocol 
for processed agricultural products. 
Once again the changes made in tariffs are gradual, asymmetrical and reciprocal 
with the EU agreeing to make more extensive concessions more quickly. The title 
is designed to be a framework provision or building block provision because it 
provides in Article 20(5) that the Association Council will meet regularly to 
consider on a product by product basis extending concessions on a reciprocal 
basis. The experience within the EU has proven that a product by product 
approach like this is a very protracted means of securing agreement and more 
16 The limited scope of the provisions on agriculture is discussed in chapter two. Chapter 
three discusses the need for reform of the CAP if new states are tojoin the qU. 
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recent practice has been to favour the broad brush approach of harmonisation. It 
must be assumed that the EU is content f6r the development to take as long as 
possible since it protects their domestic markets from competing Polish goods. 
Article 20(6) is a rather unusual provision. It calls for regalar consultation 
between the parties in the Association Council "on the strategy and practical 
modalities of their respective polices". Again this type of consultation must go 
beyond what is strictly necessary to ensure the smooth functioning and 
development of the Agreement. It makes reference to Poland's wish to join the 
EU and must therefore be assessed in terms of the questions surrounding the 
reformation of the CAP. should Poland join the EU. 
A final point to note is that the provisions of the Agreement may be suspended 
if imports subject to concessions cause, or are likely to cause, "serious 
disturbance" on the market. In these circumstances the party may take any 
44measures it deems necessary". 
Fisheries 
The provisions on fisheries are even more limited than those on agriculture. 
Fishery products originating in the EU and in Poland, covered by Regulation 
(EEC)No. 3687/91 on the common organisation of the market in the sector of 
fishery products, are to be covered. The chapter merely provides a consultation 
mechanism so that parties may conclude "as soon as practicable" negotiations of 
an agreement. Only then will the product by product discussions begin which are 
provided for in Article 20(5) of the chapter on agriculture. Given the sensitivity 
of fisheries industry within the EU it is not very surprising that the fisheries 
provisions are so limited. 
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Common Provisions 
The final chapter in the title contains provisions which apply to trade in almost 
all products. " Both parties agree not to introduce new or increase existing 
customs duties, quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect 
both in relation to imports and exports. This prohibition is not unlimited and it 
must not restrict "the pursuance of the respective agricultural policies of Poland 
and the Community or the taking of any measures under such policies". This 
opportunity to derogate from the Agreement is very wide and reflects EU 
sensitivities in the field of agriculture. 
Internal fiscal measures applied between the parties should not result in direct or 
indirect discrimination of the other party's products. " Similarly, parties should 
not "profit" from the internal taxation system by receiving repayment from the 
internal taxation in excess of the amount of direct or indirect taxation imposed on 
them. " The parties are free to establish free trade areas or customs unions with 
others provided that they do not alter the trade arrangements provided in the 
Agreement. " This would appear to be a rather uncontroversial proposition. 
However, it is combined with a consultation mechanism so that parties may 
request that consultation takes place within the framework of the Association 
Council on the establishment of free trade areas or customs unions or, rather more 
controversially, "on major issues related to their respective trade policy with third 
countries". " Although the article provides that consultation shall occur. where a 
new Member State joins the EU in order to ensure that "account can be taken of 
the mutual interests ... stated in the Agreement", there is no general requirement 
that consultations requested must relate in some way to concerns surrounding the 
17 Except where there is express exception or where Protocols I or 2 apply. 
Is Article 26(l). 
19 Article 26(2). 
20 Article 27(l). 
21 Article 27(2). 
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Europe Agreement. Again this creates a mechanism for the EU to develop an 
awareness of Poland's foreign trade policy and again provides a forum for it to 
influence or at least comment upon the development and direction of that policy. 
Chapter IV details circumstances in which parties may de k rogate from the 
Agreement. Article 28 permits Poland to increase customs duties applied to infant 
industries or sectors undergoing restructuring or facing serious difficulties, 
particularly where these difficulties produce important social problems. The 
degree and duration of any increases is limited. 22 
Articles 29,30 and 31 apply to both parties and permit them to take "appropriate 
measures" to protect the domestic economy. Article 29 applies where dumping 
23 is taking place in trade with the other party. Article 30 applies where any 
imported product threatens the stability of the domestic market. 21 Article 31 
applies where the application of the Agreement would result in re-export to a 
third country against which the exporting party maintains quantitative restrictions 
on exports, export duties or measures having equivalent effect or where it has 
created or threatens to create a serious shortage of a product essential to the 
exporting party. In each of these situationstthe parties must follow the procedure 
detailed in Article 33 before taking action. It is imperative that they inform the 
Association Council of all the circumstances as soon as possible in order, to find 
22 Any increase may not exceed 25% ad valorem and may not apply for more than five years 
unless the Association Council approves an extension. 
23 "Dumping" in Article 29 follows the definition in Article VI of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade. 
24 Article 30 provides that "appropriate measures" may be taken where 
"Any product is being imported in such increased quantities and under such conditions 
as to cause or threaten to cause: I 
- serious injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive products in the 
territory of one of the Contracting Parties, or 
- serious difficulties which could bring about serious deterioration in the economic 
situation of a region". 
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a solution which is acceptable to all. Any safeguard measures which are adopted 
must be the least disruptive to the smooth running of the Agreement and must be 
immediately notified to the Association Council. In exceptional circumstances a 
party may take immediate action on condition that the action adheres to the 
principle of proportionality. % 
Article 32 appears to be important and probably more so for Poland given the 
structure of its economy. This provision requires parties progressively to adjust 
"state monopolies of a commercial character" over a5 year period to ensure that 
there is no discrimination regarding the conditions for procurement and marketing 
of goods between nationals of the contracting parties. The Association Council 
is to be informed of measures adopted to implement this objective. 
Chapter IV permits parties to derogate from the Agreement's provisions on 
imports, exports and goods in transit on the grounds of public policy, public 
morality, public security and so on. The provision is therefore almost identical to 
Article 36 EC with two notable additions. First, the protection of intellectual 
property is included. Secondly, the protection of gold and silver. 
d. Movement of workers 
The omission of theword "free" from the wording of title IV makes the limitation 
of the following chapters quite clear. Whatever the provisions achieve it will, fall 
short of the equivalent provisions in the EC treaty which aim to ensure freedom 
of movement across borders for individual workers and companies subject only 
to certain limited restrictions. Chapter I deals with the movement of workers . 
Polish workers are not granted the right to move freely throughout the EU but 
where a Polish worker is already legally established in a Member State he or she 
is granted treatment equal to national workers in that state in ten-ns of working 
conditions, remuneration or dismissal. 25 In this way the Agreement leaves 
Member States to determine their own immigration and residency policies. 
25 Article 37. 
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Members of the worker's family are not given residency rights under the 
Agreement and are only covered by the non-discrimination provisions if and 
when they become workers . 
26 The legall y resident spouse and children of a 
worker legally employed in a Member State are granted access to that state's 
labour markets. 27 Poland also agrees to extend the same treatment to legally 
resident workers, spouse and children but "subject to the conditions and 
modalities applicable in that country". 
The Agreement aims to establish a framework to co-ordinate social security 
28 
systems. It is the task of the Association Council to ensure that this is 
implemented 
. 
2' Article 41 contains provisions which aim to expand the scope of 
movement of workers provisions. It urges the maintenance and possible 
expansion of existing bilateral agreements on the employment of workers. The 
Association Council is to examine the possibility of granting "other 
improvements". These are limited and envisage access for professional training. 
Member States are also urged to consider granting work permits to Polish 
nationals already resident in Member States. Article 41 is a particularly weak 
provision which has no legal effect and barely leaves open the possibility of co- 
ordination at EU level. Instead the emphasis is placed firmly upon action by 
individual Member States. During the second stage of the Agreement the 
Association Council shall examine ways of improving the movement of Polish 
workers but this must take into account. the employment situation in the. 
Community. 'O ' 
26 In this context the workers family refers to the spouse and children only. 
27 This is not extended to seasonal workers covered by bilateral agreements within the 
meaning of Article 4 1. 
29 Article 38. 
29 Article 39. Any procedures adopted must be no less favourable than rights or obligations 
created by existing agreements between Poland and the Member States. 
30 Article 42. 
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The final article in the chapter on movement of workers obliges the EU to provide 
technical assistance for "the establishment of a suitable social security system in 
Poland". The article is silent as to who should determine the suitability or 
otherwise of the system. 
e. The Right of Establishment 
Chapter 11 of Title IV contains the provisions on the right of establishment. The 
aim of the provisions is to achieve equality in the right for companies and 
nationals from either contracting party to establish in the other party. The EU 
agrees that the treatment of Polish companies and nationals establishing and 
operating in a Member State shall be "no less favourable" than the treatment 
accorded to companies and nationals from that Member State. " This was 
effective from the entry into force of the Agreement. Poland agrees to accord 
Member States' companies and nationals the same treatment through a rolling 
programme which will be phased in over a ten year period. " The equal treatment 
principle is not extended to the products listed in Annex XIIe. Although Poland 
has agreed to a gradual introduction of the equal treatment principle in general it 
has made a significant concession in Article 44(7) to permit Community 
companies "to acquire, use rent and sell real property", and as regards natural 
resources, agricultural land and forestry, the right to lease, where these are 
directly necessary for the conduct of the economic activities forwhich they are 
established. This must be very important for firms seeking to cariy out business 
in Poland but it probably means that Poland runs the risk of having significant 
sections of its economy owned by foreign companies since it is unlikely that 
Polish companies will be in as strong a position to acquire property. 
The meaning of establishment is defined in Article 44(4). In relation to nationals 
it covers the right to take up and pursue economic activities as self-employed 
persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies, which 
31 Article 44(2). 
32 Article 44(l). It is possible to accelerate or prolong the time scale Article 44(5). 
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they effectively control. In relation to companies it covers the right to take up and 
pursue economic activities by setting up and managing subsidiaries, branches and 
agencies. Polish companies and EU companies are those established in 
accordance with the laws of Poland or the Member State which have registered 
office, central administration or principle place of business ih the territory of 
Poland or the EU. " However should the company have only its registered office 
in Poland or the EU it must demonstrate a "real and continuous link- with the 
economy" of Poland or one of the Member States. " 
Derogations from the provision in the chapter are pennitted in three ways. The 
first is contained in Article 47 where parties are free to apply rules which are 
justified by legal or technical differences between the "migrant" company and the 
"domestic" company or by "prudential reasons" as regards the financial sector. 
The difference in treatment is subject to the proportionality principle and must 
therefore not go beyond what is strictly necessary. The second is contained in 
Article 50 where Poland is permitted to derogate from its obligations where it has 
economic concerns . 
3' Again the measures taken by Poland are regulated by the 
proportionality principle. The final route to derogation is contained in Article 53 
which has the usual derogation on the grounds of public policy, public security 
and public health. Unusually it also contains a further restriction so that the 
establishment provisionswill not apply to activities connected, even occasionally, 
with the exercise of. official authority. 
33 Article 48. 
34 Jointly owned Polish and EU companies are also covered by the scope of this article by 
virtue of Article 54. 
35 Poland may derogate if certain industries: 
are undergoing restructuring, or are facing serious difficulties, particularly where 
these entail serious social problems in Poland, or 
face the elimination or a drastic reduction of the total market share held by Polish 
companies or nationals in a given sector or industry in Poland, or are 
newly emerging industries in Poland. 
136 
The chapter on establishment is much more extensive that the chapter on 
movement of workers. Key personnel may be employed by the beneficiaries of 
the right of establishment. Such employees must be employed exclusively by the 
beneficiary or its subsidiary and the residence and work permits are strictly 
limited to the period of employment. The key personnel are defin'ed in Article 52 
(2) and a cursory glance reveals that only very senior or well qualified people fall 
36 within the definition. It must be the case that without this concession to the 
movement of worker provisions it would be practically very difficult for firms to 
take advantage of the establishment provisions. The Association Council is to 
examine which steps are necessary to provide for the mutual recognition of 
qualifications between the contracting parties. What is interesting is that although 
the provisions on movement of individuals under the establishment provisions 
offer the potential to be much more significant than the movement of worker 
provisions the quality of workers affected is likely to be very high. Both the 
provisions on key personnel and the mutual recognition of qualifications are 
addressed only to the best qualified and well educated workers. 
f. The Provision of Services 
The third chapter in Title IV deals with the supply of services. The parties have 
agreed progressively to allow the supply of services into each other's territory and 
36 Key personnel are: 
(a) senior managers of an organisation who primarily direct the management of the 
organization, receiving general supervision or direction principally from the 
board of directors or shareholders of the business including: 
directing the organization or a department or sub-division of the 
organization, 
supervising and controlling the work of other supervisory, professional 
or managerial employees, 
having the authority personally to engage and dismiss or recommend 
engaging, dismissing or other personnel actions; 
(b) persons employed by an organisation who possess high or uncommon: 
qualifications referring to a type of work or trade requiring specific 
technical knowledge, 
knowledge essential to the organisation's service, research equipment, 
techniques or management. 
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the Association Council is to adopt measures to ensure that this takes place. 37 One 
aspect of this is to pen-nit the movement of key personnel who seek temporary 
entry into the other state in order to negotiate for the sale of the services or to sell 
services. " There are separate provisions for the supply of transport services 
where the parties have agreed to unrestricted access to the market on a 
commercial basis in relation to international maritime transport. Special transport 
agreements are to be negotiated between the parties on the coordination and 
liberalisation of air and inland transport. 39 Poland also agrees to adapt its legal, 
administrative, technical and other rules to fall into line with EC legislation on 
air and inland transport "in so far as it serves the liberalisation purposes and 
mutual access to markets of the parties and facilitates the movement of 
passengers and goods". Once again we see another example of Poland agreeing 
to conforrn to the EU predetermined standard. 
The differences between the supply of services generally and the supply of 
transport services is striking and must surely be explained by the need for a 
smooth running transport system to ensure the successful movement of goods 
beiween the contracting parties. 
The final chapter in Title IV deals with general provisions. There are two 
interesting aspects. First, there is recognition that the Agreement must adapt in 
line with the WTO and the Agreement has been altered by virtue of decisions in 
the GATT Uruguay round. The Europe Agreement was negotiated prior to the 
conclusion of the General Agreement on Trade in Sýrvices (GATS). This explains 
37 Article 55. 
38 Although where the individual is seeking to sell services this must be done for tile service 
provider and the representative must not be engaged in making direct sales or in 
supplying services themselves. 
39 Prior to the conclusion of these negotiations the parties agree not to introduce new 
measures which are more restrictive or discriminatory. 
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I the EU's reluctance to agree to more precise provisions. " Secondly, Poland is 
entitled to exclude EU companies and nationals established in Poland from Polish 
public aid until the end of the ten year transitional period. " 
g. Payments, Capital, Competition and State Aids q 
Chapter I deals with current pzyments and movement of capital. In relation to 
current payments the objective is to ensure that the parties authorise payments on 
the current account of balance of payments which apply to movements of goods, 
services or persons under this Agreement. The provisions provide for the 
adoption of reciprocal obligations but implementation will be a-symmetrical. " 
The provisions on capital aim to ensure that EC rules on the free movement of 
capital are applied in full and the Association Council is to examine ways of 
enabling this to take place. " Once again these provisions contain provision for 
derogation and once again there is a connection to something external to the 
Agreement. Poland is entitled to apply exchange restrictions in circumstances 
where they would be permitted under International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
restrictions. Any restriction must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner and 
should cause the least possible disruption to the Agreement. 
Chapter 11 deals with competition and other economic provisions. Article 63(l)(I) 
outlines the prohibition against agreements between under-takings, decisions 
between associations of undertakings and concerted practices between 
40 On this point see Marise Cremona "The Movement of Persons, Establishment and 
Services" in Marc Maresceau (ed) Enlarging the European Union: Relations Between the 
EU and Central and Eastern Europe (Longman, 1997). 
41 This applies to the areas of public education services, health related and social services 
and cultural services, Article 58(3). 
42 Both parties agree not to introduce any new foreign exchange restrictions on movement 
of capital and current payments between residents of the Community and Poland or to 
make existing arrangements more restrictive. This applied to the Member States from the 
entry into force of the Agreement and will apply to Poland five years thereafter. 
43 The Association Council will begin its examination during the second implementation 
stage. 
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I 
undertakings which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition. This is broadly equivalent to the prohibition contained 
in Article 85(l) EC but without the possibility of exemption in Article 85(3). 
Article 63(l)(ii) provides that "abuse between one or more undertakings in a 
dominant position in the territories of the Community or of Poland as a whole or 
in a substantial part thereof'. This formulation is found in Article 86 EC. Article 
63(l)(iii) contains the prohibition against any public aid "which threatens to 
distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain 
goods". Again this formulation is found in the EC treaty. " The Agreement 
contains several provisions relating to public aid and this emphasis is 
unsurprising given the nature of the Polish economy. Poland is to be classified as 
an area "where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious 
unemployment" when assessing the fairness of any public aid granted. " The 
parties have agreed to provide annual reports on the total amount and distribution 
of aid given and, when requested, to provide information on individual cases of 
public aid. Certain products are excluded from the scope of the public aid 
prohibition. 
The Association Council has to adopt the necessary rules to implement the. 
competition provisions and to ensure that practices are assessed using the criteria 
arising from the application of the rules in Articles 85,86 and 92 EC. Where 
either party considers a practice incompatible with the prohibitions outlined in 
Article 63(l) then they make take "appropriate measures" if the Association 
Council's implementing measures are not yet in place or do not deal adequately 
with the situation. 
44 Article 90(2) EC. 
45 This classification is derived from Article 92(3) EEC and will apply for the first five years 
of the Agreement although his time may be extended for a further five years should the 
Association Council consider it necessary. 
140 
Poland has agreed that within five years it will have established protection for 
intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights "similar to that existing in 
the Community". This is interesting because it goes beyond the functioning of the 
Agreement and instead aims to alter Poland's domestic laws. The standard which 
Poland should attain is difficult to discern. Poland is to reach the standard which 
exists not "under Community law" but rather "in the Community". Should 
Poland attempt to gauge a mean standard or would it fulfil its undertaking by 
reaching the standard which exists in at least one Member State ? It would appear 
that the standard will be attained in two ways. First, Poland has agreed to accede 
to the Munich Convention on the Grant of European Patents and to other 
Conventions. Secondly, Article 68 requires Poland to approximate its intellectual 
property laws to EC law"as a precondition for Poland's economic integration into 
the Community". 
The final Article in the Chapter deals with public contracts and the parties have 
agreed to award such contracts on the basis of non-discrimination and reciprocity. 
h. The Approximation of Legislation 
The approximation of laws arises in Chapter three of the title. It should be born 
in mind that the approximation does not represent a compromise between the 
Polish legislation and the EC legislation, rather Poland is required to approximate 
its laws to the EC laws. Clearly Poland has had no role to play in determining the 
content, nature or scope of these laws. By Article 68 Poland has agreed to 
approximate its laws to existing and future EC legislation so in effect it has 
agreed to adopt unknown legislation and has done so without having the EU agree 
a date for Polish accession. The approximation of laws is to cover a Nvide number 
of areas in particular : customs law, company law, banking law, company 
accounts and taxes, intellectual property, protection of workers at the workplace, 
financial services, rules on competition, protection of health and life of humans, 
animals and plants, consumer protection, indirect taxation, technical rules and 
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standards, transport and the environment. The EU has agreed to provide Poland 
with technical assistance to implement the approximation programme. " 
The White Paper has provided a detailed list of what the Commission considers 
to be the most important directives required to han-nonise to thd standards of the 
single market. " 
i. Economic Cooperation 
This title is a catch all title since it includes provisions which have a direct link 
to economic cooperation and other provisions where the link- to economic 
cooperation is somewhat tenuous, for example education. Article 71 provides 
some guiding principles which the title should adhere to. The overarching aim is 
to contribute to Poland's economic and social development. In addition, it is 
hoped that policies are "guided by the principle of sustainable environmental and 
social development". The title aims to ensure that "special attention" is bestowed 
upon measures which foster cooperation between the CEES. 
Industrial Cooperation 
The first article deals with industrial cooperation. " Cooperation is focused upon 
measures which support the private sector over the public sector and free 
competition rather than centrally planned economy. The implications are quite 
clear. The EU wishes to encourage these states to adopt its model of capitalism 
and is keen to ensure that the CEES do not drift back towards the Communist 
philosophy. This is clearly related to the EU's objectives for the Europe 
Agreement, discussed in chapter three. 
46 Article 70 provides that this may include, inter alia: the exchange of experts; the 
provision of information; organization of seminars; training activities; and aid for the 
translation of Community legislation in the relevant sectors. 
47 The relationship between the White Paper and the Europe Agreement is discussed in 
chapter four. 
48 Article 72. 
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Article 72(2) states that industrial cooperation initiatives should take account of 
Polish determined priorities. Article 72 also says that initiatives should seek "in 
particular to establish a suitable framework for undertakings, to improve 
A 
management know-how and to promote transparency as regards markets and 
conditions for undertakings". % 
The next article is also concerned with the promotion of the private sector and 
deals with investment promotion and protection. " This article aims to create a 
climate favourable to private investment through cooperation and focuses in 
particular upon: 
1. The establishment of a legal framework supporting investment; 
The implementation of transfer capital arrangements; 
Increasing investment protection; 
4. Carrying through deregulation and improving economic infrastructure; 
and 
5. Exchanging information on investment opportunities. 
It must be assumed that the Member States would see these five features as 
priorities in order to increase their trading opportunities with the CEES. 
Article 74 deals with agro and industrial standards and conformity assessment. 
Once again Poland has agreed to harmonize its standards and procedures to 
predetermined Community standards. 
j 
49 Article 73. 
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Article 75 deals with cooperation in science and technology and is aimed at 
encouraging the parties to work together in a variety of areas such as research and 
I 
development and training activities. It is the task of the Association Council to 
detennine the procedures which best provide for cooperation. 
Editcation and Training 
Education and training is covered in Article 76 and is a surprising inclusion. 
Education is something which lies at the very heart of a state's identity. The 
European Court of Justice recognised this in the Groener case. 'O Member States 
are very reluctant to endorse EU "interference" with their education policies and 
where there is an EU dimension to education it is limited to issues of access, 
mobility and discrimination. In this context it is therefore striking that an 
association agreement should contain this provision. Cooperation is aimed at 
improving the "general level of education and professional level of qualifications 
in Poland". More specifically in paragraph 4 cooperation is to "assist in 
developing curricula, elaborating teaching materials and equipping educational 
institutions". Poland has agreed to promote an EU dimension in its teaching by 
teaching EU languages and teaching "European studies" whatever that may be. 
The "Europeanisation" of Polish education is also encouraged by enabling Polish 
participation in Community education programmes and by concentrating upon 
the education of "scholars, professionals and public servants to be involved in the 
process of European integration and cooperation with Ahe Community 
institutions". It clear that the Article concentrates more upon education in general 
than training which could be considered to have a stronger economic dimension. 
Agriculture and the Agro-industrial Sector 
Article 77 deals with agriculture and the agro-industrial sector. A number of 
underlying trends may be identified in this provision. First, the emphasis is once 
50 C379/78 Groener v Minister for Education and the City of Dublin Vocational 
Educational Committee [1989] ECR 3967 where the ECJ upheld an Irish language 
requirement stating that it was permitted by the "nature of the post". 
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again upon the development of the private rather than the public sector. " 
Secondly, Poland has agreed to harmonise its standards and legislation in line 
with pre-existing EC law standards. " Finally, the Article requires Poland to 
subscribe to EU farming and farm management techniques. " 
Energy 
Energy is covered in Article 78. The two guiding principles are free market 
principles and progressive integration of the Polish and EU markets. Cooperation 
is to be diverse and wide-reaching and enable the EU to play a direct role in the 
formulation and planning of energy policy. " Environmental considerations are 
also to be taken into account. " There is a separate article for cooperation in the 
nuclear sector. 56 Here the thrust is somewhat different to the energy article and 
focuses upon safety issues such as the management of radioactive waste and 
radiation protection. 
Environment 
The environment is mentioned on a number of occasions throughout the 
Agreement and is given a separate title in Article 80. This reflects the importance 
which at least the Member States and the EU attached to Polish environmental 
51 See for example, Article 77(l)(2) which states that cooperation shall endeavour to: 
"develop private farms and distribution channels, methods of storage, marketing, etc". 
52 See for example Article 77(l)(8) where cooperation aims to : 
"develop cooperation on health, animal and plant health, including veterinary legislation 
and inspection, vegetal and phytosanitary legislation with the aim of bringing about the 
gradual hannonization with Community standards through the assistance for training and 
the organization of checks". 4 
53 For example by agreeing to "promote complementarity in agriculture", Article 77(l)(6). 
54 Article 78(2)(3). 
55 For example, Article 78(2)(7) states that cooperation shall focus upon: 
"The environmental impac. t of energy production and consumption". 
56 Article 79. 
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issues and Article 80 states that the parties have judged "the vital task of 
combatting the deterioration of the environment ... to be a priority". 
The article contains a long list of onerous objectives such as "combatting regional 
and transboundary air and water pollution" and "-waste reductilOns". Five routes 
of cooperations are identified as the means of attaining these goals: 
I. exchanging infonnation; 
2. training programmes; 
3. Polish approximation its laws to EC law standards; 
cooperation at regional and national level; and 
5. development of strategies, particularly with regard to global and climatic 
issues. " 
Transport" 
Article 81 deals with cooperation in the field of transport. An effective transport 
system is central to the success of the free movement of goods and movement of 
persops, services and capital contained elsewhere in the Agreement. Again. 
Poland agrees to adopt EU standards and to adopt transport policies consistent 
with Community transport policies. " 
$7 The environment is discussed in chapters four and eight. 
58 PHARE is funding a road assistance improvement programme as part of the TOURIN 
programme (discussed below in relation to tourism). See TOURIN Newsletter 1/96. 
59 Article 81(l)(3) and Article 81(3)(6). 
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Telecommunicatimis 
Telecommunications is covered in Article 82. Cooperation concentrates upon 
three main areas: the modernization of Poland's telecommunications; exchanges 
of information; and adopting European standards. This article appears to be less 
expansive than the EC telecommunications legislation but it is Worth noting that 
Article 82(2)(3) provides for the "integration of trans-European systems; the legal 
(emphasis added) and regulatory aspects of telecommunications". 
Banking and Financial Services 
Article 83 deals with banking and other financial services. A common set of rules 
and standards for accounting and for the supervision and regulation of banking, 
insurance and financial sectors is to be adopted. The Article does not stipulate 
what the common standard is or how it should be defined. 
Monetary Policy 
Monetary policy is covered in Article 84. It states that "at the request of the Polish 
authorities", the EU will assist in the introduction of full convertabililty of the 
zloty and the gradual approximation to the policies of the European Monetary 
System. 
Article 85 deals with money laundering and the parties have agreed to cooperate 
to prevent their financial systems being used to launder the proceeds from 
criminal or drug related activities. Poland has agreed to adopt "suitable standards 
equivalent to those adopted by the Community and international foraý'. 
Regional Development 
Regional development is covered in Article 86. It basically covers cooperation 
on regional development and land-use planning through the use of, inter alia, 
technical assistance and joint actions. 
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Social Cooperation 
Ar-ticle 87 on social cooperation deals with three issues. First, improving the 
level of health and safety. Secondly, employment issues such as the organization 
bf the labour market and job-finding and careers advice services. Finally, social 
security cooperation. Unlike other areas of the Agreement the sbcial article does 
not require Poland to harmonise its legislation with that of the EU. The closest it 
comes to this is in Article 87(l) where it urges the parties to use EU health and 
safety standards "as a reference". Similarly, there is no provision for the 
Association Council to consider introducing new or more advanced measures 
should future progress make this possible. 
Towisin 
. 
The Maastricht Treaty introduced restricted tourism to the list of the EU's 
activities. " It is not surprising therefore that the tourism provisions contained in 
Article 88 are limited and vague. Cooperation is to "facilitate the tourist trade" 
and "transfer know-how". 
Tourist projects are funded by PHIARE. One example is the TOURIN programme 
which supports the development of tourism and tourist services in Poland through 
a range of projects relating to, inter alia, marketing, tourism promotion and 
personnel training. " 
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SAIEs) 
The encouragement of the SME is one of the European Commission's central 
policies. They are excluded from many aspects of European Competition policy 
such as the Mergers Regulation. The Europe Agreement in Article 89 sees the 
continuation of this special treatment and aims to develop and strengthen SMEs 
and cooperation between SMEs in the EU and Poland. 
60 Article 3(t) provides that the activities of the Community shall include: 
"Measures in the spheres of energy, civil protection and tourism". 
61 See generally TOURIN Newsletter 1/96. 
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Information and the A udiovisual Media 
Article 90 contains the provisions relating to information and the audiovisual 
media. Priority is to be given initially to programmes promoting the EU either in 
the form of basic information on the EU to the general public or special 
infon-nation for specialised audiences. Poland is also invited to participate in EU 
action programmes. 
Customs 
Cooperation under Article 91 is aimed at facilitating the Agreement's trade 
provisions and approximating the Polish system to the EU system. So, in effect 
the Agreement operates on two levels here: on one level it perfon-ns an enabling 
function and ensures that the necessary practical procedures are in place to fulfil 
the Agreement's trade goals: on a higher level it ties Poland to predetermined 
procedures which extend beyond the scope of the trade provisions. 
Article 91(2) indicates some of the types of cooperation envisaged such as the 
exchange of information and the introduction of a single administrative document 
for the transit systems between the EU and Poland. 
Statistical Cooperation 
Cooperation under-Article 93 aims to develop an efficient statistical system which 
can plan and monitor "the process of reform" and "to contribute to the 
development of private enterprise in Poland". In particular, Poland has agreed to 
harmonise its systems to international and EU standards. The EU has agreed to 
provide technical assistance "where appropriate". 
Economics 
Cooperation under Article 93 aims to facilitate economic reform and economic 
integration in Poland. In particular, it aims to improve the understanding of Polish 
and EU economies and of devising and implementing economic policy in market 
economies. 
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Drugs 
The final article in the title on economic cooperation targets both drug trafficking 
and the reduction of drug abuse. To this end, technical and administrative 
assistance will be provided. " 
j. Cultural Cooperation 
The Maastricht Treaty introduced culture to European treaty IaW. 63 Until this 
point culture was not really part of European law save for some reference to 
culture in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. ' Title VII extends 
EU and Member State cultural cooperation programmes to Poland. Cooperation 
may include in particular: 
I. translation of literary works; 
2. conservation and restoration of historic and cultural monuments and sites; 
3. training of persons working in the cultural field; and 
4. cultural events with a European -character. 
k. Financial Cooperation 
Financial assistance, covered in Title VIII, is designed to implement the 
Agreement's objective and takes two forms: 
I. grants under the PHARE programme; and 
2. loans provided by the European Investment Bank. 
62 Article 94(3). 
63 Article 128 EC. 
64 See C379/78fn 50 above. 
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The parties are to agree upon an " inclicative programme" which will detail the 
objectives and the areas of the Community's financial assistance. The Association 
Council will be infonned of this. 
Poland may also benefit from temporary financial assistande to support its 
currency or other economic objectives. The financial assistance is dependent upon 
two conditions. First, Poland's adherence to IMF supported programmes. 
Secondly, Poland's rapid transition to reliance on finance from private source". 
The Association Council will be informed of the conditions attached to any 
assistance. Financial assistance should be based upon Poland's need and 
economic situation and will be coordinated with assistance from other sources 
such as G-24, IMF and EBRD. " It has been noted that the title on financial 
cooperation falls short of expectations on the Polish side, see chapters one and 
two. 
Conclusions 
The Polish Europe Agreement is an extensive document. Excluding protocols, it 
runs to twenty eight pages, 122 Articles and nine Titles. One of the principal. aims 
for the Agreement is to establish a free trade area based upon precise and 
reciprocal obligations. A wide range of additional aims may also be ascribed to 
the Agreement; these are discussed in chapter three. 
Similarly, the text also impacts upon the implementation process of the Polish 
Europe Agreement and the theoretical framework examined in this thesis in a 
number of ways. First, the precision of the text varies considerably. The 
provisions on free movement of goods require the parties to attain definite 
standards within a proscribed timetable. By contrast, the provisions on the supply 
of services are very vague: the parties merely undertake to "allow progressively 
the supply of services", no target or timetable is provided. Similarly the 
provisions on the approximation of laws do not necessarily oblige Poland to attain 
t 
65 Article 100. 
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the EC law standards they merely urge Poland to "use its best endeavours" to 
ensure that future legislation is compatible with EC legislation. There are man), 
provisions which do not contain any attempts to impose obligations upon the 
parties but which rather aim to establish a framework for future cooperation. 
These include, intet- alia, the provisions on culture, educatiod, tourism, social 
cooperation and the audiovisual media. The Agreement also contains a number 
of provisions which are open to broad interpretation such as those in Articles 21 
and 28 where the parties may adopt"appropriate measures"'where the threat to the 
domestic market may cause "serious disturbances". The high levels of ambiguity 
could be problematic for implementation. 
Secondly, the Agreement contains a number of provisions which permit the 
parties to deviate from their obligations. These are described in table eight. The 
potential for implementation conflict here is compounded due to the ambiguity 
of some of the provisions, discussed above. 
Table Eight: Provisions permitting the a doption of protectionist measuress 's 
1. Agriculture Article 21- Parties may take " necessary 
1 
measures" where agricultural imports ý 
cause serious market disturbances. 
2. Free movement of goods Article 28 - Increase customs duties to protect 
infant industries, sectors undergoing 
restructuring or facing serious 
difficulties. 
Article 28- Parties may take "appropriate 
measures" where imports 
cause/threaten to cause: serious 
injury to domestic producers or 
serious disturbances to the economy. 
3. Dumping Article 29- Parties may "take appropriate 
measures" in accordance with Article 
VI of the GATT. 
4. General prohibition on the Article 35 
grounds of public morality, 
policy or security etc. 
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Table Eight: Provisions permitting the ado tion ýf protectionist measures 
5. Establishment Article 50- Poland may derogate if certain 
industries are undergoing 
restructuring, facing serious 
difficulties, face reduction in market 
share or are newly eQlerging 
industries. 
6. Current payments Article 60- Poland may apply exchange 
restrictions if pennitted according to 
its status under the IMF. 
7. Competition provisions Article 63 - Parties may take "appropriate 
measures"where: the matter is not 
adequately addressed by rules on 
public aid; there is serious prejudice 
to the party's interest or material 
injury to a domestic industry. 
Thirdly, the Agreement contains a number of provisions which permit 
consultation to take place on issues which go beyond the scope of the Europe 
Agreement. Indeed the wording of some provisions is so wide there is no need to 
demonstrate any connection to the Europe Agreement. This may cause problems 
for the implementation process because one of the parties may not wish a 
particular issue to be discussed. In addition, where an issue is discussed which is 
not connected to the Agreement there is no framework, other than the purely 
diplomatic, for resolving any dispute which may arise since there will be no 
guiding principles arising from the Agreement. and no possibility to use the 
dispute resolution mechanisms, such as arbitration, contained in the Agreement. 
Table nine details such provisions. 
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Table Nine: Provisions enabling consultation to take place on issues 
beyond the scope of the Europe Agreement 
L Political dialogue Article 3(l) - Consultations "as appropriate" 
bet-ween the President of the 
European Council, the President of 
the Commission and 4he President of 
Poland. 
Article 3(2)- Association Council to have general 
responsibility for "any matter which 
the parties might wish to put to it". 
2. Free movement of goods Article 27(2) - Consultation within the Association 
Council on agreements establishing a 
customs unions, free trade area and 
"on other ma or issues related to their 
respective trade policy with third 
countries". 
3. Institutional provisions Article 102 - Association Council may examine 
44any major issue arising within the 
framework of this Agreement and 
any other bilateral or international 
issue of mutual interest". 
Finally, there are many provisions which require Poland either to develop its IaNvs 
in line with EC law or where there is. conflict as to interpretation then 
interpretation should be in line -with EC I aw. Table ten details these provisions: 
Table Ten: Provisions which are based upon EC law standards 
Free movement of Article 35 - derogation to the free movement of 
goods goods, similar to Article 36 EC. 
2. Competition Article 63(l) - based upon Articles 85,86 and 92 
provisions EC. 
3. Approximation of laws Article 68 - Poland to approximate its laws to EC 
laws. 
4. Free movement of Article 61 (1) - gradual application of Community 
capital rules on free movement of capital. 
5. Intellectual and Article 66 - Poland to adopt "levels of protection 
commercial property similar to that existing in the 
Community". 
6. Agro and industrial Article 74(2) -*Compliance with EC technical 
standards regulations and EC standards. 
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Table Ten: Provisions which are baLeýonýE C law standards 
7. Education Article 76(2) - promote teaching of European. 
studies. 
8. Agriculture Article 77 - harmonisation with EC standards. 
9. Environment Article 80(3) - approximations of laws to EC 
standards. 
10. Transport Article 81(l) - achievement of operating standards 
"comparable to those in the 
Community". 
11. Telecommunications Article 82(l) -. prornote European standards, systems 
of certification and regulatory 
approaches. 
12. Monetary policy Article 84 - gradual approximation of Polish 
policies to those of the European 
Monetary System. 
. 
13. Money laundering Article 85(2) - establishment of standards equivalent 
to those adopted by the EU. 
14. Social cooperation Article 87 - EU health and safety standards used 
as reference. 
15. Information and the Article 90 - Parties to harmonise policies on 
media regulation of cross-border 
broadcasting, technical norms and the 
promotion of European audio-visual 
technology. 
16. Customs Article 91 (1) - Approximation to EU system. 
17. Statistical cooperation Article 92 - harmonise to EU methods, standards 
-and classifications. 
Table ten demonstrates that where the wording of the provisions is vague then 
very often implementation is skewed in favour of the EU sides's objectives where 
Poland has agreed to confonn to a predetennined EU standard or indeed a future 
EU standards. 
The consequences of these observations for both the process of implementation 
of the Polish Europe Agreement and the theoretical framework examined in this 
thesis arc analysed in chapter eight. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Polish Europe Agreement: 
Implementation Structures 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the structures which have evolved to implement the Polish 
Europe Agreement. Some structures were provided for in the Agreement, others 
already existed or were modified to meet the demands of the Agreement. The 
structures take one of four forms: Polish, Joint Polish/EU, EU or Member State. 
The chapter will describe the complex range of implementation structures which 
exist and their functions and powers. It will consider the relative importance of 
each of the structures to the implementation process and the extent to which a 
hi6rarchy of implementation structures has evolved. It will also examine the 
extent to which there is coordination within and between the structures. 
Polish Structures 
Hoiv is Poland Governed ? 
In order to understand the process which has evolved to implement the Polish 
Europe Agreement a brief examination of the Polish system of government is 
necessary. ' The powers and responsibilities of the institutions ruling Poland are 
presently governed by an interim constitution, passed on October -17,1992,.. 
referred to as the small constitution. 2 The government and opposition parties 
agreed upon a draft constitution on 2 April 1997 which then required approval by 
For a general overview of the main political developments in Poland between 1989 and 
1994 see Frances Millard, The Anatomy ofthe New Poland (Edward Elgar, 1994). 
The Constitutional Act of 17 October, 1992 on the Mutual Relations between the 
Legislative and Executive Institutions of the Republic of Poland and on Local Self- 
government with Constitutional Provisions Continued in Force. Dziennik Ustaw, No. 84, 
item 426 and as further amended by: Dziennik Ustaw of 1995, No. 38, item 184; Dziennik 
Ustaw of 1995, No. 150, item 729. 
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national referendum. 3 The Referendum took place on 25 May 1997.52 per cent 
of Poles voted in favour of the new Constitution, 45 per cent voted against. ' 
However, the constitutional position was initially unclear because groups 
opposing the new constitution, principally Solidarity and right-wing groups, had 
announced plans to challenge the legality of the referendutn in court. The 
protesters claimed that because less than 42 per cent of the electorate actually 
voted the referendum was invalid. The legal challenge could not succeed as the 
constitutional position was unequivocal. The law relating to the new constitution 
is governed by the Constitutional Act of 23 April 1992 on the Procedure for 
Preparing and Enacting a Constitution for the Republic of Poland. ' Article I1 (1) 
of the act clearly shows that it is not necessary that a majority of the electorate 
vote in favour of the new constitution: "The approval of a Constitution by 
referendum shall have taken place when the majority of voters participating in 
the vote have voted in favour of it"(emphasis added). 
It will be seen from the responsibilities and powers discussed below that the 
Polish system of government is based upon the principle of the separation of 
powers: legislative power rests largely with the Sejm and the Senate; executive 
power with the President and the Council of Ministers. 4 Article 10 of the new 
constitution provides: 
441. the system of government of the Republic of Poland shall be 
based on the sepration of powers and balance of powers betweer! 
the legislative, executive andjudicial powers. 
Article 1 (1) of the Constitutional Act of 23 April 1992 on the Procedure for Preparing and 
Enacting a Constitution for the Republic of Poland. Dziennik Ustaw, No. 67, item 336 
as amended by Dziennik Ustaw of 1994, No. 6 1, item 25 1. The new constitution entered 
into force three months after publication in the Official Journal. There is no official 
English translation available for the new constitution at this date. This chapter uses a 
translation by Albert Pot and Andrew Caldwell, unpublished. 
The Times, 28 May 1997. 
Dziennik Ustaw, No. 67, item 336, as amended by Dziermik Ustaw, No-6 1, item 25 1. 
Judicial power rests with the independent courts: Sejm -of the Republic of Poland, 
Chancellory of the Sejm, Interparliamentary Relations Bureau, Warsaw 1996. 
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2. legislative power shall be vested in the Sejm and the Senate, 
executive power shall be výsted in the President of the Republic 
of Poland and the Council of Ministers, and the Judicial power 
shall be vested in the courts and tribunals. " 
The Sejm is the lower house. It is comprised of 460 Deputies who are chosen for 
a four year tenn by secret ballot in general, equal, direct and proportional 
elections. ' 391 Deputies are elected in multi-member constituencies from 
constituency lists of candidates, 69 Deputies are elected from national lists of 
candidates! Each constituency covers the territory of one voivodeshiP ( region). 
Between 3 and 17 Deputies may be elected from each constituency and the 
number is determined by reference to population size. ' The Senate is composed 
of 100 Senators, chosen for the term of the Sejm, by secret ballot, in free, general 
and direct elections. 'O Each constituency elects two Senators, with the exception 
of Warsaw and Katowice which elect three. " The two (or three in the case of the 
two voivodeships mentioned) candidates receiving the highest number of votes 
Article 96 of the new constitution. 
Article 2 of the Act of 28 May 1993 on Elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 
Dziennik Ustaw, No. 45, item 205, as amended by Dziennik Ustaw of 1995, No. 132, 
item 640. 
Article 45 of the Act of 28 May 1993 on Elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 
Dziennik Ustaw, No. 45, item 205 as amended by Dziennik Ustaw of 1995, No 132, item 
640. 
10 Article 97 of the new constitution. 
It Article 2 of the Act of 10 May, 1991 on Elections to the Senate of the Republic of Poland, 
Dziennik Ustaw, No. 54, item 224. 
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are elected to the Senate. " Of the two houses the Sejm is the more powerful; one 
commentator considers that in the legislative process the Senate "tends simply to 
rubber-stamp the legislation of the lower house". " 
The Sejm has four main powers: q 
a. to detennine the form of govemment; " 
to pass statutes; 15 
C. to appoint officials to number of positions and bodies of state authority; 
and 
d. to Supervise the executive authority. 
Much of the work of the Sejm is carried out by its twenty five Standing 
Committees which consider and prepare matters under deliberation in the Sejm 
and deliver opinions on matters referred by the Sejm or the President. " 
The Polish President is currently Aleksander Kwasniewski. The President is 
elected for a term of five years by direct election and has a number of powers. " 
He or she is the. "supreme representative of the Republic of Poland and the 
12 Article 17 of the Act of May, 1991 on Elections to the Senate of the Republic of Poland, 
Dzienniok Ustaw, No. 45, item 205 as amended by Dziennik Ustaw of 1995, No. 132, item 
640. 
13 Polan& Country Profile 1996-7 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1997). 
14 This is discussed in more detail below. 
15 The legislative process is discussed in more detail below. 
16 Article 18 of the Standing Orders of the Republic of Poland, 1992. 
17 Article 127 of the new constitution. 
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guarantor of the continuity of state authority". " Secondly, the President is to 
"ensure the observance of the Constitution, safeguard the sovereignty of the State, 
the inviolability and integrity of its territory". " The President represents Poland 
in foreign affairs and may ratify or denounce international agreements. 20 
14 
The President has a number of legislative powers. He or she may issue regulations 
and issue executive orders in order to implement statutes .21 The President also has 
the power to introduce draft statutes, to veto draft statutes and make statutes 
effective by signing them and ordering their promulgation in the Journal of 
Laws. 22 
The Council of Ministers is the Polish Government. It is composed of the Prime 
Minister, as chairperson, the Deputy Prime Minister and Ministers. " The Prime 
Minister is nominated by the President, the former then proposing the 
composition of the Council of Ministers who are appointed by the President. " 
Within 14 days of appointment to office, the Prime Minister must submit a 
programme of activity for the Council of Ministers together with a motion of 
confidence-to the SeJm; the vote of confidence requires an absolute majority 
vote. " The Council of Ministers has responsibility for conducting internal affairs, 
foreign policy and managing governmental administration. " There are twelve 
Is Article 126(l) of the new constitution. 
19 Article 126(2)of the new constitution. 
20 Article 133(l) of the new constitution. 
21 Article 142(l) of the new constitution. 
22 Article 144 of the new constitution. 
23 Article 147 of the new constitution. 
24 Article 154(l) of the new constitution. 
23 Article 154(2) of the new constitution. 
26 Article 146(l) of the ne%v constitution. 
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areas specifically mentioned in the new constitution where the Council of 
Ministers should take policy decisions: 
the implementation of statutes; 
It 
2. issuing regulations; 
3. coordinating and supervising the work- of organs of state administration; 
4. protecting the interests of the State Treasury; 
5. adopting the draft state budget; 
6. supenising the implementation of the state budget and passing a 
resolution on the closing of the state's accounts and reporting on the 
implementation of the budget; 
7. ensuring the internal security of the state and public order; 
ensuring the external security of the state 
9. exercising general control in the field of relations with other states and 
international organisations; 
10. concluding international agreements requiring ratification as well as 
denouncing other international agreements; 
exercising general control in the field of national defence and annually 
specifying the number of citizens. xvho are required to perform active 
military service; and 
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12. detennining the organisation and the manner of its own work. 27 
The Legislative Procedure 
Four main groups have the right to initiate legislation: 
I 
1. Members of the Sejm; 
2. The Senate; 
3. The President; and 
4. The Council of Ministers. " 
All draft statutes have three readings in the Sejm. 2' Once passed by the Sejm the 
bill proceeds to the Senate which has thirty days to accept, reject or amend the 
30 
proposal. If the Senate rejects or amends a statute it may still be deemed 
accepted unless the SqJm rejects it by absolute majority. " The draft becomes law 
when the President signs the statute no later than twenty one days after its 
recei pt. 32 The legislative process is presented in more detail in diagram two 
below. 
27 Article 146(4) of the new constitution. 
28 Article 11 8(l) of the new constitution provides that legislation may be proposed by a 
group of 10,000 citizens who arc entitled to vote. 
29 Article 11 9(l) of the new constitution. 
30 Article 121(2) of the new constitution. 
31 Article 121(3) of the new constitution Article 52 of the Standing Orders of the Scjm of 
the Republic of Poland, 1992. 
32 Article 122(3) of the new constitution. The President may request that the Constitutional 
Court rule upon a bill's conformity with the Polish constitution. The President may refuse 
to sign a bill declared unconstitutional by the court; Article 122(4) of the new 
constitution. The President must sign a bill if it is adopted by a 3/5 majority at the 
renewed Sejm reading. 
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Diagram Two: The Polish legislative process 
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Implementation Procedures ; vIthin Poland 
The implementation of the Agreement has proven to be a complex task. Within 
Poland a multi-faceted or multi-layered approach has evolved. This chapter aims 
to explain how the implementation process - operates in Poland. It will 
demonstrate that the procedures are evolving and adjustments are made as 
experience grows. It is important to recall that the implementation of the Europe 
Agreements is only one facet of Polish-EU relations. Moves in the direction of 
accession are on-going and implementation of the Europe Agreement occurs in 
tandem with work in implementing the acquis conzinunazilaire in the White 
Paper, discussed in chapter four. 
Chapter eight examines the significance of the complexity of institutional 
structures. This thesis asserts that institutions matter because lack of a coherent 
structure may make it more difficult to achieve policy goals. Institutions are 
important therefore in predicting implementation outcomes. Where there is no 
clear allocation of responsibility for tasks then it is likely that some issues are left 
unimplemented. 
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Discussions on implementation initially focused upon the best way to implement 
the Europe Agreement. Some commentators and politicians believed that a single 
legislative act should be used. Others believed that several acts should be used. " 
Given the complexity of the task, the latter option, which emerged as the favoured 
solution, is the more effective system of implementation. In order to ensure that 
the objectives and standards contained in the Europe Agreement are effective 
implementing legislation must be carefully scrutinised. It is important that the 
Polish legislature, civil service, lawyers and courts understand the relevant 
concepts as they operate within the acquis communautah-e and within the Europe 
Agreement. In addition, it is imperative that the implementing legislation sits 
comfortably with existing Polish legislation: Wejciechowski calls this 
, 31 "maintaining the continuity and comprehensive nature of legal order'. Using a 
single piece of legislation to implement the Europe Agreement would be too 
crude an instrument to reflect the complexities of implementation. 
Poland had embarked upon a process of harmonisation to the level of the acquis 
communautah-e before the Europe Agreement entered into force on I February 
1994. A goverrimental action programme started in 1993 detailing 130 statues and 
programmes relating to the Europe Agreement . 
35 In 1992 work began on 
identifying which areas of the Europe Agreement required implementation and 
which were already part of Polish law. (It should be recalled that the First 
Generation Agreement had already established standards on the abolition of 
certain duties). The legal analysis resulted in the publication of a "White Paper" 
in 1995 designed to provide guidelines and a system of prioritising areas for 
implementation. It should be noted here that Poland's approach in the "White 
Paper" is not merely to ensure implementation of the obligations and standards 
contained in the Europe Agreement, its intention is to ensure that implementation 
33 Jerzy Andrzej Wqjciechowski, "The Polish Law and European Union Law. The Process 
of Harmonisation" (1995) Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy, 70 at p71. 
34 Jerzy Andtzej Wojciechowski, fn 33 above at p72. 
35 Jerzy Andrzej Wcjciechowski, fii 33 above at pp70 and 72. 
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takes place in tandem with adoption of the acquis communautaire. 
All levels of Polish government are involved in the process of implementation 
to a greater or lesser extent. The levels may be conveniently divided into three 
groups: Legislature controlled, Executive controlled and loint Polish/EU 
controlled. 
The Legislature: the role of the Sejin and the Senate in implementation 
There are three Sejm committees which deal with relations with the European 
Union: the European Integration Committee, the Joint Parliamentary Committee 
(JPC) and, to a lesser extent, the Foreign Affairs Committee. The work of the first 
two committees is directly related to the implementation of the Europe 
Agreements. 
The European Integration Committee, formerly the Europe Agreement 
Committee, was established in the autumn of 1992. Although it has no direct 
legislative role it is an important committee which creates opinions, debates 
issues of European integration -ind educates parliamentarians on EU issues. As 
from 22 May 1997, it has been charged with thectask of "assisting in the 
adaptation of Polish laNv to European law, European integration and the 
implementation of the provisions of the Europe Agreement and the adjustment 
programme". " Jan Borkowski, under-secretary. to the minister of foreign affairs 
and former President of the Committee, considers its experience to be extensive 
and important. " He believes that the committee is a vehicle which assists the 
SqJrn prepare for accession to the European Union. The committee attracts 
influential people, such as former Prime Minister Mrs. Danuta Hubner, who wish 
to discuss the strategic aspects of the EU policy. The importance of the committee 
has grown steadily. This may be seen in a number of examples of the committee's 
36 Information received II August 1997 from Piotr Babinski, Senior Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Sejm. 
37 Interview Jan Borkowski. 
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work. First, it prepared a project of changes to SqJm regulations connected to the 
acquis coininunautaire. Secondly, it prepared a report on accession to the EU 
which provided the basis for a very important debate in the Sejm. Thirdly, each 
year the Council of Ministers prepares a report on the Polish economy and law. 
The Committee scrutinises the report in order to check its compatibility with the 
acquis conzinunautaire. Special sub-committees evaluate each section of the 
report and afterwards present their opinions'to a plenary session of the Parliament 
with special recommendations for the government. 
The Foreign Affairs Committee is responsible for " the foreign policy of the 
Polish state". " 
The Senate has appointed a number of ad hoc committees to deal with legal 
relations between Poland and the EU. Between April and October 1992 an ad hoc 
committee worked on this area. This was replaced in January 1993 by the Ad Hoc 
Committee for European Integration. 39 
The Polish legislative process pen-nits legislation to be introduced using a number 
of routes (see above). It is important that any new legislation which is introduced 
does not conflict with provisions of the Europe Agreement. There are proposals 
to introduce a check to ensure that all Sejm and Senate sponsored bills do not 
conflict with the Europe Agreement and the acquis communautaire. A checking 
procedure is already operational in relation to government sponsored legislation 
and is discussed in more detail below. 
The Sejm's committees play a relatively weak role in the implementation process. 
The majority of power for Polish implementation rests with the Executive. 
39 Piotr Babinski, fn 36 above. 
39 Http: //www. senat. gov. pi/egi-bin/tr-win? /noty/eii/notal I a. litml. 
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The Execritive 
The Department of European Integration was the first government de 
, 
partment 
responsible solely for the implementation of the Europe Agreement. It was 
established by the Polish Council of Ministers in January 1991 and works with 
the Polish Mission to the EU in Brussels, its principal function' is to coordinate 
legislative reforms relating to implementation Nvork-ing alongside the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs. " 
In spring 1994, at the same time that Poland applied for EU membership, the 
Prime Minister set up a system so that there would be a small number of people 
responsible for EU integration within each ministry. The size of these so-called 
European Integration Units may vary from one to another. " One of the members 
is usually an undersecretary of state. An informal system of contact has grown up 
between these people and it is considered that this should help develop a 
coordinated approach to harmonisation. " 
The following institutions are responsible for the implementation of different 
aspects of the Europe Agreement: Ministries of Education; Finance; Civil 
Engineering and Construction; Culture and Art; Communications; -Defence; 
Environment; Industry and Commerce; Agriculture; Home Affairs; Justice; 
Transport; Foreign Economic Relations; Health; and the Central Planning Office; 
Anti-monopoly Office; Public Procurement Office; Committee for Scientific 
40 Carolyn Brzezinski, "The EC-Poiand Association Agreement: Harmonization of an 
aspiring Member State's Company Law" (1993) 43 Harvard International Law Journal, 
105 at p 132. 
41 Jan Borkowski, fii 37 above. 
42 Jan Borkowski, fn 37 above. 
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Research; Certification Office; Central Office of Measurements; National Atomic 
Agency; and the Standardisation Committee. 
A two tier structure had evolved. One level comprised separate agencies of 
various levels of standing ranging from Ministries to Agenciee. The other level 
was interdepartmental. The Interdepartmental group for the Programme of 
Adaption to the Requirements of the Europe Agreement was comprised of 
representatives from all ministries and central administration offices and was 
designed to provide a forum for interdepartmental action. 
There had been criticisms levelled against the Polish implementation process 
which related to the coordination between government departments. 43 In August, 
1994 Poland's Supreme Chamber of Control (NIK) presented a paper to the SqJm 
Europe Agreement Committee which discussed government activities relating to 
Polish accession to the EU. " The paper was highly critical stating that the central 
administration was still very poorly prepared in adjusting Poland's economy and 
legislation to European standards. The NIK considered that the Department of 
European Integration had "neither power nor means to coordinate, control and 
monitor the activities of the various institutions which should serve the purpose 
of European integration". In addition, it found that the unsatisfactory flow of 
information brought about the danger of "incoherence of Poland's stance in 
negotiations with the EU partners". 
A number of changes has taken place either in response to those criticisms or 
inevitably as a result of the evolving nature of the process. 
43 Brzezinski found a distinct lack of coordination between Polish government departments 
engaged in the process of drafting legislation designed to implement company legislation. 
Carolyn Brzezinski, fii 40 above at 133. 
44 Polish Press on the Relations BeAveen the EU and Poland, August 1994, EC Delegation 
to Poland. 
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The Committee on European Integration was established in August 1996 and met 
for the first time in October of 1996 . 
4' The Committee is described as "the 
national administration's principal authority for planning and co-ordinating 
policies regarding Poland's integration with the European Union and the planning 
and co-ordination of Poland's adjustment to European standards Its well as the co- 
ordination of the national administrations' disbursement of incoming foreign 
aid .,, 
411tS membership is drawn from the highest levels of the government. The 
chairperson is the Prime Minister and the Committee's day to day activities are 
managed by a Secretary appointed by the Chairperson; the present secretary is 
Professor Danuta Hubner, a seasoned and well respected politician. The 
Committee members are drawn from the ministries dealing with the most 
important areas of government and include the Ministers of. Foreign Affairs; 
Internal Affairs and Administration, Economy, Finance, Environmental 
Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry, Labour and Social Policy, 
Agriculture and Food, Economy and Justice. A maximum of three additional 
members may be appointed by the Prime Minster to serve on the Committee 
providing that their "experiences or posts may be of significance to the discharge 
of the Committee's duties". 
The Committee has nine main duties: 
Co-ordinating existing procedures and developing new procedures for 
integration with the EU in economic and social terms; 
2. Planning and co-ordinating the adaptation of Polish legal. institutions and 
assessing the conformity of draft legislation with EC Law; 
3. Co-operating with the European Commission on the implementation of 
integration programmes; 
45 Act of August 1996 on the Committee for European integration. 
1 46 Act of August 1996 on tile Committee for European Integration. 
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4. Assessing the progress of adjustment processes; 
5. Co-ordinating the procurement and use of foreign aid funds; 
6. Assessing the information and human resource costs of integration; 
7. Co-operating with local self-government organisations in increasing their 
involvement in various organisational structures of the European Union; 
S. Attending to national defence and security matters in accordance with the 
competencies prescribed in separate provisions of law; 
9. Discharging other duties delegated by the Prime Minister or arising out 
of separate provisions of law. 
The Polish government hopes that this committee will better coordinate the work 
of the different ministries and will connect these ministries to the general strategic 
goal of EU membership. " The establishment of a committee of this calibre 
reflects the importance which the Polish government attributes to EU accession. 
The Polish 111ifte Paper on Integration 
As the process for implementation developed it became clear that a more 
structured approach was desirable. In 1992 the Legal Service Department of the 
Department for European Integration began work on detailing all areas of Polish 
law which failed to comply with the Europe Agreement The resulting White 
Paper was published in 1995 and detailed the measures which should be adopted 
as a matter of priority. Necessarily the measures related to the areas of law which 
Poland deemed to be most important for the economy. " Following this the 
47 - Jan Borkowski, fn 37 above. 
48 The rules governing the establishment and functioning of foreign and domestic 
businesses, the establishment and operation of banks and insurance companies, 
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Commission published a White Paper in May 1995 . 
4' The Commission's paper 
was designed to detail all secondary legislation relating to the Internal Market. 
It was drawn up, not with the aim of facilitating implementation of the Europe 
Agreement, but rather to "deepen understanding of the Community's legislative 
approach by the countries concerned and to facilitate approximation in the pre- 
accession phase". The Polish government used the Commission White Paper in 
the preparation of a programme of approximation which details all the legislative 
measures necessary in order to meet the standards of the acquis communallfaire 
relating to the internal market. " The legislative programme is contained in a 450 
page document planning a structured process of implementation between 1996 
and 2002. It provides the Polish legislative proposal, the community directive, 
any existing Polish legislation, the ministry responsible and the stage which the 
legislation has reached in the adoption process. " 
The Polish government's approach to the process of integration has been 
evolutionary. The latest innovation is the National Strategy for Integration (NSI) 
adopted by the Polish government on 28 February 1997. " Hubner explains that 
the NSI is designed to meet the cemands facing Poland in the period leading up 
to accession. " In particular she stresses three issues which the NS1 addresses: the 
intellectual property rules, customs rules, import quotas, technical standards, regulations 
governing finance markets, transportation law, telecommunications, contract law, 
remedies for breach of contract, principles of private international IaNv and civil procedure 
of arbitration. 
49 "Preparation of the Association Countries of Central and Eastern Europe For Integration 
into tile Internal Market of the Union" COM(95) 163 final. 
- so Jerzy Andrzej Wojciechowski, fiz 33 above at p 73. 
51 Interview with Marek Tabor. 
52 The National Strategy for Integration is a Polish Government document drawn up by the 
Office of the Committee for European Integration following a Resolution of the Polish 
Parliament of March 14 1996. See generally, Reuter News Service- CIS and Eastern 
Europe, 28 January 1997. 
33 Danuta Hubner, "On National Strategy for Integration" volume I (1997) Yearbook of 
Polish European Studies, 177 at 177. 
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readiness of the central administration; the adaptation of legal, economic and 
institutional spheres ; and the preparation of Polish society. 
The NSI defines the bodies charged with the implementation of the NSI: 
q 
1. The Council of Ministers; 
2. The Committee for European Integration; 
3. The Foreign Ministry; 
Other Ministries and central offices; 
5. Regional and local authorities; 
6. Polish diplomatic missions, particularly in the Member States of the EU 
and in the states associated with the Union; 
7. The Polish Parliament; 
8. The Polish President and his Office. 
It will be noted that these are broadly the same bodies which were responsible for 
the implementation of the Europe Agreement and then the White Paper. The 
Committee for European Integration has the task of co-ordinating the work of 
these bodies and also the work of non-governmental organisations dealing with 
han-nonisation. 
The implementation of thq Europe Agreement is a key aspect of the NSI which 
considers an efficient market economy to be essential if Poland is to participate 
fully in European integration. The NSI considers that this requires the 
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implementation of the provisions of the Europe Agreement and the 
recommendations contained in the Commission's White Paper on the Single 
Market. 
The NSI is divided into nine sections and runs to 53 pages. The introduction 
provides the background to the NSI and the bodies charged with its 
implementation. The remainder of the document is then divided into eight parts 
dealing with general political objectives, the adaptation of the economy, the 
adaptation of legislation, external affairs, justice and home affairs, training and 
human resources, information activities and executive summary. 
Part 11, dealing with the adaptation of legislation, is relevant to the 
implementation of the Europe Agreement. It outlines the timetable for 
implementation contained in the Europe Agreement and restates Article 69 of the 
Europe Agreement which calls for convergence of laws in a range of areas. " 
Sections 3.8 -3.13 of the NSI deal with the methodology of legal adaptation and 
provide that the Polish Government has overall responsibility for this. There are 
three main threads to the methodology. First, section 3.9 describes the adaptation 
programmes drawn up by government departments following- the European 
Commission's White Paper on the Single Market. " Second, section 3.11 
describes how an "Experts Team on the Harmonisation of Polish Law " 
consisting of academics, prosecutors, barristers, legal advisers and notaries assists 
government departments in the adaptation process. Finally, section 3.12 outlines 
the processes which scrutinise the compatibility of Polish Law with EC Law. The 
NSI hopes that this approach will ensure that new legislation will not only be of 
54 This is discussed in more detail in chapter five above. 
55 The tasks and responsibilities of government departments in this area are defined in 
Resolution No. 133/95 of the Council of Ministers on the Fulfilment of Obligations 
Necessary for the Participation in the Single Market. 
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"high legislative quality and practicality" and crucially that it does not develop 
separately from "Polish social conditions, or its legal traditions". " 
The NSI also covers training in legal issues. Staff in government legal 
departments and other departments involved in integratio'n were already 
participating in training on legal issues connected with European integration. " 
The training is to be extended to include more government ministries, judges and 
prosecutors and legal staff working in regional and local administration. " 
Training programmes are to be co-ordinated by the Committee for European 
Integration. " 
The implementation process could be undermined if legislation were enacted 
which conflicted with the objectives or standards of the Europe Agreement. All 
government sponsored legislative drafts must contain an "initial opinion" 
detailing the extent of any non-compliance with the acquis communautaire, the 
proposed solution and when compliance will be achieved. In most cases this will 
have been formulated by the European Integration unit within the ministry where 
the bill originated. Since 29 March 1994 the department of European Integration 
has the right to deliver a "final opinion" on the compatibility of all draft acts with 
the acquis communautaire . 
6' This acts as a check on the work of other 
government ministries. 
Two months following the adoption of the NSI, Polish implementation structures 
appeared to have run into coordination difficulties again. During the citrus fruit 
56 Part 3.13 of the National Strategy for Integration. 
57 Part 6.9 of the National Strategy for Integration. 
58 Parts 6.9 and 6.10 of the National Strategy for Integration. 
59 Part 6.15 of the National Strategy for Integration. 
60 Resolution of the Polish Council of Ministers adopted 19 March 1994. See Jerzy Andrzej 
Wojciecliowski, fii 33 above at p74., 
174 
dispute, discussed in chapter seven, the then Prime Minister, Wlodzimierz 
Cimoszewicz, criticised ministers for failing to respect the coordinating role of 
the European Integration Committee. The Ministry of Finance was singled out for 
criticism. The Prime Minister adopted a very tough stance stating that "if there 
is one more example of neglecting what the law says about the Committee, from 
whatever official or whatever ministry, then vice-ministers responsible for 
European integration will be sacked". " It remains to be seen how well the 
European Integration Committee can coordinate Polish implementation in the 
future. It is clear however that the scale of the implementation required, combined 
with the number of departments and agencies to coordinate, make the task a 
daunting one. 
Joint Structures 
The Europe Agreement provides for the establishment of three committees: the 
Association Council; the Association Committee; and the Association 
Parliamentary Committee (more commonly referred to as the Joint Parliamentary 
Committee). 62 Of the three committees the details of the workings and 
deliberations of the Joint Parliamentary Committee are the most open; agenda, 
papers and minutes are published in the Official Journal in a fairly detailed form. 
The workings of the other two committees are less public and only bare details 
are published in the Official Journal. Interviews conducted in Poland and Brussels 
have assisted in providing a fuller picture of theý work of these committees and in 
addition, Corm-nissioner Hans van den Broek has often chosen to use the press to 
reveal details of implementation disputes with Poland when this suited the 
European Commission's purpose (this is discussed in more detail in chapter 
seven). 
61 The Reuter European Community Report, 29 April 1997. 
62 The institutional provisions are contained in Title IX of the Agreement. 
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TheAssociation Council 
Article 102 of the Europe Agreement provides that the Association Council is 
charged with supervising the implementation of the Agreement. It is to meet at 
ministerial level once a year and "when circumstances require". Its remit is very 
wide covering: "any major issues arising within the framework orthis Agreement 
and any other bilateral or international issues of mutual interest". Membership 
consists of the members of the Council of the European Communities and 
members of the European Commission on the one hand and members of the 
government of Poland on the other. The Association Council is presided over by 
a member of the Council and a member of the Polish government. 
Of the three institutions, the Association Council is the most powerful. It may 
adopt decisions in order to attain the Agreement's objectives. The Agreement 
provides that these decisions are binding on the parties to the Agreement who are 
required to "take the measures necessary to implement the decisions taken". " The 
Association Council may also draw up decisions and recommendations by 
agreement between the two parties. " In addition, it may establish any special 
committee or body to assist it carry out its duties. " 
The Association Council has held four meetings so far: 7 March 1994; 17 July 
1995; 16 July 1996; and 20 April 1997. At its first meeting the Association 
Council adopted its rules of procedure and the rules of procedure for the 
66 
Association Committee. 
63 Article 104 of tile Europe Agreement. 
64 Article 104 of the Europe Agreement. 
65 Article 107 of tile Europe Agreement. 
66 The Reuter European Community Report, 8 March 1994. The Association Council was 
required to do this by virtue of Article 103(3) of the Europe Agreement. 
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TheAssociation Committee 
The Association Committee is charged with assisting the Association Council in 
the performance of its duties. " Its membership is drawn from representatives of 
the members of the Council of Ministers and members of the European 
Commission on the one hand and representatives of the Pofish'Government on 
the other, normally at senior civil service level. The Association Committee is 
assisted in its work by ten sub-committees and three working groups. There are 
proposals to replace these sub-committees with fewer multi-disciplinary 
committees in order to make work on implementation more effective by 
responding more accurately to the different areas of the Europe Agreement being 
studied. " The Association Council may delegate any of its powers to the 
Association Committee and where it does so then it acts under the same 
conditions as the Association Council. " 
The Association Committee has held six meetings: 23-24 June 1994; 1-2 
December 1994; 29-30 June 1995; 18-19 April 1996; 4 March 1997; and 7 
March 1998. 
The Joint Parliamentary Committee 
The Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) is designed - as a forum for the 
exchange of views. " Its members are drawn from the European Parliament and 
the Polish Parliament. "The Joint Parliamentary Committee does not have the 
power to adopt binding decisions. It may however make recommendations to the 
Association Council and may request information relating to the implementation 
67 Article 105 of the Europe Agreement. 
68 Marek Taborfn 51 above. 
69 That is, under the conditions outlined in Article 104 of the Europe Agreement. 
70 Article 108 of the Europe Agreement. 
71 Article 109 of the Europe Agreement. 
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of the Agreement from the Association Council which it Must SUpply. 72 The 
Association Council must inform the Joint Parliamentary Committee of its 
decisions. 73 
The JPC was not the first forum for relations between the European Parliament 
and the CEES. A decision of the European Parliament of II October 1984 
provided for a delegation for relations with the countries of Eastern Europe. " The 
delegation never came into existence however, due to the non-recognition of the 
EEC by the CMEA. A later decision of 21 January 1987 set up a new delegation 
subject to the proviso that, "no official action will be taken to set up this 
delegation until the European Community is formally recognised by the countries 
concerned". The 1987 decision divided the CEES into two groups of ten. Poland 
belonged to the Eastern Europe Group 1. 
The Joint Declaration on Mutual Recognition of 25 June 1988 removed the 
impediment to relations and between 1988 and 1989 the Eastern Europe Group 
I delegation visited Poland and the Polish delegation visited Strasbourg. 
The Joint Parliamentary Committee has held eight meetings: December 1993; 
March 1994; January 1995; September 1995; January 1996; 9-10 September 
1996; 15 April 1997; and 20 January 1998. 
Although the terms of the Europe Agreement indicate that the majority of the 
decision-making power rests with the Association Council, in practical terms 
experience has shown that its is within the Association Committee and its sub- 
committees that the really detailed discussions take place. " The Association 
72 Article I 10 of the Europe Agreement. 
73 Article I 10 of the Europe Agreement. 
74 See PE 209.033. 
75 Marek Tabor, fn 51 above. 
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I. 
Council really only rubber stamps implementation decisions reached by the 
Association Committee. Meetings of the Association Council only last one hour 
and of that hour only around ten minutes is given over to trade issues. In these 
circumstances there is no time for detailed discussion or debate on 
implementation issues. % 
European Structures 
Directorate General ]A 
Directorate General IA (DG I A) was established by the Commission in 1993 to 
reflect the wider dynamics of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). " It 
has three overall tasks: 
1. Relations with the European countries which are not members of the EU, 
the New Independent States of the Fon-ner Soviet Union and with 
Mongolia; 
2. CFSP; and 
3. Managing the Commission Delegations and external offices in third 
states. 
It plays a pivotal role in the implementation process since it carries out the work 
of the Commission side within the Association Committee. In addition, it is 
responsible for the pre-accession strategy for all CEES and the administration of 
the PHARE programme. 
The EUDelegation to Poland 
The EU Delegation to Poland represents the EU. It is staffed by both Commission 
officials selected by the Commission from among its existing staff and by locally 
76 See Dominic Me Goldrick, International Relations Law of the European Union 
(Longman, 1997) at pp147-148; S. Nuttall, "The European Commission's Internal 
Arrangements for Foreign Affairs and External Relations" (1995) CFSP Forum 2. 
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appointed personnel. The delegation receives instructions from and reports 
77 directly to the Commission. 
The European Commission established a very small Delegation in Poland in 
1990. The beginnings were humble to say the least; just one person working from 
a Warsaw hotel room, not always supported by a secretary. 78 By 1993 the 
Delegation had moved to offices in the prestigious Aleje Ujazdoskie and the 
number of staff had grown significantly to 35,25 of whom are Polish. It has two 
main functions. First, to oversee the PHARE programme in Poland. Indeed the 
majority of staff in the Delegation work- on PHARE. Secondly, to disseminate 
information on the EU. This is in line with the Commission's policy in its paper 
"Towards a Closer Association with the Countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe" which provides that "real partnership requires popular understanding of 
the Con-u-nunity and support for its objectives. To this end, information activities 
should be enhanced. " Three staff within the delegation deal with the Europe 
Agreements on a full time, daily basiS. 79 
The TechnicalAssistance hiformation Evchange Ofj)'Ice 
The Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office (TAIEX) was established 
in Brussels in 1995 following the publication of the White Paper. The office is 
designed to assist coordination and enhance technical assistance to association 
countries attempting to implement the acquis communautalre. Its mandate has 
been subsequently extended to assist the CEES prepare for EU membership. To 
this end, it deals with the entire acquis, not just single market legislation. " 
77 On Commission Delegations generally see, L. J. Brinjhurts, "Permanent Missions of the 
EC in Third Countries: European Diplomacy in the Making" (1984) LIEI 23. 
78 "Activities of the Commission of the European Communities in Poland 1990-1992" 
PRESREP. 9, Warsaw, March 1993. 
79 Interview with Jan Willem Blankert. 
80 European Dialogue: Jan-Feb 1998, Issue 1: Technical Assistance (European Commission, 
1997). 
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The Office works together with the Commission directorate generals, Member 
States and the EU Delegations. It has two mainways of working. First, it attempts 
to provide answers to requests for information by contacting the appropriate 
person, usually within the Commission. Secondly, it runs various workshops and 
study visits on topics such as agriculture, general single market lbgislation, social 
policy, environment, transport, financial services, competition and customs. In 
1997 it offered over 90 workshops. TAIEX,. vas initially offered as a service only 
to government officials. From 1998 its has been available to members of 
parliament, the business community, local government and non-governmental 
organisations. The Commission hope that it will provide a quick and flexible 
response to queries and requests for advice. " Polish experience has found it 
useful for long-term solutions and training but that it does not really respond well 
to shorter term and more immediate problems relating to implementation. " 
Member State Structures 
Each of the fifteen Member States is party to the Europe Agreement. Their 
governinents play a very important role in the implementation process. Within the 
UK government much of this work is carried out by UK Permanent 
Representation to the EU (UK Rep). The extent to which the governments of the 
Member States work together with the Commission in implementation is 
discussed in chapter seven. 
Conclusions 
The picture of implementation structures which emerges from this chapter is very 
complex. Table eleven illustrates the range of agencies involved in the 
implementation process: 
81 "Position of the European Union", Third meeting of the Association Council, Brussels 
16 July 1996. 
82 Interview with Mr. Macieji Gorka. 
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Table Eleven: Implementation structures 
Polish Structures Joint Structures European Member State 
Structures Structures 
Legislature Association DGIA 'Governments 
Executive Council EC Delegation UK Rep 
Committees Association TAIEX 
Committee PHARE 
JPC 
I 
I 
The complexity is compounded because the process of implementation has 
evolved constantly . Within the European structures the TAIEX Office was 
established long after the conclusion of the Europe Agreement negotiations and 
within its short existence its mandate has expanded considerably. The Polish 
procedures for implementation have developed significantly since the 
establishment of the Department for European Integration in 1991. Table twelve 
illustrates some of the main developments adopted by the Polish Executive. 
Table Twelve: Evolution of Polish implementation strategy 
1991 Department of European Integration established 
1994 European Integration Units established 
1995 Polish White Paper 
996 Committee on European Integration established 
1997 National Strategy for European Integration adopte d 
This complex and constantly evolving set of systems has given rise to two sets of 
difficulties. 
The necessarily wide range of agencies involved in the implementation process 
means that it is very difficult to ensure coordination within one structural group. 
DGIA must coordinate the Commission response across directorate generals. 
Member State governments must coordinate across government departments. It 
is clear that the Polish side have found this type of interdepartmental coordination 
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particularly difficult at times. The lack of coordination amongst Polish agencies 
weakens their ability to pursue clear objectives and to resolve problems. Poland 
must strive to develop a strong Euro technocracy capable of dealing with EU 
matters, particularly when faced with dealing with the institutional advantages 
which the EU side has as the Repeat Player in the negotiationý. 
The second problem which arises relates to ranking and coordination between 
structures. Conflicts have arisen on implementation issues between Poland and 
the EU side and also between the European structures and the Member States. 
These conflicts are discussed in detail in chapter seven. 
If it is true, as the new institutionalist suggest, that "institutions matter" then the 
complexity of these organisations must tell us something about the complexity 
of the implementation of the Europe Agreement. Table eleven illustrates four 
groups of structures. Within each of these groups various institutions exist. Each 
institution plays a part in the implementation process. Table twelve illustrates that 
within one of the groups, namely Poland, at least five implementing strategies 
have been adopted in a short, six year period. 
Chapter two suggested that as the layers of the institutional structures increased 
so did the levels of obfuscation. It further contended that this obfuscation directly 
disadvantaged the weaker party to the Agreement, in this case Poland, because it 
made the process of negotiating more difficult. This is particularly relevant in the 
context of a mixed agreement where the non-unitary nature of the EU and the 
consequent division of competence between the EU and its Member States may 
not be clear cut and as a consequence the third party to such negotiations may not 
fully understand the implications of the institutional structure with which it must 
negotiate. 
Chapter eight will consider in more detail the impact of these difficulties upon the 
implementation process. 
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CHAPTERSEVEN 
Implementation Disputes 
Introduction 
The implementation of the Polish Europe Agreement has not been without 
controversy. From the entry into force of the interim agreement disputes relating 
to its implementations have arisen. 
This chapter will examine disputes which have arisen in five sectors: tanneries, 
oil, steel, cars and citrus fruits. The chapter does not attempt to cover all the 
disputes which have taken place or which are on-going, instead it focuses upon 
these five sectors since each demonstrates certain aspects of the implementation 
process and dispute resolution strategies employed by the parties. 
This chapter is largely based on information obtained from original interviews. 
The commercial nature and the currency of the dispute makes thern. highly 
sensitive and access to documentation is very restricted. The details of the 
interviews conducted are provided in the introduction to this thesis. This chapter 
also draws upon media reports of implementation disputes. The specialist on -line 
services, such as Reuters, provide the most accurate and up to date reporting of 
the implementation disputes. Polish officials also refer to such resources as a way 
of monitoring disputes. ' 
The Tanneries Dispute 
In the early 1990s Poland was faced with a critical shortage of raw material in the 
form of skins and hides, the raw material which is transformed into leather, which 
in turn fonns the raw material for clothing, shoes and other consumer goods. The 
Polish tannery industry is largely located in rural areas which have high 
Interview with Marek Tabor. 
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unemployment and the government is keen to protect this type of small industry? 
To this end, quotas were introduced on the export of hides and skins. The quotas 
for 1994 and 1995 were set at 1,400 tonnes per year and were increased for 1996 
to 3,000 tonnes. 
-k 
Tanners in the EU complained about the Polish export quotas, claiming that they 
deprived them of access to raw materials and artificially depressed prices in 
Poland to as little as 40% of the world price. 3 They argued that this gave Polish 
producers an unfair advantage because the raw materials represent 50% of the 
cost of leather goods. The European Confederation of Tanners and Dressers 
(COTANCE) claimed the quotas would reduce EU employment, transfer 
productive capacity to the CEES and ultimately weaken all European production 
since the resulting Polish industry could only operate successfully through 
artificial protection. ' COTANCE contended that this would make European 
production more vulnerable to competition from Asian and Latin American 
tanners. 
The Polish side claimed that the quota was justified under Article 31 of the 
Europe Agreement since compliance with Articles 13 and 25 of the Agreement 
-would lead to "a serious shortage, or threat thereof, of a product essential to the 
exporting party". ' In such circumstances a party may "take appropriate measures" 
. Any safeguard measures adopted must, by virtue of Article 33(2), be notified to 
the Association Council and become subject to periodic consultations with a view 
to establishing a timetable for their abolition "as soon as circumstances permit". 
2 Interview with Krzysztof Treczynski. 
3 European Report, no. 2216, March 16 1996. 
4 Fn 3 above. 
These articles relate to the abolition of customs duties, quantitative restrictions and 
measures having equivalent effect. 
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Article 103 Europe Agreement provides for a two stage dispute resolution 
procedure. The first stage is political, any dispute is referred to the Association 
Council which has the power to "settle the dispute by means of a decision". The 
second stage is to go to arbitration. Either party may notify the other of the 
appointment of an arbitrator; the other party should then appoint a second 
arbitrator within two months. The Association Council appoints a third arbitrator; 
no timescale for the appointment of the third arbitrator is provided. 
Discussions had taken place within the framework- of the Association Council for 
two years without a compromise deal. The decision was reached to take the 
dispute to arbitration. The EU designated Tan Van-Thin, a senior negotiator for 
the EU in the GATT Uruguay round, as its arbitrator. Poland had nominated 
Andrezej Olechowksi, a Polish businessman and former foreign and economic 
affairs minister. In the end, the third arbiter was not appointed "because the issue 
had been resolved" .6 
The Association Council meeting on 16 July 1996 adopted a decision settling the 
dispute. ' Decision No 3/96 rLpresents a compromise between the parties. It 
accepts the Polish contention that the measures adopted were in response to a 
"critical shortage of raw materials in the form of skins and hides in the Republic 
of Poland". However, the essence of the decision is to limit the impact and 
eventually phase out the export restrictions. Article I increased the annual quota 
for exports from Poland of skins and hides to 10,000 tonnes for 1996,12,000 
tonnes for 1997 and 15,000 tonnes for 1998. All export restrictions relating to 
skin and hides are to be eliminated by I January 1999. Although the decision 
entered into force on the day of its adoption, the 1996 quota applied with effect 
from I January 1996.8 
Interview with Jan Willem Blankert. 
Decision 3/96 of the EC-Poland Association Council OJ 1996 L208/3 1. 
8 Article 3, Decision 3/96, fii 7 above. 
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This was the first, and to date only, occasion where the arbitration procedure was 
initiated. It is perhaps curious that it was this dispute which went to arbitration 
since the dispute had a relatively small impact in terms of overall trade between 
the parties. As one Polish official stated, "if you look at overall'trade figures the 
tannery industry represents a very small problem; bigger problems have been 
more easily resolved". ' Both the EU and Polish sides agree that the impetus for 
arbitration and at least part of the reason why the dispute proved to be so 
intractable was the interests of individual Member States. The Polish diplomatic 
mission counsellor cited the strong interests of the Italian government and 
believed that as the dispute progressed the issue became "one of honour". " Other 
Polish officials believed that it was the Commission which had pushed for 
arbitration under pressure from "some Member States". " Commission officials 
were clearly of the view that the reason for arbitration was Member State 
interests, principally Italy. 12 
On examining the initial text of the Europe Agreement some commentators had 
expressed concerns about the effectiveness of the arbitration procedure in dispute 
resolution Where such procedures had been part of. past preferential trade 
agreements the associated states were reluctant to upset the EU by involving such 
an "unfriendly means of arbitration". " This would not appear to be the Polish 
experience. One Commission official felt that Poland benefited from arbitration 
since they successfully used the procedure to draw out the dispute, gaining 
9 Krzysztof Treczynski, fii 2 above. 
10 Krzysztof Treczynski, fiz 2 above. 
11 Marek Tabor, fn I above. 
12 Jan Willem Blankert, fii 6 above. 
13 Lode Van Den Hende, "EU -Safeguard Measures Under the Europe Agreement" 140 at 
pp 154-155, in Marc Maresceau (ed) Enlarging the European Union (Longtilan, 1997). 
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valuable time in which to restructure their industry. 14 Concerns were also 
expressed that since the Agreement requires the Association Council to act 
unanimously in the appointment of arbitrators that this could render the procedure 
unworkable. " The tanneries dispute has shown that the arbitration procedure can 
be an effective means of resolving disputes and that merdly initiating the 
procedure can create the necessary political leverage to broker an agreement. It 
is clear that the Commission considered the use of the arbitration procedure to be 
a very effective means of reaching an agreement. One official stated that the 
leather goods issues had been raised with Poland on a number of occasions 
without success and that the arbitration process "proved to be a useful stick"., ' 
Indeed the Cornmission expressed the view that it would not rule out employing 
arbitration in future disputes, especially where strong Member State interests 
were involved. " 
The Daewoo Dispute 
The car market in Poland has been growing steadily in the 1990s. Economic 
liberalisation coupled with improving access to consumer credit have assisted the 
" 239,000 new cars were registered, in 1994,250,000, in rising demand. " In 199) 
1995,264,000, and in 1996,374,000. By 1997 the number of new cars registered 
had increased to 475,000. '9 This makes Poland the fastest growing car market in 
Europe. 20 
14 Interview with John Bell. 
15 Lode Van Den Hende, fn 13 above at pp 154-155. 
16 Jan Willem Blankert, fii 6 above. 
17 Jan Willem Blankert, fn 6 above. 
18 Financial Times, 30 May 1997. 
19 Financial Times, 23 February 1998. 
20 hilp: lliviviv. dii. gov. ztklotslcetitezirolpolandlazitomotive. htnil. 
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Daewoo, the South Korean car manufacturer, wished to develop a strong foothold 
in the developing Polish car market. On 14 November 1995 it signed an 
agreement in Warsaw ensuring that it would become the second largest car maker 
in Poland after the Italian company Fiat. " The agreement established a joint 
venture between Daewoo and FSO, the Polish state-6\vned company 
manufacturing Polonez cars. Daewoo have a 70% share in the joint venture and 
are committed to an investment of at least $ 1.1 bn. " The FSO plant's employees 
received a 15% equity share and the Polish government own the remaining 15%, 
including a "golden share" permitting it to ensure that Daewoo abides by its 
investment promises. The FSO employees were also given full employment 
guarantees for three years and an agreement that Daewoo would honour existing 
collective agreements at the plant. In return for their significant investment, 
Daewoo struck a deal with the Polish government enabling them to transport 
complete cars by sea to Slovenia where they were dismantled into ten parts and 
then brought to Warsaw by rail. The parts were then reassembled at the FSO 
plant. The Polish government agreed that Daewoo would pay no duties on such 
imports. 
On the face of it there should be nothing to trouble Poland's EU partners. The EU 
wishes to encourage foreign direct investment into Poland to assist with the 
country's economic restructuring. However, competitor manufacturer Fiat quickly 
made clear their "outrage" at the content of the Daewoo agreement . 
23 Foreign- 
made cars suffer from a 25% tariff disadvantage over locally-built vehicles unless 
they are imported into Poland in parts and assembled locally. In addition, EU 
producers may also import a fixed number of cars into Poland without paying 
21 Fiat are estimated to have 35% of the Polish car market, Daewoo 25% and Opel 10%. 
Euro-cast 20 January 1998. 
22 Financial Times, 27 October 1995,3 February 1997. See also, The Warsaw Voice, 3 
November 1996. 
I 
23 Financial Times, 3 February 1996 
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customs duty. In 1996,38,750 cars could be imported under these terms. Fiat, like 
Opel and Ford assembles its cars from around 1,000 parts which are imported into 
Poland in order to claim the tariff exemption. 
The EU side, both in interviews and in press reports, was very vhgue as to which 
provisions of the Europe Agreement were infringed by the Daewoo agreement. 
One EU official said that the Commission was "very concerned about the 
situation given the sensitivity of the car market in the EU"; " another that the 
Commission felt that Daewoo had received "special treatment". Press reports 
boldly asserted that the agreement "clearly contravenes the ten-ns of Poland's 
pioneering association agreement with the Union" without explaining how this 
infringement was manifested. " There were a number of reports of "privileged 
treatment" being awarded to Daewoo, affording "back door entry" into the EU. " 
Most reports made general statements about the Daewoo agreement breaching the 
spirit of the Europe Agreement. 
The Commission considered that Poland had incorrectly applied the Tariff 
Combined Nomenclature and, as a result, was in breach of Article 7(2) of Title 
III relating to the free movement of goods which requires that "the combined 
nomenclature of goods shall be applied to the classification of goods in trade 
between the two partieS99.27 The extent to which this provision may be directly 
applied to the circumstances of the Daewoo agreement must be questioned. Title 
111, Chapter IV Europe Agreement outlines the common provisions relating to the 
free movement of goods. Article 25 deals -with the prohibition on any increase in 
customs duties, quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect to 
24 John Bell, fn 14 above. 
25 European Voice, 7-13 November 1996. 
26 See, for example, Reuter News Service CIS and Eastern Europe 6 March 1997. 
27 Information received from Stephen Rhodes, Manager, EU enlargement, Central and 
Eastern Europe Trade Policy Unit, UK Department of Trade and Industry on 3 March 
1998. 
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the two, in trade between the Community and Poland. The Daewoo agreement 
related to trade between Poland and a non-EU manufacturer and so cannot fall 
within the scope of Article 25. Article 26 deals with the prohibition on internal 
fiscal measures which may diriectly or indirectly discriminate against the products 
of the parties to the Agreement. The Daewoo agreement relates to an external 
fiscal measure, customs duties applied to imports, and so cannot fall within the 
scope of Article 26. The only provision in Title III which relates to trade between 
Poland and non-EU states is Article 27 which does not preclude frontier trade 
arrangements "except in so far as they alter the trade arrangements provided for 
in this Agreement". Does the Dae%voo agreement "alter the trade arrangements" 
provided in the Europe Agreement ? The Europe Agreement does not directly 
deal with such a situation. Indirect support for the use of Article 7(2) may be 
found in Article 7(l) Europe Agreement which provides for the gradual 
establishment of a free trade area between the parties in accordance with the 
provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). A 
fundamental aspect to the GATT is the obligation for parties to grant Most 
Favoured Nation status to each other. In this way the EU side may indeed feel that 
the Daewoo agreement was discriminatory since the combined nomenclature 
appears to be applied differently to the Korean company than to EU companies. 
However, Polish officials contested that there are no special measures for 
Daewoo and that EU manufacturers such as Mercedes, Renault, Peugeot and 
Volkswagen had been offered a similar deal, but for various reasons, including 
a reluctance to commit to the necessary direct investment, the deals had not been 
finalised. " 
The lack of certainty as to whether the agreement infringes the Europe Agreement 
does not necessarily preclude discussion between the parties within the 
framework of the Europe Agreement. Article 27(2) requires the parties to consult 
each other "within the Association Council ... where requested on other major 
issues related to their respective trade policy with third countries". The Europe 
28 Interview with Jan Borkowski. 
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Agreement does not define what constitutes a "major issue" nor does it consider 
which party may construe an issue to be so important. The wording implies that 
any party may make such an interpretation since it talks about. consultations 
"between the parties". In the dispute relating to oil, discussed below, a similar 
requirement to consult gave rise to difficulties of interpretationt The Polish side 
appear to have adopted a restrictive approach so that "consultation" requires only 
that they notify the EU side of their decisions. The EU side has taken a much 
broader interpretation so that consultation requires discussion between the parties 
in an attempt to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. This explains the 
statements to the press prior to the Association Council meeting in 1997, where 
the EU side "regretted" Polish non-consultation while the Polish side considered 
that they had "consulted with the EU all the way, but the Commission has often 
never responded to our plans". " 
The Commission negotiators acknowledged the sensitivity of the dispute. The EU 
side did not wish to be seen to be blocking foreign investment. " Polish officials 
argued that the continued uncertainty surrounding Daewoo was hindering 
investment by other potential investors ( in particular flyundai). ` The EU 
countered that frequent changes to import rules was discouraging investment. " 
At the same time the EU side was under pressure from EU manufacturers to 
protect its interests. 
The Daewoo agreement was criticised by Commissioner Hans van den Broek 
during a visit to Poland in July 1996. He attempted to pressurise the Polish side 
29 European Report, no 2220,30 April 1997. 
30 Jan Willem Blankert, fiz 6 above. 
31 Hyundai subsequently established ajoint venture with a Polish car maker which permits 
them to assemble cars without paying import tax on imported assembly kits. Ironically, 
Daewoo have complained about tile deal expressing concerns over "any improper 
inducement of unnecessary over-capacity and over-competition", see Budapest Business 
Journal 6 October 1997. See also Central European Times. 12 November 1997. 
32 European Report, no. 2229,4 June 1997. 
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into a deal by linking the dispute to Polish accession to the EU, stating that it was 
94 regrettable that such trade difficulties should affect relations between the EU and 
Poland at a time whenwe are -working so closely to prepare for accession. They 
need to be resolved quickly so that they do not interfere with our preparations for 
(Poland's] membership. "' Discussions within the Association Committee failed 
to result in agreement on the Daewoo issue. " The agreement was raised again at 
the Association Council meeting on 30 April 1997. The EU took note of the 
Polish proposals and said they should be implemented as soon as possible under 
strict control mechaniSMS. 3' The EU side said that it would follow the 
development of the matter very closely and come back to it at a later stage. 
Press reports in April 1997 discussed the possibility of referring the dispute to the 
World Customs Organisation's (WCO). 31 In the end this was not done but 
agreement was finally reached by reference to the WCO rules on the Harmonised 
System of Tariff Classification. " Poland agreed to review the mode of 
importation of components for car assembly by all entities conducting industrial 
assembly of passenger vehicles in Poland. On this basis, Poland undertook to 
33 Financial Times, 17 July 1996. 
34 Rcutcr European Community Report, 10 March 1997. 
35 RAPID Prcs: 97/15 1. 
36 The European, 10 April 1997. 
37 The WCO was established on 15 December 1950 in order to enhance the effectiveness 
and efficiency of customs administration in the areas of compliance with trade regulation, 
protection of society and revenue collection, thereby contributing to the economic and 
social well-being of nations. 
The Han-nonised Commodity Description and Coding System (known as the Harmonised 
System) was developed as a multipurpose nomenclature by the WCO for meeting the 
requirements of customs authorities, statisticians, carriers and producers. It was 
implemented on I January 1988 by an international Convention known as the 
"International Convention on the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding 
System". 
The WCO should not be confused with the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the 
organisation which succeeded the GATT following the GATT Uruguay round. The WTO 
has a dispute settlement system with fixed timetables providing a more structured 
procedure for resolution than previously existed under the GATT. 
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consult with such producers to ensure that imports are consistent with the relevant 
definitions and procedures contained in the Hannonised Systems of Tariff 
Classification. 
There is no mention of arbitration by the WCO or reference to its rules in the case 
of dispute contained in the Europe Agreement. The par-ties in this instance both 
agreed to the use of the WCO rules. The fact that resort to this type of external 
legal framework was necessary supports the contention that the Europe 
Agreement was not intended to cover this sort of situation. It also highlights the 
difficulties which arise where the Agreement permits discussion to take place on 
issues which may not be directly connected to the operation of the Europe 
Agreement. This is because the Agreement cannot provide either the answer to 
the problem or a mechanism for resolving the problem. This was identified as a 
potential problem in chapter five. 
It is interesting to note that the Commission is currently involved in a similar 
dispute involving Daewoo and Ukraine and is considering initiating dispute 
settlement procedures. 
38 
The Oil Dispute 
The Polish oil industry requires significant restructuring. Oil plants are not very 
technologically advanced, are heavy on energy consumption and tend to be 
overstaffed. The Polish goverm-nent wished to introduce a restructuring 
programme and notified the Commission on October 1995 of their intention. 39 In 
November 1995 Poland added some additional product groups to the restructuring 
programme which they also notified to the Commission. The programme was due 
to take effect from I January 1996. 
38 IP/98/173. 
39 Marek Tabor, fn I above. 
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Poland was confident that it had fulfilled its notification requirements under 
Article 28 Europe Agreement. Article 28 provides that "Poland shall inform the 
Association Council of any exceptional measures it intends to take and, at the 
request of the Community, consultations shall be held in the Association Council 
on such measures and the sectors to which they apply before t1ley are applied. " 
In addition, Poland is required to provide the Association Council Xvith "a 
schedule for the elimination of customs duties". The Polish side pointed out that 
the meaning of consultation is not defined within Article 28 nor is there any 
timetable for consultation. " 
The Commission adopted a different view. It considered that Poland 'was not 
eligible to introduce its restructuring programme because it had failed to follow 
the procedure contained in tile Europe Agreement. " The UK government was 
particularly concerned about the oil industry and took the view that Poland had 
quite clearly breached the consultation requirements and acknowledged that this 
interpretation of the legal position was a stricter view than that held by the 
Commission who, in private at least, was not quite so convinced that the legal 
argument, %vas cut and dry. " 
Poland complained that the first half of 1996 was taken up with discussion on the 
notification and consultation procedure rather than focusing on the substance of 
the Polish programme for the oil industry. " 
Another question of interpretation which arose was the interpretation of 
"restructuring" . Article 28 permits Poland to derogate from the provisions of the 
Europe Agreement by increasing customs duties, but only in relation to "infant 
40 Krzysztof Treczynski, fn 2 above 
41 Jan Willem Blankert, fn 6 above 
42 Interview with Richard Jones. 
43 Marek- Taborfn I above. 
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industries, or certain -sectors undergoing restructuring or facing serious 
difficulties, particularly where these difficulties produced important social 
problems. " The EU side contended that the term should be interpreted as it would 
.0 
under EC law. " 
11 
The Commission has always treated restructuring aid very strictly under EC law 
because it considers- that such aid may distort competition by preventing market 
forces from eliminating inefficient companies. " It is very reluctant to approve 
such aid and will only do so in exceptional circumstances where there is an 
acceptable restructuring plan and where it has been demonstrated that the 
Community interest is best served by keeping the company in business. " The EU 
side attempted to argue that the situation in the Polish oil industry was not as 
grave as the Polish side had portrayed . In this way they contested that the 
proposed programme related to modernisation rather than restructuring. The 
Polish side had a very strong counter-argument. In other parts of the Europe 
Agreement there is specific reference to the use of the acquis as an 
interpretational standard. For example, Article 63 Europe Agreement which deals 
with competition provisions provides that any practices contrary to that Article 
are to be "assessed on the basis of criteria arising from the application of the rules 
of Articles 85,86 and 92 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. " 
Moreover, Opinion 1/91 demonstrates the limits of such interpretational 
provisions where the ECJ has made it clear that it will interpret international 
agreements in light of their object and purpose. " It is self evident that the Europe 
Agreement and EC treaty have different objectives and purposes. 
44 John Bell and Krzysztof Treczynski, fns 6 and 2 above. 
45 See Magefesa OJ 1991 15/18. 
46 See Alpha Romeo, OJ 1989 L394/9. 
47 Opinion 1/91 [199 1] ECR 6079. 
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The Association Council meeting of July 1996was rather fraught. Hans van den 
Broek complained strongly to the press about Polish protectionism. " He stated 
that "the European Union deeply regrets the unilateral actions taken by Poland... 
and reiterates its opinion that the Polish oil sector cannot be viewed as 
undergoing restructuring in terms of the (EU's) criteria. "" He Faade it clear that 
the EU wished to see a commitment to retail price liberalisation by the end of 
1996, a progranune for privatisation and modernisation of refineries and a rise in 
security stocks. He linked these requirements to the success of Poland's EU 
membership application. 
An experts meeting took place in Poland on 17 and 18 October 1996 after , vhich 
all sides seemed to be cautiously optimistic that an Agreement had been 
reached. " During the negotiations the Commission had been somewhat surprised. 
They had anticipated that agreement could have been secured earlier but found 
that negotiations became protracted by three Member States forcing a stricter 
agreement. " This could explain the frustration experienced by Polish negotiators 
who found that progress was slow due to the Commission's lack of power to 
agree restructuring figures and timetables proposed by the Polish side. 52 - 
By the next Association Council on 30 April 1997 the tone was more 
conciliatory, with the parties noting that "significant efforts had been made on 
both sides to resolve some outstanding and long-rutining trade difficulties". " 
They had also managed to improve cooperation and adopt "negotiated 
48 Financial Times, 17 July 1996. 
49 Reuter EC Report, 16 July 1996. 
50 Marek Tabor and Jan Borkowski, fns I and 28 above. 
51 Jan Willem Blankert, fii 6 above. 
52 Marek Tabor, fh I above. 
53 RAPID 13 May 1997. 
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1 54 solutions' . It was noted that exchanges of letters were being prepared with 
regard to the Polish oil sector. The Association Council also welcomed the 
liberalisation of oil prices in February 1997 ahead of the July timetable requested 
by the EU. " 
The General Affairs Council meeting in Brussels on 10 November 1997 formally 
approved Polish plans for the oil sector. The principal features of the agreement 
were: greater flexibility in the tariff system with a view to complete dismantling 
on I January 2001; a commitment on the Polish side, relating to privatisation 
programmes and modernisation of refineries, increasing emergency reserves, 
equal treatment by polish refineries for all purchasers and the lifting of all 
quantitative restrictions on the import of petroleum products; and the holding of 
regular meetings between the two parties to monitor implementation of the 
various measures. 56 
The Steel Dispute 
The restructuring of the Polish steel industry raises similar issues to oil industry 
restructuring. Internal, Commission analysis demonstrates the sensitivity of steel 
restructuring in Poland. " The steel industry represents 3.1% of total industrial 
employment with around 90,000 jobs. It is anticipated that the numbers employed 
in the steel industry will be reduced by around 50% to 45,000 by the year 2002. 
In Silesia, the steel sector represents 40% of industrial employment. Any job 
closures would clearly impact upon employment at both the national and regional 
level. 
54 Fn 53 above. 
55 Fn 33 above 
56 RAPID PRES/97/328 12 November 1997. 
57 European Report, no. 2294,25 February 1998. See also generally, L Alan Winters, 
"Liberalization of the European Steel Trade" in European Union Trade Ivith Eastern 
Europe, Riccardo Faini and Richard Portes (editors) (CEPR, 1994) at pp201 at see. 
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The Polish government wished to adopt a programme to restructure the steel 
industry. In 1995 customs duties on steel imports were set at 12%. The EU side 
considered this level to be protectionist. " In January 1996 Poland implemented 
a 20% reduction in these duties, bringing them down from 12-9%. 5' A further 
reduction to 6% was later instituted. " Duties should be reduced to zero in 1999.61 
Discussion surrounding the steel industry appeared, at least initially, to have taken 
place in a much less heated environment than oil restructuring talks. The Polish 
side developed close contact with the Con-u-nission and agreed to give the EU side 
information discussing progress each step of the way. 62 It is clear that the 
Commission was satisfied that Poland fully complied with the consultation 
requirements in this instance. 63 The pay off for the Polish side in working more 
closely with the Commission was the opportunity to impress upon the EU side 
both the cost of the restructuring process and the need for EU financial assistance: 
"Commissioner van den Broek now understands some issues and the Conunission 
can help Poland with different funds for restructuring". 6' Another Polish official 
considered that the Commission acknowledged that the restructuring programme 
was necessary and understood that the programme would cause significant social 
problemS. 61 
58 "Europe" No 6626 14 December 1995. 
59 Agence Europe, 18 January 1996. 
60 European Report, no. 2288,4 February 1998. 
61 Financial Times, 25 March 1998. 
62 Jan Borkowski, fiz 28 above 
63 Jan Willem Blanker-t, fii 6 above. 
64 Jan Borkowski, fii 28 above. 
65 Marek Tabor, fiz I above. 
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The Association Council meeting on 30 April 1997 noted an agreement in 
principle to a three year extension of the period in which Poland could grant state 
aids for restructuring purposes under the conditions mentioned in Article 8(4) of 
Protocol 2 Europe Agreement. " The Association Council also stated that it may, 
taking into account the economic situation in Poland and the in%plementation of 
the restructuring of the Polish steel sector between 1996 -1999, decide to further 
extend that period until 31 December 200 1. 
A cautionary note was expressed at the 1997 meeting. Whilst the EU was 
prepared to agree to an extension of the state aid regime under certain conditions 
it cited steel as an example of a sector which was still not becoming competitive 
fast enough. " This observation was restated in the Commission's Opinion on 
Poland's application for EU membership where it was noted that problems were 
"especially severe" in the steel industry. " The Commission also highlighted that 
the regional importance of the steel industry means that the process of 
restructuring "has painful consequences for those eastern and southern parts of 
Poland which depend on a few heavy induStries". 
66 RAPID 13 May 1997. Article 8(4) of Protocol 2 provides: 
The Parties recognise that during the first rive years after the entry into force of the 
Agreement and by derogation to paragraph I(iii), Poland may exceptionally as regards 
ECSC steel products, grant public aid for restructuring purposes provided that: 
the restructuring programme is linked to a global rationalisation and reduction of 
capacity in Poland, 
it leads to the viability of the benefiting firms under normal market conditions at 
the end of the restructuring period, and 
the amount and intensity of such aid are strictly limited to what is absolutely 
necessary in order to restore such viability and are progressively reduced. 
The Association Council shall, taking into account the economic situation of Poland, 
decide whether the period of five years could be extended. 
67 European Report, no 2230,30 April 1997. 
69 Commission Opinion on Poland's Application of Membership of the European Union, 
COM(97) 2002 final 15 July 1997 at p28. 
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Did closer cooperation over steel restructuring give the EU side access to 
information which then counted against Poland's application ? This is unlikely 
to be the case since the questionnaires issued to all applicants required very 
detailed information on economic restructuring. In any case, once all economic 
markers were cumulatively assessed the Commission considered that Poland, 
together with Hungary, came closest to satisfying the economic criteria for EU 
membership. " 
More recently it has emerged that it has proved to be more difficult to secure 
agreement on steel restructuring than had perhaps been hoped in the cautiously 
optimistic meetings of 1996 and 1997. Polish officials had stressed that the 
situation was an evolving one where the restructuring process would require 
constant refon-n . 
7' The Europe Agreement required Poland to cut import duties 
on steel to 3% at the start of 1998. It has retained duties at 6%. Crisis talks were 
held at the end of 1997. Poland left these talks with the impression that they could 
retain the 6% import duties pending the presentation of a restructuring plan for 
the steel industry. " This outlin. - agreement was reached in talks between Hans 
van den Broek and the Polish Foreign Affairs Minister Bronislaw Gennek. 
Subsequently, two Member States, Spain and Italy, refused to endorse the 
agreement. The Commission has been forced to seek a formal mandate from 
Member States in an attempt to reach a new agreement and has requested the 
Council to confer powers upon it to revisit the dispute on behalf of all 15 member 
States with clear instructions and powers. The EU side appears to have given an 
undertaking not to impose any retaliatory measures against Poland for the 
decision not to lower import duties. " 
69 Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union COM(97) 2000 final vol I p46. 
70 Jan Borkowski, fii 28 above. 
71 Fn 60 above. 
72 PAP News Wire 4 February 1998. 
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At tile Joint Parliamentary Committee meeting on 20-21 January 1998, Howard 
Pearce, a senior UK Foreign Office official, expressed concem over the "current 
disagreements over steel". 7' Richard Czaneeki, the Secretary of State responsible 
for Poland's Committee of European Integration, represented the Polish 
government at the same meeting. He adopted a tough stance saying that Poland's 
behaviour over steel was "an expression of our willingness to comply with the 
rules of the EU game". 7' He made a clear link with the dispute and Poland's 
desire that the Polish Accession Partnership agreement be adapted "in some 
element to make a better match with short-and medium- term aspects of our new 
national programme of preparations". 
European Commission experts carried out on-the-spot assessments in the first 
weeks of 1998 in order to determine capacity cuts of the new restructuring 
programme. The assessments will be based upon Polish definitions. The EU side 
expressed concern as to the accuracy of Polish projections in the past and is now 
insisting upon detailed market analysis and forecasts. " The Commission has 
offered a package of financial and other assistance to Poland in the form of 
funding studies into the restructuring plan, assistance for technical aspects of 
privatisation (such as environmental audits) and co-funding for social and 
regional conversion measures accompanying restructuring. More importantly, it 
urges the Council to formalise the agreement, reached in principle in 1997, to 
permit continued state aid for restructuring. 
Steel restructuring was discussed at the Association Committee meeting on 4 
March 1998. The tone of the meeting was reported to have been "cooperative", 
without major differences being aired. " Poland is scheduled to present its 
73 European Report, no 2285,24 January 1998. 
74 Fn 73 above. 
75 European Report, no 2294,25 February 1998 
76 European Report, no. 2297,25 March 1998. 
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midway plan for restructuring in April and a detailed plan by the end of June. It 
is at this point that the really difficult negotiations will take place. Already some 
commentators are suggesting that the steel industry has become a testing ground, 
both of Poland's ability to restructure the more difficult sectors of its economy 
and of its approach to EU membership. " N 
If the "carrot" approach outlined above does not result in agreement then the 
Commission has not ruled out the use of arbitration or retaliation measures under 
the European Agreement. " 
The Citrus Fruit Dispute 
The final dispute considered in this chapter relates to citrus fruit. At the beginning 
of the 1990s Poland set value-added tax rates (VAT) on imports of citrus fruit at 
22%. At this time such fruit was considered to be a luxury commodity. " In 1997 
two Member States, Spain and Portugal, argued that the rates were 
discriminatory. 
A new negotiating technique in Polish-EU relations was employed by the EU 
side. Spain argued that unless Poland reduced the rate it would refuse to endorse 
the common position at the Foreign Affairs Council on 29 April 1997. Without 
a common position the Association Council scheduled for 30 April could not 
adopt any binding decisions and the EU side threatened to downgrade the 
Association Council to an informal meeting. The timing of this Association 
Council was particularly significant because it would be the last meeting between 
the parties at this level before the Council would meet in December to decide 
upon which states would proceed to pre-accession negotiations. 
77 Stephan Wagstyl, "Heavy Metal Fights for Status Quo", Financial Times, 25 March 1998. 
78 Fn 75 above. 
79 Interview with Danuta Hubner, BBC Summary of World Broadcast I April 1997 
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The Polish Prime Minister, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, argued that reducing the 
VAT rate would cost Poland $65 million in lost revenues and resisted EU 
pressure until the eleventh hour. 'o On the afternoon of 29 April a senior Polish 
official confirmed that the Polish cabinet had agreed to reduce VAT to 7% from 
I January 1998, "even although we believe the EUs insistence il not justified". " 
The Polish side strongly disagreed with the EU's interpretation that its VAT rates 
were discriminatory and contended that the EU was making selective use of 
GATT rules and definitions. It is clear that the Polish side feel that they have 
made a concession to the EU from which they hope to profit in future 
negotiations. A senior official argued that "while we don't accept the argument, 
we are making a gesture and we expect some flexibility in return". " Jarslow 
Kalinowksi, a member of the Polish government, contested that the EU was 
overly protectionist on agriculture and that Poland should be offered increased 
access for Polish farm products in return for concessions on citrus fruits. " 
oven, iew 
The five disputes discussed above cover a range of issues. Some concern sectors 
of significant economic importance, such as the oil industry or car manufacturing. 
Others concern sectors of much less significance in terms of the European 
economy as a whole, such as tanneries or citrus fruit. Commission officials found 
that there was no real pattern to the conflicts. One expressed the desire for some 
sort of early warning system. but states that "it is not possible to see in advance 
which issues will become problems". " In the five disputes it is, however, possible 
to identify both common root causes and also common triggers which assisted in 
80 Reuters 25 April 1997 
81 European Report, fii 29 above. See also RAPID 13 May 1997. 
82 Fn 29 above. 
83 Fn 29 above. 
84 Jan Willem Blankert, fiz 6 above. 
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, I. 
propelling a minor disagreement into a major trade dispute. Four such categories 
may be identified: 
1. The impact of wider issues; 
2. Member State interest; 
3. Differences in interpretation; and 
4. Playing for long tenn rules or goals. 
Table thirteen summarises the impact of these common roots and common 
triggers upon the implementation process: 
Table Thirteen: Coinnion roots and cointrion triggcrs 
Dispute Member Difficulties in Dispute Wider Playing for 
States Interpreting part of Issues long-term 
Interest the E. A. E. A.? rules/gains 
Tanneries Italy Regional 
policy 
DaeNvoo Italy (but Article 27(2), Article Foreign Poland - need to 
also other "consultation" 7(2) EA direct encourage 
E. U. car relevant? investment foreign direct 
manu- investment. 
facturers) E. U. -need to 
protect 
domestic car 
industry. 
Oil UK and Article 28, Economic Favourable 
"three "consultation" restructuring interpretation of 
member and consultation and 
states" "restructuring" restructuring 
Steel Germany, Was action Economic Polish desire for 
Spain and justified under restructuring E. U. financial 
Italy Article 8(4), support 
Protocol 2 
Citrus Spain Selective Polish desire for 
use of pre-accession 
GATT? concessions 
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The Impact of Wider Issues 
The implementation of the Europe Agreement is taking place in parallel with 
economic restructuring in Poland. The process of restructuring is necessarily slow 
and requires know-how and financial support which may not always be available 
in sufficient quantities. Polish officials stress the links between the social costs 
of restructuring and the process of implementation " One stated that "the 
elections in 1993 [when a goverrunent comprised of former Communists was 
returned] gave a very clear signal about the nature and the pace of transition in 
Poland". " The Polish side has learned that the timetable and pace of restructuring 
is very sensitive and must be accepted by the Polish people. The oil and steel 
disputes, in particular, have taken place against the backdrop of restructuring and 
those disputes sharply reflect the need for Poland to balance the impact of its 
restructuring programmes upon the electorate against its desire fully to implement 
its obligations under the Europe Agreement. 
Member State Interest 
All external relation agreements reflect, to a greater or lesser extent, a tension 
between the interests of individual Member States and the wider EU interests. It 
is inevitable that within a mixed agreement, such as the Europe Agreement, "the 
Member States and the Community will only rarely have exactly the same 
interests and concerns". " The ECJ has stressed the duty of close cooperation 
between the Member States and the EU in the negotiation and implementation of 
mixed agreements. The duty follows from the "requirement of unity in the 
international representation of the Community". " It requires Member States and 
the institutions to inform each other of their position, to attempt to reach a 
common position on matters contained within the mixed agreement and to 
85 Interviews with Piotr Babinski and Jan Borkowski. 
86 Jan Borkowski, fii 28 above. 
87 1 Macleod, ID Hendry A. D. Stephen Hyett, The External Relations of the European 
Communities (Clarendon Press, 1996) at p148. 
88 Riding 1178 at paras 34-36. See also Opinion 2191 at para 36. 
n 
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proceed by common action within the framework of international bodies and 
conferences. 89 This is also discussed in chapter five. 
In each of the five disputes examined Member State interests have played a 
significant role either in prolonging the dispute or in magnifying the dispute. The 
tanneries and citrus disputes provide a classic illustration of the interests of one 
Member State, in protecting its domestic industry, overriding the wider 
Community interests in ensuring the harmonious development of relations with 
Poland in order to secure the longer term objective of European integration. In 
both disputes the overall economic impact was relatively small. 
Conflicts may also arise within a mixed agreement because the Commission 
negotiates on behalf of the EU side. Where the substance of the agreement relates 
to provisions which are clearly within the Member States' competence the 
Commission usually obtains a mandate from the Council. On some occasions the 
mandate may require that any agreement reached by the Commission is subject 
to approval of the final text by the Member States. 9' A similar split in competence 
has arisen in relation to implementation negotiations under the Europe 
Agreement. In both the steel and oil disputes the Commission negotiated on 
behalf of the EU side. The Commission had reached agreements in principle with 
Poland which they considered best protected the Community interest. The 
agreements were then taken back to the Member States. The Commission found 
that in relation to oil "three Member States" required a stricter deal. In relation to 
steel, Spain and Italy refused to endorse the Commission's agreement, forcing the 
Commission to seek a precise negotiating mandate from the EU. Such conflicts 
within the EU side cause confusion and frustration on the Polish side and 
undermine the duty of cooperation which should govern mixed agreements. 
Member States also have different interests which may be affected by Polish 
accession to the EU. The impact of these interests upon the implementation of the 
89 See generally I Macleod, ID Hendry, A. D. Stephen Hyett, fiz 87 at p148. 
90 See, for example, the agreement on the European Economic Area. 
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Europe Agreement is discussed in chapter eight which will also consider the 
limitations of the duty of close cooperation in external relations. 
Differences in Interpretation 
Differences in interpretation may arise in three ways. First, 'the parties may 
disagree as to the meaning of the words contained in the Agreement. In the 
Daewoo and oil disputes, disagreement arose as to the correct interpretation of 
"consultation". 9' Secondly, the parties may disagree as to the conclusion to be 
drawn when the Agreement is applied to a particular set of facts. In the steel and 
oil disputes the parties contested whether the economic circumstances in Poland 
justified the adoption of protectionist measures under the Europe Agreement. 92 
Thirdly, the parties may disagree as to whether the Agreement has any application 
to the issue at all. In both the Daewoo and citrus disputes Poland strongly 
contested that the dispute did not come within the framework of the Europe 
Agreement. One UK official admits thaI the UK often asks the Commission to 
raise issues not strictly contravening the Europe Agreement but which are more 
to do with the "spirit of the Agi,, ement". 9' Whilst the Member States mayjustify 
this on the basis that it will assist Poland in the accession process, it does not 
appear to be justified in terms of the Europe Agreement. 
These disputes demonstrate how implementation conflicts may ari§e where the 
wording of an external relations agreement is sufficiently vague to enable the 
parties to adopt conflicting positions in an attempt to protect their own interests. 
Playing for Long-term Rules or Goals 
The parties to the Polish Europe Agreement have all adopted negotiating 
positions during the implementation process in an attempt to secure their long 
91 Articles 27(2) and 28 Europe Agreement. 
92 Under Article 8(4), Protocol 2 and Article 28 Europe Agreement. 
93 Telephone interview with Stephen Rhodes, fn 27 above. 
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term interests. A number of different examples may be seen. During the oil 
dispute, one Polish official stated that he believed that the reason why the EU side 
had adopted a strong stance Nvas to "try to discourage the use of Article 28 in the 
future". " He estimated that around 15% of Polish exports could make use of 
Article 28 in the future. The EU could be seen to have two long-term objectives 
during the oil dispute negotiations. First, to adopt a strong position in order to 
demonstrate to Poland and the other associated states that they would treat 
protectionist measures under Article 28 very strictly. Secondly, to ensure that the 
EC laxv definition of "restructuring"was adopted despite the lack of reference to 
the acquis as an interpretational guide. 
Poland has also attempted to adopt negotiating positions with a view to securing 
long-term. advantages. In the steel dispute Poland hoped that closer cooperation 
with the EU side would result in improved financial support. In the citrus dispute, 
Poland anticipated that its "concession" would result in a more favourable pre- 
accession "package". Most importantly, in the Daewoo dispute Poland sought to 
defend its right to encourage foreign direct investment. 
On balance, in each of these five disputes at least, whilst it is interesting to note 
Poland's attempts to secure long-term gains, the EU side has been much more 
successful in protecting its long-tenn interests. The reasons for this are discussed 
in chapter eight. 
Dispute Resolution Strategies 
A variety of dispute resolution strategies were employed during the course of the 
five disputes. Some strategies followed were expressly provided within the 
Europe Agreement, for example, the arbitration procedure has been employed on 
just one occasion, during the tanneries dispute. It appears that merely initiating 
the procedure enabled the dispute to be resolved in a mutually acceptable way. 
Other strategies employed have no express mention within the Europe 
94 Krzysztof Treczynski, fn 2 above. 
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Agreement, for example, the reference to external standards such as the use of the 
WCO rules in the Daewoo dispute. Reference was also made to the GATT (now 
WTO) as an external factor. However, the interesting point to note is that 
although the Europe Agreement makes reference to the GATT /WTO standards 
there has been no attempt to invoke the WTO procedures inlorder to resolve 
disputes. Whereas the EU-side did threaten the use of the WCO dispute resolution 
procedures even although this was not expressly provided in the text. 
A summary of the main strategies employed is provided in table fourteen below. 
It is interesting to note that in each of the five disputes a range of strategies has 
been employed and that different combinations of strategies have been employed 
in different disputes. 
Table Fourteen: Dispute resolution strategies 
Dispute Instit- 
utional 
Meetings 
Visit by 
tile 
Comm- 
issioner 
Linked to 
Accession 
Arbit- 
ration 
Threat to 
downgrade 
Association 
Council 
Reference 
to 
External 
Standard 
Tannerie 
s 
Initiated 
Daewoo W. C. O. 
Oil 
Steel Not ruled 
ollt 
Citrus 
I 
v GATýj 
As a general starting point, it is apparent that many of the real implementation 
decisions take place at the level of the Association Committee, experts meetings 
or during exchanges between lower-ranking officials. " The Association Council 
95 Marek Tabor, fn I above. 
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meets just once a year. Meetings only last. for around one hour which provides 
little opportunity for discussion. 
The EU side has attempted to exert psychological pressure upon Poland during 
the disputes in a number of ways. Firstly, Commissioner Hans Win den Brock has 
adopted a very high profile in some of the Polish implementation disputes. He 
became personally identified with condemnation of Poland and deliberately made 
use of the press ensuring that the disputes would achieve maximum publicity. 
His outspoken and often stinging comments have often surprised Polish officials 
who feel he has focused upon a small number of disputes without really 
considering the bigger picture. He has not issued similar statements against the 
other associated states. Secondly, on a number of occasions the EU side has 
employed Poland's desire for accession to the EU in an attempt to secure a 
favourable resolution. Thirdly, as may be clearly seen in table four-teen, where the 
trade disputes related to sectors which were very important to the EU in overall 
economic terms (such as cars, steel and oil) the EU side employed a wide range 
of dispute resolution strategies. Finally, during the citrus dispute the EU side 
threatened to downgrade the Association Council to an informal meeting as a way 
of securing a tariff reduction. 
It is difficult to assess the impact of such techniques. The EU side employed a 
wide range of dispute resolution strategies. This ensured that pressure was exerted 
upon the Polish side from a number of different levels and that pressure was 
applied both consistently and over a long period. The EU side has not adopted a 
similar range and intensity of dispute resolution strategies with other associated 
states. This acknowledges that Poland is perceived to be the "difficult partner". " 
The EU side is keen to send a clear message to the other associated states that it 
will take a strong stance where implementation of the Europe Agreement is 
concerned. In addition, the EU side needs to ensure that Poland maintains 
progress towards economic restructuring. It is aware of the domestic social costs 
Jan Willem Blankert, fii 6 above. 
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which restructuring programmes bring and is using the carrot of membership to 
drive the programmes forwards. The Polish side acknowledged both its need for 
EU membership and the strength of the EU's bargaining positions, " the situation 
for the Commission is very nice, Poland must wait for a date before starting 
negotiations and they [the Commission] set the exams". " q 
The use of dispute resolution techniques must also be viewed within the context 
of EU membership. The implementation of the Europe Agreement is perceived 
by the EU side as a sort of training for membership. " On a number of occasions 
EU officials have commented that the Polish position adopted during a trade 
dispute was not the behaviour expected of an EU partner. In this way the EU side 
is sending a strong message to the Pole about the sort of cooperation required 
before and after accession to the EU. 
Conclusions 
This thesis contests that a tripartite framework based upon a modified Sabatier 
and Mazmanian framework, power imbalance and institutional considerations 
may be employed to analyse implementation. This chapter examines a number of 
disputes and difficulties which have arisen in the course of implementing the 
Polish Europe Agreement and considers both the roots causes for theses disputes 
and the factors which have played and important role in dispute resolution. 
The disputes in this chapter illustrate how difficulties in implementation may be 
fuelled both by the nature of the text of the Europe Agreement and the power 
imbalance between the Parties. This chapter demonstrates the implications of 
some of the themes outlined in chapters two and three, particularly in three ways. 
97 Krzysztof Treczynski, fn 2 above. 
98 "The Poles have to remember and have to be told in a consistent way that if you want to 
join you are expected to behave in a certain way", interview with Richard Jones. 
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First, table thirteen highlights how the power imbalance reflected in the text, 
which was demonstrated in chapter six, impacts upon the implementation 
process. It also demonstrates how both sides adopt negotiating strategies with the 
aim of playing for long-term rules or goals. The adoption and relative success of 
such strategies reflects the parties' relative positions on Galanter's Repeat-player 
One-shotter continuum. For example, the EU side wanted to ensure a narrow 
interpretation of "consultation and restructuring" to reduce the possibility of 
future disputes in this area. Poland hopes to accede to the EU, therefore it is not 
a classic one-shotter since Poland hopes to have an on-going relationship with the 
EU. This relationship and power imbalance is reflected in the disputes which 
have taken place. 
Secondly, table fourteen demonstrates another way in which the text structures 
the implementing process by providing for the adoption of arbitration through 
meetings between the institutions or meetings of the institutions, visits by the 
Commissioner and, as a last resort, initiating the arbitration process. The power 
imbalance between the Parties also colours the process of dispute resolution. For 
example, in the citrus dispute the EU side were able to exploit their superiot 
position by securing agreement from Poland after threatening to downgrade the 
Association Council meeting. 
Finally, the non-unitary nature of the EU which was discussed in chapter three is 
also relevant. The disputes examined in this chapter demonstrate how the sharing 
of competences in a mixed agreement may impact upon the implementation 
process. in all five disputes the domestic interests of the Member States played 
a significant factor in either the creation and or the duration of the dispute. The 
disputes also demonstrate the importance of institutions to the implementation 
process. The non-unitary nature of the EU side was identified in chapter two. 
This was most clearly seen during the steel dispute where the agreement which 
the Commission had brokered was subsequently overtumed by a number of 
Member States. During the disputes many levels of institutions were involved: 
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EU institutions such as the Commission; Polish institutions and institutions 
created by the Europe Agreement itself such as the Association Council. The 
disputes demonstrate how a complex array of institutions were involved in an 
attempt to secure implementation. 
q 
It would be disingenuous to suggest that the process of implementation of the 
Polish Europe Agreement has been characterised solely by disputes. The 
Commission's Agenda 2000 document provides an assessment of Poland's ability 
to join the EU. Chapter eight assesses the importance of the implementation 
disputes within the overall implementation process. It also evaluates the relevance 
of the disputes to an understanding of Sabatier and Mazmanian's implementation 
framework. 
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CHAPTEREIGHT 
Conclusions 
Introduction q 
This final chapter synthesises the work- of the earlier chapters. It begins with an 
evaluation of the available infýrmation on the overall progress made in the 
implementation of the Europe Agreement. It then evaluates Sabatier and 
Mazmanian's framework in relation to the analysis and evidence gathered in this 
thýsis. It stresses the need to take full account of the power imbalance between 
the parties when analysing implementation framework. It concludes by 
highlighting the issues which have played a crucial role in shaping the 
implementation of the Europe Agreement. 
Overall Evaluation of Implementation 
The Commission's Agenda 2000 documents provide the closest approximation 
to an overall assessment of Poland's progress on implementation of the Europe 
Agreement. ' An Opinion was prepared for each of the applicants, assessing their 
ability to join the EU by measuring their performance under each of the 
Copenhagen Council criteria outlined above in chapter four. The Opinions, based 
upon both factual evidence and predictions based on economic and political 
criteria, were all delivered at the same time because the Madrid Council liqd 
insisted that all the applicants were to be treated equally. None of the applicants 
was considered to satisfy all of the criteria. However, the Commission considered 
that Poland, Hungary, Estonia, the Czech republic and Slovenia could reach the 
necessary standard in "the medium term" (five years) provided "they maintain 
and strongly sustain their efforts of preparation". An analysis of the Polish 
opinion is carried out in table fifteen below. The analysis reveals thatwhilst 
Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union, COM(97) 2000 final, 15.07.1997. 
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progress in certain areas was praised it is clear that other areas, such as the 
restructuring of the agricultural sector and the enforcement of environmental 
legislation, would require long-ten-n solutions. 
11 Table Fifteen: Analvsis of the Polish OiAnion" 11 
Criteria for 
Membership 
Political criteria 
Economic 
criteria 
Intemal market 
Innovation 
Progress Made 
" Political institutions 
stable and functioning 
correctly 
" Legislative elections free 
and fair 
" Fundamental rights 
mostly in place 
Progress made towards a 
functioning market 
economy 
Economy stabilised 
Prices and trade largely 
liberalised 
Gro%vth and investment 
strona 
Foreign direct 
investment increasing 
" Substantial progress in 
harmonisation 
" On course to assume 
border controls 
" Good progress in 
implementing and 
enforcing anti-trust 
provisions 
" Education and training 
present no major 
problems 
" Research and technical 
development present no 
major problems 
" On course to comply 
with audio-visual 
standards 
Difficulties/Steps 
Required 
Need to continue to 
improve judicial system 
Need to grant wider press 
freedom 
" Reform of pensions and 
security systems 
" Further development of 
financial services 
" Further reform of Banking 
sector 
" Modernisation of 
agriculture 
" Competitiveness of state- 
owned industries 
" Around half of the acquis 
is still to be implemented 
" Improve administrative 
structure to enhance 
enforcement 
" Procyress on 
implementation and 
enforcement of state aid 
poor 
Greater progress required 
in advanced 
communications 
Lags behind other 
applicants in 
telecommunications 
infrastructure 
Predicted 
Target 
Time 
Medium 
term 
Medium 
term 
Medium 
temf 
Medium 
to long 0 
term 
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Table Fifteen: Analvsis of the Polish Opinion 
Criteria for 
Membership 
Economic and 
fiscal affairs 
Sectoral 
policies 
Economic and 
social 
cohesion 
Progress Made 
" Should be able to 
participate in the third 
stage of EMU (non -Euro 
participant) 
" On course Nvith direct 
taxation 
" On course with statistics 
requirements 
" Private sector on 
course 
" Significant progress in 
hannonising in 
agriculture 
" On course with energy 
legislation 
" On course in relation 
to EURATOM 
" On course with 
transport sector acquis 
" On course with Small 
and Medium 
Enterprise policy 
On course with social 
acquis 
On course with 
regional policy 
Difficulties/Steps 
Required 
Ability to participate in 
Euro is dependent upon 
the success of structural 
transformation 
Sustained effect required 
to comply with indirect 
taxation acquis 
" Certain sectors, 
particularly state- 
owned, require urgent 
restructuring 
" Coherent structural and 
rural development 
policy 
" Strengthen 
administrative 
structures 
" Implementation and 
enforcement of 
veterinary and 
phytosanitary 
requirements 
" Restructure agro-food. 
sector 
" Long ten-n solution for 
Polish agriculture 
" Further modernisation 
of fisheries 
" Energy industry needs 
to be closely monitored 
" Resources required for 
the foundations for 
Trans Europ6an 
Networks 
Greater progress in 
relation to health and 
safety at work 
Administrative and 
budgetary structures to 
be established 
Predicted 
Target 
Time 
Medium 
term 
Medium 
to long 
tenn 
Medium 
term 
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Table Fifteen: Analysis of the Polish Opinion 
Criteria f, r Progress Nlade Difficulties/Steps Predicted 
Membership Required Target 
Time 
Quality of life On course for full - Effective compliance Long 
and the implementation of requires increased term 
crivironment environmental acquis public and private 
sector investment 
- Consumer protection 
insufficient. Substantial 
effort required 
Justice and 0 On course to meet - Some problems with Medium 
home affairs standards drugs, border term 
management migration 
and transnational crime 
External - On course with trade and - Need to eliminate existing Medium 
policies international economic trade barriers in order to term 
relations align with the Cominunity 
- On course with trade regime 
development - Work required to align 
- On course with customs project management and 
administration computerisation 
- On course with Common 
Foreign and Security 
Policy 
Financial - Implementation of Implementation of Medium 
questions. Structural funds acquis financial control needs term 
provides basis for further significant effort 
developments 
- Penalising fraud 
comparable with 
Member States' systems 
Administrative - Some reform achieved Continued return of Medium 
capacity to administrative structures term 
apply to the 
acquis 
One of the criteria the Commission employed in its assessment was the 
candidate's capacity to assume the obligations of membership. This was 
evaluated according to a number of indicators: 
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- the obligations set out in the Europe Agreement, particularly those relating to 
right of establishment, national treatment, free circulation of goods, intellectual 
property and public procurement; 
- implementation of the measures set out in the White Paper' as essential for 
establishing the single market; and 
- progressive transposition of the other parts of the acquis. ' 
Agenda 2000 does not provide a breakdown on the implementation of the Europe 
Agreement. It does, however, contain a table illustrating progress in adopting 
White Paper measures. ' Since there is a fair degree of overlap between the 
provisions of the Europe Agreement and the White Paper this give some 
indication of the overall progress in the implementation of the Europe Agreement. 
The figures indicate that at the end of June 1997, Poland had made fairly good 
progress adopting 405 of the 899 directives and regulations contained in the 
White Paper. However, limited weight may be placed upon these figures. They 
are based solely upon information provided by the Polish authorities. The 
Commission has stressed that publishing the table does not indicate that it agrees 
with this analysis. Moreover, the figures indicate only adopted legislative 
measures. There is no indication as to how these measures are implemented and 
dionitored in order to ensure their effectiveness. 
The Commission found that Poland had implemented "significant elements" of 
the Europe Agreement provisions and for the most part this was carried out 
"according to the timetable for implementafion set out in it [the Europe 
Agreement]". It characterised activity under the Europe Agreement as "intense 
in all areas of cooperation due to the volume of trade flows and the increasing 
Commission's opinion on Poland's Application for Membership of the European Union 
COM(97) 2002 final at p 108. 
Annex 2 to the Polish opinion. This is contained in Annex I to this thesis. 
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familiarisation". However, it also stressed that progress made in transposing 
legislation still required to be supported by "concrete measures of 
implementation, as well as [the] establishment of an effective administrative 
underpinning implementation". It also considered that legislative adaptationwas 
proceeding slowly in the field of technical rules and standards. ' 
The Commission's overall assessment, as regards implementation of the Polish 
Europe Agreement, was positive. It considered that Poland should be in a position 
fully to participate in the single market in the medium term provided it 
"continued its efforts on transposition of the acquis and intensified work on its 
implementation". 
Although Polish and EU officials alike described past and future implementation 
disputes as "inevitable", such disputes have been a more pronounced feature of 
Polish-EU relations than EU relations with other CEES. One EU official 
commentated that the "view from Brussels colleagues is that Polish 
implementation is more difficult in the sense thac they are less likely to do as they 
are told. " This view is echoed in the Polish opinion where the Commission stated 
that "too many trade disputes have arisen". ' Whether such disputes have a long- 
term impact upon the process of implementation is open to question. Clearly, 
despite the disputes, the overall evaluation by the Commission was favourable. 
Applying the Modified Sabatier and Mazmanian Framework 
Chapter three examined Sabatier and Mazmanian's implementation framework 
which identifies variables which may affect the implementation process and 
examines the relative importance of these variables. The modified framework 
adopted the following variables as relevant to this study: 
Interview with Jan Willem Blankert 
5 Fn 2 above at p 108. 
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Table Six: Modified Sabatier and Mazmanian framework 
A. B. C. 
Tractability of the Coherency of the Variables Affecting 
Problems Structure of the Implementation which 
Implementation Process ire not Derived from 
the Agreement 
1. Difficulties in handling I. Precision and clear I. Variation over time in 
change ranking of the Europe social, economic and 
2. Diversity of proscribed Agreement's technological 
behaviour objectives conditions affecting 
3. Percentage of 2. Financial resources the attainability of the 
population within a available to the Agreement's 
political jurisdiction implementing objectives 
whose behaviour needs institutions 2. The amount and 
to be changed 3. The extent of continuity of media 
4. Extent of behaviour hierarchical integration attention to the 
required of target within and among problem addressed by 
groups implementing the Agreement 
institutions 3. Variations over time 
4. Extent to which andjurisdiction in 
decision-making rules public support for the 
of implementing Agreement's 
agencies are supportive objectives 
of the Agreement's 
objectives 
These variables- will now be applied in turn to the experience of the process of - 
implementation of the Polish Europe Agreement to date. 
A. Tractability of the Problems 
1. Difficulties in handling change 
The need for a causal link- between the implementation of the Agreement and the 
attainment of the Agreement's objectives. 
This is very difficult to assess within the instant context because of the wide 
range of objectives which may be ascribed to the Agreement. Chapter three 
stressed both the diversity of objectives which may be ascribed to the Agreement 
and that the perception of successful outcome will alter depending upon which 
party is making the assessment of success. Moreover, it is difficult to prove a 
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direct link between a successful outcome and the successful implementation of 
the Agreement since, as chapter four clearly demonstrated, a complex structure 
of legally binding and non-legally binding measures regulates behaviour between 
the parties. This is in addition to other independent variables which may impact 
upon the objective. 
For example, one of the Polish objectives identified in chapter three was to 
increase exports to the EU. To what extent has the implementation of the trade 
provisions of the Europe Agreement contributed to any changes in Polish external 
trade ? It is impossible to provide a definitive answer because it is impossible to 
6 
attribute any changes in trade patterns to a single root cause. Many other factors 
such as the performance of the Polish domestic economy and activities on the 
global market may impact upon trade performance. Analysis of trade 
performance is further frustrated by the lack of reliable statistical data. Tables 
sixteen and seventeen (below) provide a widely differing picture of trade between 
Poland and the EU over a four year period: ' 
Table Sixteen: Polish foreign trade with the EU according to GUS* 
1990 1991 1992 1993 
Exports 5026,2 ECUmn 6481,8 ECUmn 5876,8 ECUmn 7644,1 ECUmn 
Imports 3266.2 ECUmn 1 6044,0 ECUmn 6503,6 ECUmn 9210,0 ECUmn 
, 
Ll'rade Balance +1760, OECUmn 
1-+437,8ECUmn 
1 -626,8 
ECUmn 
, -1565,9 
ECUmn 
* GUS is the Polish Central Office of Statistics 
6 See Elizabieta Kawecka-NVyrzykowska, "Poland's Trade Relations with the European 
Community" (1993) Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 21 at pp2l-22. 
Tables from Elizabieta Kawecka-WYrzykowska, "Poland and the European Communities: 
Impact of the Europe Agreement on the Integration of Poland into the European 
Economy" Paper no. 63, Foreign Trade Research Institute, October 1994. 
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Table Seventeen: Polish foreign trade with the EU according to EUROSTAT 
--T 199-0 1991 1992 1993 
Exports 5156,4 ECUmn 6211,7 ECUmn 7078,5 ECUmn 7566,0 ECUmn 
mports 4393,3 ECUmn 7875,3 ECUmn 8153,3 ECUmn 9872,5 ECUmn 
Trade Balance , 
+763,1 ECUmn 1 -1663,6 ECUmn - 
1074,8 ECUmn -2306.5 ECUmn 
Analysis carried out in 1994 suggested that the implementation of the interim 
agreement had a disappointing impact upon Polish trade. Although the Agreement 
provides for asymmetry in favour of Poland, the trade balance figures 
demonstrated a growing trade deficit in favour of the EU. ' Commentators noted 
that other economic factors such as Polish GDP and inflation were equally 
important in contributing to the trade deficit. 
More recently, economic indicators for 1996 show that the EU is Poland's main 
trading partner, accounting for 66.5% of exports and 63.9% of impor-ts. These 
figures also indicate a trade balance slightly in favour of Poland. ' It is impossible 
directly to attribute this to the progress made in implementing the Europe 
Agreement trade provisions however. The growth in Polish GDP (from over 3% 
in 1993 to over 6% in 1997) steadily falling inflation (from 40% in 1993 to 15% 
in 1998) and falling unemployment figures (from a high of 17% in 1994 to a low 
of 11% in 1997) all impact upon Polish foreign trade. ", In these circumstances 
economists may at best hope to demonstrate the scale of influence exerted by the 
Agreement. 
8 Elizabieta Kaweeka-Wyrzykowska, fn 7 above at pp4l-42. 
Figures from Datastream/ICV: OECD; GUS, reported in the Financial Times, 25 March 
1998. 
10 Figures from Datastream/ICV, fn 9 above. 
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2. Diversity ofproscribed behaviour 
Analysis of the text of the Europe Agreement in chapter five demonstrated that 
it covered a wide diversity of proscribed behaviour. Sabatier and Mazmanian's 
framework would suggest that the scope of the Agreement would necessarily 
make implementation difficult. Chapter six demonstrated how the various 
implementation tasks have been divided up amongst the implementing 
institutions and how different implementation strategies have emerged. This has 
helped to mitigate the problems of the scope of the Agreement to an extent. 
However, two problems have been created by this division of labour. First, it 
creates the need for tight coordination between the various implementing 
institutions and this has not always been the case. Secondly, it creates the danger 
that certain aspects of the Agreement do not fall clearly within the competence 
of any implementing agencies and are not implemented. Both of these dangers are 
discussed in relation to section (B) below. 
3. Percentage of population ivithin a political jurisdiction lphose behaviour 
needs to be changed 
The analysis in chapter three indicates that very few constituents of Polish society 
will remain untouched by the Europe Agreement. However, a ranking of the 
Agreement objectives has emerged in three ways. First, the interim agreement 
focused upon the trade provisions of the Agreement. Secondly, as chapter five 
demonstrated, the Agreement's articles vary in precision and detail. This has 
meant that implementation has focused upon the more detailed provisions which 
provide targets and a timetable at the expense of provisions which merely provide 
for cooperation in the future. Finally, the use of autonomous legal instruments 
such as the White Paper and the pre-accession strategy have skewed 
implementation of the Europe Agreement. They have focused attention on the 
implementation of certain areas of the Agreement which support the pre- 
accession strategy and also encourage progress towards hannonisation with the 
acquis, by providing a detailed breakdown of Single Market legislation. This 
focus upon implementation of the trade provisions has limited the percentage of 
the population whose behaviour needs to change as a result of the Agreement. 
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What the research has shown is that where compliance with the trade provisions 
of the Europe Agreement has had a direct, adverse effect upon the Polish 
workforce then implementation becomes more difficult. This was seen in relation 
to the disputes with oil and steel restructuring discussed in chapter seven where 
the social costs of restructuring forced Poland to adopt "protectionist measures". 
This may indicate that as the percentage of the population affected by the 
Agreement increases ihen there is a corollary increase in difficulty in 
implementation. However, the crucial issue is not necessarily the percentage of 
the population affected but how they are affected. What are the social and 
economic consequences which arise from implementation of the Europe 
Agreement ? Experience has shown that where the population is affected in an 
adverse way then it is the degree of adversity which dictates the impact upon the 
implementation process; the more adverse the impact, the more likely that there 
is a slowing down in implementation. 
4. Ertent of behaviour required of target groups 
The analysis of the Commission's Opinion in Agenda 2000 carried out in table 
fifteen would tend to support Sabatier and Mazmanian's contention that the 
greater the amount of behavioural change required, the more problematic. the 
implementation. Agriculture, the environment and telecommunications were all 
identified as areas where implementation of the required standard is expected to 
take place in the long term (ten years) rather than the medium ten-n (five years). 
In each of these areas Poland faces severe difficulties due to the scale of the 
problems and the high cost of rectifying the, problems arising from the need for 
new technology for a long term solution. 
However, it should be noted that the process of implementation is not yet 
complete. It is obvious that the more straightforward aspects of the Agreement 
would be the first to be implemented. This does not necessarily mean that at the 
end of the ten year period there cannot be successful implementation of the 
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targets relating to the problem areas identified in Agenda 2000. What it does 
mean is that implementation will be more difficult to achieve in these areas. 
B. Coherency of the Structure of the Implementation Process 
L Precision and clear ranking of the Dirope Agreenteitt's objectives 
Chapter three indicated that the Agreement varied significantly in the extent of 
detail provided. The trade provisions, for example, are much more detailed than 
other provisions and this is supported by the analysis in chapter five. Taken 
together with the interim agreement this has helped to ensure that the trade 
provisions have been implemented ahead of other provisions. " 
The Commission's White Paper has identified and rectified the vagueness in 
certain parts of the Europe Agreement, principally Article 68 on the 
approximation of laws. The table contained in the Polish Opinion clearly 
demonstrates that Poland has made significant progress in implementing the 
White Paper. Table fifteen demonstrates that progress is less advanced where the 
measures to be adopted or the standards to be attained are less precise. This 
would support Sabatier and Mazmanion's contention that the greater the clarity 
of a provision, the smoother the implementation is likely to be. 
Some of the implementation disputes which were analysed in chapter seven arose 
in part due to disputes as to the interpretation of the Agreement. In the Daewoo, 
oil and citrus disputes the parties differed in their interpretation of Agreement 
articles. This prolonged the dispute and therefore acted as a break on the 
implementation process. So it may be clearly seen that where an Agreement 
contains terms which are either vague or undefined, such as "consultatiow' or 
"restructuring7, then this may hinder the implementation process by causing 
disagreement between the parties. 
"People do not really talk about the Europe Agreements any more. fliey have been taken 
over by events such as the work on harmonisation of laws and application for 
membership. What is important are the trade provisions because they provide concrete 
goals and obligations with a timetable. " Interview with Jorgen Mordenstein. . 
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Disputes which arise due to conflict over the meaning of the Agreement's 
provisions show that the process of interpretation is not linear. This necessarily 
prolongs the implementation process in the way demonstrated in diagram three: 
Diagram Three: Non-linear implementation 
Stage One 
Parties conclude an 
agreement/ 
agreement provision 
Stage Two 
Implementation tasks 
divided between 
the institutions 
Stage Four 
Disagreement 
between parties over 
implementation 
Stage Three 
Institutions start 
to implement 
the agreement 
Stage Five 
Consultation/ 
Discussion/ 
Arbitration/ 
Stalemate 
Diagram three illustrates the policy cycle which may take place during 
implementation. Where implementation is linear then the implementation process 
will follow stages one to three. However, the need to define or redefine the 
meaning of certain provisions may emerge during the implementation process. 
This will require that some or all of the implementation stages, outlined in 
diagram three, are revisited. Examples may be seen in the steel and oil disputes 
where the parties disagreed about the meaning of certain Articles in the Europe 
Agreement (stage four). This meant that the restructuring programme required to 
implement the Agreement (stage two) could not be devised and implemented 
(stage three) until the parties reached an agreement on the interpretation of the 
relevant provisions (stages five and one). 
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This picture of implementation is further complicated by the fact that stage two 
in the implementation process may also not be linear. This is discussed in more 
detail in relation to category (B) (4) below. 
2. Financial resources available to the implementing institutions 
The Europe Agreement is implemented using finance from a variety of sources: 
the Polish government, PHARE, ElB loans, EBRD loans and so on. These are 
discussed in more detail in chapter three. The health of the Polish economy is 
central in deten-nining the level of finance which the Polish government may 
make available for implementation and the impact of economic restructuring 
upon implementation is discussed in relation to category (C) below. 
3. The evient of hierarchical integration ivithin and aniong implementing 
institutions 
The Europe Agreement itself provides only for a limited institutional framework 
designed to oversee implementation: the Association Council; the Association 
Committee; and the Joint Parliamentary Committee (jpC). 12 Chapter six 
demonstrated that although the text of the Agreement indicates that the bulk of 
the decision-making power rests with the Association Council, in reality the vast 
majority of the detailed and day-to-day decisions are in fact taken by the 
Association Committee. 
Chapter six also explained that four levels of implementing institutions exist to 
carry out implementation: 
I. Polish structures; 
2. Joint Polish/EU structures; 
12 The main functions and powers of these committees are discussed in chapters five and six. 
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3. EU structures; and 
Member State structures. 
These structures, with the exception of the dedicated instiattions mentioned 
above, are not specifically identified with the text of the Agreement so it is 
important in this implementation study to look beyond the limits of Sabatier and 
Mazmanian's framework and consider all implementing institutions. 
The implementation structures which have evolved present a complex and 
dynamic picture. Sabatier and Mazmanian. stress the importance of hierarchical 
integration within and among implementing institutions. Chapters six and seven 
provide examples where integration has broken down, both within and among 
implementing institutions. 
Chapter six demonstrated the different levels of implementing structures which 
have evolved within Poland. On two occasions the complexity of the structures 
has given rise to criticism of lack of coordination within the Polish structures. 
First, in August 1994, Poland's Supreme Chamber of Control presented a paper 
to the Sejm Europe Agreement Committee which stated that the Department of 
European Integration had "neither power nor means to coordinate, control and 
monitor the activities of the various institutions which should serve the purpose. 
of European integratioW. " Secondly, following the citrus dispute in 1997, the 
Polish Prime Minster publicly chastised his Ministers for failing to respect the 
coordinating role of the European Integration Committee. 
Such slips in coordination within the Polish structure are inevitable. The creation 
of a democratic process of government within Poland is evolving at the same time 
as the implementation of the Europe Agreement is taking place. Indeed the Polish 
13 Polish Press on the Relaflons Between the EU and Poland, August 1994, EU Delegation 
to Poland. 
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Constitution was only adopted in 1997. Moreover, the complexity of the Europe 
Agreement requires a complex system for implementation. The Polish side have 
worked hard to correct short comings in their implementation structures and 
acknowledge that the process is an evolving one. " With time a more streamlined 
system for implementation will inevitably be in place. q 
Chapter seven demonstrated a lack of coordination between implementing 
institutions, principally between the EU and Member State structures. The basic 
problem in a number of disputes was the conflicting objectives of the parties. In 
the tanneries dispute, for example, Italy was keen to protect the interests of its 
domestic industry while the Commission was more inclined to consider whatwas 
in the best long-tenn interests for the EU as a whole. In the oil and steel disputes 
the Commission reached agreement with the Polish side only to have it 
overturned by Member States. This is discussed in more detail in relation to 
category (13)(4) below. 
All of the implementation disputes discussed in chapter seven demonstrate a lack 
of integration between the implementing institutions. This may be explained by 
reference to the competing objectives of the parties to the Agreement identified 
in chapter three. 
4. E-Went to n1hich decision-making rules of hnplementing agencies are 
supportive of the Agreement's objectives 
Chapter six demonstrated that in addition to a complex system of implementing 
structures, a complex system of decision-making rules exists. Within the Polish 
structures a system for checking the compatibility of existing legislation and 
legislative proposals with the acquis has evolved. This should mitigate against the 
existence or the adoption of legislation which conflicts with the Europe 
Agreement provisions. Responsibility for the implementation of the Agreement 
has been divided up amongst the government departments so that those officials 
14 Interview with Jan Borkowski. 
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with relevant expertise may oversee implementation of the appropriate 
provisions. This system of division has not been without problems though. The 
Polish governmental structure does not exactly mirror the allocation of DGs 
within the Commission. This has meant that on some occasions more than one 
Polish ministry has had responsibility for the implementation bf a directive or, 
alternatively, there is no ministry dealing with a particular directive. This problem 
arose in relation to the directive on the recognition of professional qualifications. 
There had been a suggestion that the Ministry of Education should deal with the 
implementation of the directive but it refused, saying that they lacked the 
competence to deal with the task. " 
This shows that within the implementation process outlined in category (13)(2) 
above, stage two of the process may not always be linear. So that the allocation 
of implementation tasks may result in overlapping responsibilities or in the failure 
to allocate responsibilities. In both cases this would require stage two to be 
revisited. 
The lack of coordination between the Member States and the EU structures shows 
the limitations of one of the decision-making rules which should ensure smooth 
implementation: the duty of close cooperation, that is the "requirement of unity 
in the international representation of the Community". 16 Whiist the ECJ may 
consider this duty to be one of the fundamental principles of exterpal relations it 
is apparent that the Member States do not accord it the same respect. In both the 
oil and steel disputes the Commission had negotiated a compromise deal with 
Poland which certain Member States later refused to endorse. This highlights two 
problems for the EU side in mixed agreements. First, the difficulties which arise 
15 Interview with Macieji Gorka. 
16 . Ruling 1178 (Re Draft Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials) 
[1978] ECR 215 at para 35. This was discussed in chapters two and six. 
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where the Commission is given a limited or unclear mandate. Secondly, the 
conflict between the interests of Member States and the interests of the wider EU 
which have already been discussed at length in this thesis. 
These conflicts reinforce the non-unitary nature of the EU dis6ussed in chapter 
two. The Europe Agreement is a mixed agreement since it includes areas for 
which the EU has legislative competence, areas for which the Member States 
have legislative competence and areas where the legislative competence is shared 
between the EU and its Member States. Chapters two, six and seven examined the 
implications of the mixed agreement for the process of implementation. Table 
five demonstrated how the various Parties to the Europe Agreement may have a 
variety of implementing objectives. It further demonstrated that whilst it is 
possible for these objectives to overlap, there exists wide scope for conflict where 
different Parties pursue competing objectives during implementation. With the 
Polish Europe Agreement the division of competence between the EU and its 
Member States (ie within the EU side) was sometimes unclear to the Polish 
negotiators. For example, in the steel dispute the Polish negotiators assumed that 
the agreement which they had reached with the Commission represented a final 
deal assuming that the Commission proposals represented the agreed view of all 
institutions within the EU side. They did not anticipate a review of that agreement 
by the Member States nor that the Member States could block acceptance of the 
deal brokered by the Commission. 
Moreover, table eleven demonstrates how the conclusion of a mixed agreement 
generates a very complex institutional structure to oversee that agreement with 
various institutions representing the interests of the Parties' to the agreement and 
the many layers of governance which make up each of the Parties. For example, 
the EU is comprised of a number of institutions each of which have played a role 
in the negotiation and conclusion of the Europe Agreement. 
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Although this thesis classified the EU and its institutions as one side the trade 
disputes in chapter seven demonstrate very clearly the competing interests which 
exist between EU institutions and both problems identified here have common 
roots in that they arise in part because of a limited EU foreign policy. " 
q 
The first problem identified above could be overcome by the Commission 
requesting a detailed mandate from the Council before embarking upon 
negotiations with third parties. However, not only would this be a very time- 
consuming process it may not be popular with the Commission since it may be 
perceived as undermining its authority to represent the EU side in mixed 
agreements. Another alternative would be for the EU side to grant the 
Commission a more open-ended negotiating mandate which would include an 
undertaking on the part of the Member States to endorse any Agreement reached 
by the Commission within the terms of th at mandate. This would provide the 
Commission with greater flexibility in negotiations and could be granted more 
quickly since the level of detail would be limited. Whether the Member States 
would agree to this type of mandate would doubtless be dependent upon the 
sensitivity of the sector concerned. At the very least the implementation disputes 
examined in chapter seven highlight the need for. greater use to be made of 
coordination meetings between the Member States and the Commission to limit 
the impact of diverging objectives. 
Variables Affecting Implementation which are not Derived from the 
Agreement 
1. Variation over litne in social, econondc and technological conditions 
affecting the attainability of the Agreenzent's objectives 
It is apparent that changes in socio-cconomic conditions in particular have played 
an important role in the implementation of the Europe Agreement. The oil and 
steel disputes reflect the Polish government's concerns about the pace of 
17 See for example, Christopher Hill "The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing 
Europe's International Role" (1993) 31 Journal of Common Market Studies 305. 
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implementation and the impact which the required restructuring programmes are 
having upon the Polish people. This is discussed in more detail in relation to 
category (C)(3) below. 
EU membership has been a constant objective for Poland. This"has helped drive 
the implementation process forward since the progress in implementation is one 
of the factors relevant to the determination of membership. Chapter seven 
demonstrated the willingness of the EU side to link progress in implementation 
to the success of Poland's EU membership application in the Daewoo, oil, steel 
and citrus disputes. For the EU side implementation has taken place during a time 
of changing conditions. The focus within the EU has been firmly upon the 
progress towards the third and final stage of Economic and Monetary Union. 
Member States have been required to adopted stringent fiscal policies in order to 
comply with the convergence criteria stipulated in the EC treaty. The security 
threat from the CEES appears less immediate to the existing Member States; 
systems of democratic government are now in place in the CEES and Russia is 
an economically weakened state. Both of these factors may have reduced the 
urgency to extend EU members' aip to Poland. In addition, now that the financial 
costs of enlargement have been made explicit in Agenda 2000 many Member 
States, particularly those which may lose funding as a result of the CAP and 
structural funds reforms, may begin to see Poland as a threat to their position 
within the EU. It will be interesting to monitor the effects of these changes on 
implementation as the pre-accession phase advances. 
Z The Amount and Continuity ofMedia attention to the problem addressed by 
the Agreement 
The Commission has used the media extensively during implementation to raise 
the p rofile of Polish implementation disputes. This enabled the Commission to 
demonstrate that it would not tolerate deviation from the implementation process 
by Poland. In addition, by making an example of Poland in. this way, the 
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Commission was sending a clear signal to the other associated states, 
discouraging them from straying from the implementation process. 
3. Variations over thne andjurisdiction in public supportfor the Agreement Is 
objectives q 
The 1993 Polish legislative elections returned a government drawn from the post- 
Communist parties. This sent a very clear message to Polish politicians about 
popular disquiet at the impact of economic reforrns and they are now highly 
sensitised to the need to balance restructuring and the social costs of the process. 18 
The impact of this balancing process upon the implementation of the Europe 
Agreement was clearly seen in the oil and steel disputes where Poland has 
attempted to slow down the pace of implementation in order to lessen the social 
costs of restructuring. 
Additions to Sabatier and Mazmanian's Framework 
The textual analysis carried out in chapter six illustrated three ways in which the 
text of the Agreement could influence the implementation process: 
1. By including provisions which permit the parties to adopt protectionist ! 
measures; 
2. By including provisions which permit consultation to take place on issues 
beyond the scope of the Agreement; and 
3. By including provisions which are based upon standards contained in the 
EC treaty. 
The provisions outlined above may affect the implementation process in different 
ways. Provisions in categories (1) and (2) provide the possibility for conflict to 
take place between the parties. In both the oil and steel disputes Poland choose 
is Jan Borkowski, fii 14 above. 
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to adopt protectionist measures. Poland chose to deviate from the agreed customs 
duties on oil, justifying its action under Article 28 Europe Agreement which 
permits the parties to adopt "appropriate measures" to protect sectors undergoing 
restructuring. In relation to steel Poland wished to extend the period in which it 
could grant state aids for restructuring, asserting that this was justified under 
Article 8(4) of Protocol 2 Europe Agreement. In both disputes the parties 
disagreed as to whether the adoption of protectionist measures was justified, 
protracting the dispute and slowing down the implementation process. 
Table nine in chapter six provides a summary of provisions which permit 
consultation to take place on issues beyond the scope of the Europe Agreement. 
This may create tension between the parties to the Agreement in two ways. First, 
one of the parties may not wish for consultation to take place. Secondly, if 
consultation does take place and the issue is not directly covered in the 
Agreement then the Agreement cannot provide a solution to the issue. In both the 
Daewoo and citrus disputes the Polish side strongly contested that the issues 
raised did not fall directly within the framework of the Europe Agreement and at 
best infringed the "spirit of the Agreement". In the Daewoo dispute the parties 
used an external standard, reference to the WCO rules, to reach an agreement 
after a very protracted dispute. The use of an external standard supports the 
contention that a solution to the dispute was not available within the framework 
of the Agreement and so any implementation analysis must take account of the 
impact of the international economic environment. 
One of the most important aspects of the implementation analysis is the extent to 
which the implementation of the Agreement achieves its objectives. Chapter three 
delineated the various objectives which may be ascribed to the Agreement by 
each of the parties to the Agreement. It was noted that whilst these ob ectives may j 
coincide, it was equally true that the parties had competing objectives. Chapter 
two employed Galanter's framework to demonstrate the asymmetry in bargaining 
power between the parties to the Europe Agreement. The analysis characterises 
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the EU side as the repeat player, placing it in a stronger negotiating position than 
Poland. Table ten in chapter six graphically illustrates how the EU side was in a 
position to use its stronger position to ensure that the Agreement contained 
provisions which skewed implementation in its favour. The table provides 
seventeen examples of provisions which are based upon standhrds contained in 
the EC treaty. This helps to attain the EU side's objectives since it enables trade 
with Poland to take place on EU terms and conditions, terms and conditions with 
which EU companies are already familiar . In general terms it ensures the 
adoption of EC legislative models and promotes wider EU interests such as 
foreign policy or environmental goals. 
The power imbalance in implementation has been ftirther reinforced in favour of 
the EU side by the proliferation of autonomous legal measures. PHARE, 
structured dialogue, the Commission's White Paper, TAIEX, Agenda 2000 and 
the various summit declarations have all been adopted or modified by the EU side 
during the course of the implementation of the Europe Agreement. Poland was 
not a party to these measures and played no real role in shaping their content. 
Nonetheless the pre-eminence which the Polish side attachos to the 
implementation of the White Paper and the various pre-accession strategies is 
self-evident in the Agenda 2000 document. 
Galanter's framework helps explain Nvhy implementation disputes covered in 
chapter seven have arisen. It also helps to explain why the parties adopted the 
positions they did during the course of those disputes. Table four, illustrating the 
model of the 'ideal type' repeat player and one-shotter, is reproduced below. 
Table Four: Model of the 'ideal typcl repeat player and one-shotter 
Repeat Player One-Shotter 
Anticipates repeated litigation Claim large (relative to size) 
Low stake in case outcome Cost large relative to outcome 
Resources to pursue long-term goals Limited resources 
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The EU side may be characterised as the repeat player in the implementation 
disputes because it had superior resources to Poland, had relatively lower 
financial stakes in the outcome of the individual disputes and is involved in on- 
going implementation not merely with Poland but also with theother associated 
CEES. Two of Galanter's variables in particular support the idea the EU side has 
the advantages of the repeat player in any implementation dispute and therefore 
adopts negotiating positions to protect its status as the more dominant side. The 
first of these, category (4), provides that: 
"Repeat players must establish and maintain credibility as a combatant. His 
interest is in his 'bargaining reputation' which serves as a resource to establish 
ccommitment' to his bargaining positions. " 
In the tanneries dispute the Polish side expressed some surprise that a dispute 
concerning a relatively small economic problem should be the one which was 
referred to arbitration. Galanter's framework explains the symbolic importance 
of the trade disputes to the EU side. By adopting an aggressive negotiating stance, 
the EU side was sending a clear signal not only to Poland, but also to the other 
associated CEES that it would not tolerate deviation in the implementation of the 
Europe Agreement. The tough stance in the Daewoo and citrus disputes in 
particular may also be interpreted as an attempt by the Commission to reassure 
Member States that it could be trusted to protect their domestic interests whilst 
at the same time developing relations with the CEES. 
The second important variable, category (7), provides that repeat players may 
play for rules in the litigation itself. Table thirteen in chapter seven highlights the 
ways in which the parties played for long-tenn rules or gains during the disputes. 
This may have been a relevant factor in the oil dispute where the Polish side 
believed that the EU were keen to ensure that a very restrictive interpretation of 
"restructuring" was adopted in order to discourage Poland and the other CEES 
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deviating from the terms of the Agreement by adopting protectionist measures 
under Article 28. 
Galanter's framework explains why the Polish side has often adopted a 
contentious position during the implementation of the Europe Atreement. Whilst 
the EU side is clearly stronger, Poland is not the ideal type one-shotter 
characterised in the table above. This is because Poland is tied to the EU at least 
for a ten year period under the Europe Agreement and is convinced that its long 
terrns goals are best served by becoming a member of the EU. Poland is therefore 
attempting to create its own bargaining reputation as described by Galanter. In 
addition, Poland has also attempted to use the implementation disputes to play for 
long-term rules or gains. In the steel dispute Poland hoped that working more 
cooperatively with the EU would ensure greater financial support for its 
restructuring programme. In the Daewoo dispute Poland sought to protect existing 
and future foreign direct investment. Finally, in the citrus dispute Poland hoped 
that conceding to EU demands would secure favourable pre-accession terms. 
The power imbalance in favour of Poland helps to explain why, despite Polish 
attempts to adopt strong negotiating positions and despite the often superior 
strength of Polish legal arguments, disputes have been resolved on terms which 
are on the whole more favourable to the EU side than the Polish side. It is for this 
reason that the issue of relative power should be central to any implementation 
analysis dealing with external relations agreements. 
Consideration should also be given to the role of the institutions in the policy- 
making process and in implementing the Agreement in the following ways: 
I. The interplay between the institutions in a complex environment; 
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2. The overlap between the institutions involved in policy making and 
implementation (for example the overlap between the functions and 
powers of the Commission and the Member States in a mixed agreement); 
The non-linear nature of implementation as clemonserated in diagram 
three; and 
4. The way in which the text itself requires interplay between policy and 
implementation (for example, the role of the Association Council in 
interpreting the terms of the Agreement) 
The factors outlined above support Sabatier and Mazmanian's contention that not 
only is policy implementation not linear but also that the institutions which are 
charged with tile task of implementation must be supportive of the a reement's 9 
objectives if the implementation is to be successftil. This thesis demonstrates that 
in certain circumstances such support is lacking and this leads to implementation 
difficulties. 
The above analysis supports the incorporation of additions to the modified 
Sabatier and Mazmanian framework. It is submitted that these additional 
variables wo uld be equally relevant to implementation studies concerning other 
mixed agreements. " The additional variables are represented in table eighteen: 
19 The additions to the modified framework are in italics. 
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Table Eighteen: The modified and expanded in on framework 
A. B. C. D. 
Tractability of Me 
FCoherenrcyof 
the Variables Affecting Power Imbalance 
tu c( 
emen 
Problems Structure of the Implementation between the Parties 
Implementation which are not to the Agreement 
Process Derived from the 
Agreement 
I. Difficulties in 
handling change 
2. Diversity of 
proscribed 
behaviour 
3. Percentage of 
population within 
a political 
jurisdiction 
whose behaviour 
needs to be 
changed 
4. Extent of 
behaviour 
required of target 
groups 
I. Precision and clear 
ranking of the 
Europe 
Agreement's 
objectives 
2. Financial resources 
available to the 
implementing 
institutions 
. 3. The extent of hierarchical 
integration within 
and among 
implementing 
institutions 
4. Extent to which 
decision-making, 
rules of 
implementing 
agencies are 
supportive of the 
Agreement's 
objectives, 
particularly the 
extent to Which the 
duty of close 
cooperation 
mitigates the effects 
of the non-unitary 
nature ofthe EU- 
side. 
5. Extent to which the 
Agreement includes 
provisions which 
permit the parties 
to adopt 
protectionist 
measures 
6. Extent to which the 
Agreement includes 
provisions which 
perinit consultation 
to take place on 
issues beyond the 
scope ofthe 
1. Variation over 
time in social, 
economic 
(inchiding the 
international 
ecollonlic 
environment) and 
technological 
conditions 
affecting the 
attainability of the 
Agreement's 
objectives 
2. The amount and 
continuity of 
media attention to 
the problem 
addressed by the 
Agreement 
3. Variations over 
time and 
jurisdiction in 
public support for 
the Agreement's 
objectives 
Extent to which 
theAgreement 
contains 
provisions which 
favour the 
objectives of one 
party over those 
of another 
F-went to which 
the dominance of 
one party is 
reinforced by 
externalfactors 
such as the 
adoption of 
autonomous 
legal measures 
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Conclusions 
The implementation analysis in this thesis provides an indication of the progress 
made in the implementation of the Polish Europe Agreement in the four years 
following its entry into force. During this period many changes have taken places 
in Polish-EU relations. Poland formally applied for EU membership in April 
1994. The Commission adopted the White Paper on the Single Market in May 
1995 and the Agenda 2000 document on enlargement of the EU in July 1997. The 
Luxembourg European Council approved the Agenda 2000 proposals and pre- 
accession talks with Poland began fon-nally on 30 March 1998. As this thesis has 
demonstrated, these developments have played a significant role in shaping the 
pace and nature of the process of implementation of the Polish Europe 
Agreement. 
The modified and expanded framework which has evolved from the analysis in 
this thesis indicates a number of variables which have impinged upon the 
implementation of the Europe Agreement. These variables may be divided into 
four broad categories: 
I. The tractability of the problems; 
2. The coherency of the structure of the implpmentation process; 
3. Non-agreernent variables; and 
4. The power imbalance between the parties to the Agreement. I 
This thesis has demonstrated that a tripartite framework based upon a modified 
Sabatier and Mazmanian framework, power imbalance and institutional 
considerations helps to explain why progress in the implementation of the 
Agreement has proceeded more quickly in some areas than in others. It assists in 
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an understanding of why implementation disputes arise. It also provides an 
explanation as to why particular dispute resolution strategies are adopted by the 
parties during implementation disputes. 
The analysis in this thesi. s has demonstrated the need for future implementation 
studies of mixed agreements to take account of the framework variables 
highlighted in table eighteen. In addition, future research should take particular 
account of the following features which have become apparent during the course 
of this analysis: 
I. Studies must take account of all implementing agencies and not merely 
those identified in the Agreement between the parties; 
2. The implementation process may not be linear; 
The duty of close cooperation is limited; 
4. The context within which implementation takes places is constantly 
evolving; 
5. Implementation structures may be necessarily complex and may evolve; 
6. The impression of whether the -Agreement has been successfully 
implemented will vary depending upon which party carries out the 
assessment; 
7. Further studies are required to consider the impact of any implemented 
measures in order to attain a true picture of the effectiveness of the 
Agreement. 
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The Polish Europe Agreement still has six years to run. Thus far implementation 
has progressed despite the difficulties indicated by the analysis in this thesis and 
the sometimes acrimonious disputes which have taken place. The implementation 
process to date has contributed a great deal to our understanding of Polish-EU 
relations in particular and to our understanding of the implementation of mixed 
agreements in general. 
It is just possible that the implementation process reflects the vitality of relations 
between the parties. Poland is a newly independent state and is very sensitive to 
any attempts to dictate or control policy. At the same time, Poland is becoming 
increasingly aware of the trend towards globalization and the concomitant need 
for compromise which this entails. It is this shifting balance between the need to 
be strong, or the friend of a strong person, which is given expression in the 
implementation of the Polish Europe Agreement. 
For Poland the ultimate measure of the success of the implementation process 
will be whether they become members of the EU. Only at that point may it truly 
reflect upon its implementation strategy and determine whether its approach was 
effective. 
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Anne-, One: Single Market - White Np er Mcasures 
White Paper Chapters Directives Regulations Total 
Stage Stage 
I 
Stage Stage 
1 11/111 1 111111 1 
1. Free movement of Capital Poland 3 1 0 0 4 
Number 3 1 0% 0 4 
2. FM and safety of industrial products Poland 27 77 3 0 107 
Number 56 104 4 1 165 
3. Competition Poland 2 0 1 0 3 
Number 3 0 1 0 4 
4. Social policy and action Poland 7 11 0 0 18 
Number 12 15 0 2 29 
5. Agriculture Poland 75 30 25 0 130 
Number 93 46 62 2 203 
6. Transport Poland 18 7 6 2 33 
Number 19 15 8 13 55 
7. Audiovisual Poland 1 0 0 0 1 
Number 1 0 0 0 1 
8. Environment Poland 9 2 4 0 15 
Number 31 7 7 0 45 
9. Telecommunications Poland 7 2 0 0 9 
Number 9 7 0 0 16 
10. Direct taxation Poland 2 1 0 0 3 
Number 2 2 0 0 4 
11. Free movement of goods Poland .0 0 0 0 
0 
Number 0 0 0 0 0 
12. Public procurement Poland 5 1 0 0 6 
Number 5 1 0 0 6 
13. Financial services Poland 10 7 0 0 17 
Number 13 8 0 0 21 
W. Protection of personal data Poland 0 0 0 0 0 
Number 0 2 0 0 2 
15. Company law Poland 2 3 0 0 5 
Number 2 3 0 1 6 
16. Accountancy Poland 3 2 0 0 5 
Number 3 2 0 0 5 
17. Civil law Poland 0 1 0 0 1 
Number I 1 0 0 2 
18. Mutual recognition of prof. qua]. Poland 0 6 0 0 6 
Number 2 16 0 0 11 
19. Intellectual property Poland 5 3 0 0 8 
I 
Number 5 3 0 3 11 
I 
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Annex One: Sing le Market - White Pap er Measures 
White Paper Chapters Directives Regulations Total 
Stage Stage Stage Stage 
1 11/111 1 iffill 
20. Energy Poland 7 0 0 0 7 
Number 10 2 3 0 15 
2 1. Customs law Poland 0 0 13 0 13 
Number 
.2 
1 14 184 201 
22. Indirect taxation Poland 9 0 0 0 9 
Numb,,. r 15 54 0 6 75 
23. Consumer protection Poland 5 0 0 0 5 
Number 8 3 0 0 
TOTAL Poland 197 154 52 2 
Number 295 293 99 212 
Number means the number of White Paper measures to be adopted. 
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